Court File No.

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF PAYLESS SHOESOURCE CANADA INC. AND PAYLESS SHOESOURCE CANADA GP INC.

(the "**Applicants**")

BOOK OF AUTHORITIES
(CCAA Initial Application)

February 19, 2019

CASSELS BROCK & BLACKWELL LLP
2100 Scotia Plaza
40 King Street West
Toronto, ON M5H 3C2

Ryan Jacobs
Tel: 416.860.6465
Fax: 416.640.3189
rjacobs@casselsbrock.com

Jane Dietrich
Tel: 416.860.5223
Fax: 416.640.3144
jdietrich@casselsbrock.com

Natalie Levine
Tel: 416.860.6568
Fax: 416.640.3207
nlevine@casselsbrock.com

Lawyers for Payless ShoeSource Canada Inc., Payless ShoeSource Canada GP Inc. and Payless ShoeSource Canada LP

I N D E X

LIST OF AUTHORITIES

TAB	AUTHORITY
A.	*Re Stelco Inc*., (2004) 48 CBR (4th) 299 (Ont SCJ), leave to appeal to CA refused, [2004] OJ No 1903 leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2004] SCCA No 336.
B.	*Re Lehndorff General Partner,* (1993) 9 BLR (2d) 975 (Ont SCJ).
C.	*Re Priszm Income Fund*, 2011 ONSC 2061.
D.	*Re Urbancorp Toronto Management Inc.*, 2016 ONSC 3288.
E.	*Re Target Canada Co.,* 2015 ONSC 303.
F.	*Re Mobilicity Group*, 2013 ONSC 6167.
G.	*Re Timminco Ltd*., 2012 ONSC 106.
H.	*Re Canwest Global Communications Corp*. (2009), 59 CBR (5th) 72 (Ont SCJ).
I.	*Calpine Canada Energy Limited (Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act)*, 2006 ABQB 743.
J.	*Northstar Aerospace, Inc. (Re)*, 2012 ONSC 3974.
K.	*Eddie Bauer of Canada, Inc. (Re)* (2009), 55 CBR (5th) 33 (Ont SCJ).
L.	*Re Aralez* (25 October 2018), Toronto CV-18-603054-00CL (Ont SCJ).
M.	*Target Canada Co. (Re)*, 2015 ONSC 1487.
N.	*HUK 10 Limited v HMV Canada Inc*. (27 January 2017), Toronto CV-17-11674-00CL (Ont SCJ).

TAB A

2004 CarswellOnt 1211
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Stelco Inc., Re

2004 CarswellOnt 1211, [2004] O.J. No. 1257, [2004] O.T.C. 284, 129 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1065, 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO STELCO INC. AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A"

APPLICATION UNDER THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

Farley J.

Heard: March 5, 2004
Judgment: March 22, 2004
Docket: 04-CL-5306

Counsel: Michael E. Barrack, James D. Gage, Geoff R. Hall for Applicants
David Jacobs, Michael McCreary for Locals, 1005, 5328, 8782 of the United Steel Workers of America
Ken Rosenberg, Lily Harmer, Rob Centa for United Steelworkers of America
Bob Thornton, Kyla Mahar for Ernst & Young Inc., Monitor of the Applicants
Kevin J. Zych for Informal Committee of Stelco Bondholders
David R. Byers for CIT
Kevin McElcheran for GE
Murray Gold, Andrew Hatnay for Retired Salaried Beneficiaries
Lewis Gottheil for CAW Canada and its Local 523
Virginie Gauthier for Fleet
H. Whiteley for CIBC
Gail Rubenstein for FSCO
Kenneth D. Kraft for EDS Canada Inc.

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.1 General principles
XIX.1.b Qualifying company

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Application of Act
Steel company S Inc. applied for protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") on January 29, 2004 — Union locals moved to rescind initial order and dismiss initial application of S Inc. and its subsidiaries on ground S Inc. was not "debtor company" as defined in s. 2 of CCAA because S Inc. was not insolvent — Motion dismissed — Given time and steps involved in reorganization, condition of insolvency perforce required expanded meaning under CCAA — Union affiant stated that S Inc. will run out of funding by November 2004 — Given that November was ten months away from date of filing, S Inc. had liquidity problem — S Inc. realistically cannot expect any increase in

its credit line with its lenders or access to further outside funding — S Inc. had negative equity of $647 million — On balance of probabilities, S Inc. was insolvent and therefore was "debtor company" as at date of filing and entitled to apply for CCAA protection.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Farley J.*:

A Debtor (No. 64 of 1992), Re (1993), [1993] 1 W.L.R. 264 (Eng. Ch. Div.) — considered

Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 2254, 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Bank of Montreal v. I.M. Krisp Foods Ltd. (1996), [1997] 1 W.W.R. 209, 140 D.L.R. (4th) 33, 148 Sask. R. 135, 134 W.A.C. 135, 6 C.P.C. (4th) 90, 1996 CarswellSask 581 (Sask. C.A.) — considered

Barsi v. Farcas (1923), [1924] 1 W.W.R. 707, 2 C.B.R. 299, 18 Sask. L.R. 158, [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1154, 1923 CarswellSask 227 (Sask. C.A.) — referred to

Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex (2002), 2002 SCC 42, 2002 CarswellBC 851, 2002 CarswellBC 852, 100 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, [2002] 5 W.W.R. 1, 212 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 287 N.R. 248, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 289, 166 B.C.A.C. 1, 271 W.A.C. 1, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 189, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) — considered

Challmie, Re (1976), 22 C.B.R. (N.S.) 78, 1976 CarswellBC 63 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Clarkson v. Sterling (1887), 14 O.R. 460 (Ont. C.P.) — considered

Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd., Re (1986), 69 B.C.L.R. 273, 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 156, 1986 CarswellBC 481 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Cumberland Trading Inc., Re (1994), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 225, 1994 CarswellOnt 255 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Davidson v. Douglas (1868), 15 Gr. 347, 1868 CarswellOnt 167 (Ont. Ch.) — considered

Diemaster Tool Inc. v. Skvortsoff (Trustee of) (1991), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 133, 1991 CarswellOnt 168 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Enterprise Capital Management Inc. v. Semi-Tech Corp. (1999), 1999 CarswellOnt 2213, 10 C.B.R. (4th) 133 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Gagnier, Re (1950), 30 C.B.R. 74, 1950 CarswellOnt 101 (Ont. S.C.) — considered

Gardner v. Newton (1916), 10 W.W.R. 51, 26 Man. R. 251, 29 D.L.R. 276, 1916 CarswellMan 83 (Man. K.B.) — considered

Inducon Development Corp., Re (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306, 1991 CarswellOnt 219 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

Kenwood Hills Development Inc., Re (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 44, 1995 CarswellOnt 38 (Ont. Bktcy.) — considered

King Petroleum Ltd., Re (1978), 29 C.B.R. (N.S.) 76, 1978 CarswellOnt 197 (Ont. S.C.) — considered

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Maybank Foods Inc. (Trustee of) v. Provisioners Maritimes Ltd. (1989), 92 N.S.R. (2d) 283, 75 C.B.R. (N.S.) 317, 45 B.L.R. 14, 237 A.P.R. 283, 1989 CarswellNS 27 (N.S. T.D.) — considered

Montreal Trust Co. of Canada v. Timber Lodge Ltd. (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 14, (sub nom. *Timber Lodge Ltd. v. Montreal Trust Co. of Canada (No. 1)*) 101 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 73, (sub nom. *Timber Lodge Ltd. v. Montreal Trust Co. of Canada (No. 1)*) 321 A.P.R. 73, 1992 CarswellPEI 13 (P.E.I. C.A.) — referred to

MTM Electric Co., Re (1982), 42 C.B.R. (N.S.) 29, 1982 CarswellOnt 170 (Ont. Bktcy.) — considered

New Quebec Raglan Mines Ltd. v. Blok-Andersen (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 93, 1993 CarswellOnt 173 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 1 O.R. (3d) 289, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 41 O.A.C. 282, 1990 CarswellOnt 139 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp. (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 2954, 16 B.L.R. (3d) 74, 28 C.B.R. (4th) 294 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp. (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 5210, 46 C.B.R. (4th) 313, (sub nom. *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Bankrupt) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp.*) 180 O.A.C. 158 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Optical Recording Laboratories Inc., Re (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 64, 75 D.L.R. (4th) 747, 42 O.A.C. 321, (sub nom. *Optical Recording Laboratories Inc. v. Digital Recording Corp.*) 1 O.R. (3d) 131, 1990 CarswellOnt 143 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Pacific Mobile Corp., Re (1979), 32 C.B.R. (N.S.) 209, 1979 CarswellQue 76 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

PWA Corp. v. Gemini Group Automated Distribution Systems Inc. (1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 609, 49 C.P.R. (3d) 456, 64 O.A.C. 274, 15 O.R. (3d) 730, 10 B.L.R. (2d) 109, 1993 CarswellOnt 149 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

PWA Corp. v. Gemini Group Automated Distribution Systems Inc. (1993), 49 C.P.R. (3d) ix, 10 B.L.R. (2d) 244 (note), 104 D.L.R. (4th) vii, 68 O.A.C. 21 (note), 164 N.R. 78 (note), 16 O.R. (3d) xvi (S.C.C.) — referred to

R. v. Proulx (2000), [2000] 4 W.W.R. 21, 2000 SCC 5, 2000 CarswellMan 32, 2000 CarswellMan 33, 140 C.C.C. (3d) 449, 30 C.R. (5th) 1, 182 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 249 N.R. 201, 49 M.V.R. (3d) 163, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, 142 Man. R. (2d) 161, 212 W.A.C. 161 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621, 1991 CarswellOnt 220 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

Standard Trustco Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Standard Trust Co. (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 7, 21 C.B.R. (3d) 25, 1993 CarswellOnt 219 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

TDM Software Systems Inc., Re (1986), 60 C.B.R. (N.S.) 92, 1986 CarswellOnt 203 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to

Viteway Natural Foods Ltd., Re (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 157, 1986 CarswellBC 499 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Webb v. Stenton (1883), 11 Q.B.D. 518 (Eng. C.A.) — referred to

633746 Ontario Inc. (Trustee of) v. Salvati (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 72, 73 O.R. (2d) 774, 1990 CarswellOnt 181 (Ont. S.C.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 2(1) "insolvent person" — referred to

s. 2(1) "insolvent person" (a) — considered

s. 2(1) "insolvent person" (b) — considered

s. 2(1) "insolvent person" (c) — considered

s. 43(7) — referred to

s. 121(1) — referred to

s. 121(2) — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 2 "debtor company" — referred to

s. 2 "debtor company" (a) — considered

s. 2 "debtor company" (b) — considered

s. 2 "debtor company" (c) — considered

s. 2 "debtor company" (d) — considered

s. 12 — referred to

s. 12(1) "claim" — referred to
Winding-up and Restructuring Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11
Generally — referred to
Words and phrases considered:

debtor company

It seems to me that the [*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36] test of insolvency . . . which I have determined is a proper interpretation is that the [*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3] definition of [s. 2(1)] (a), (b) or (c) of insolvent person is acceptable with the caveat that as to (a), a financially troubled corporation is insolvent if it is reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring.

MOTION by union that steel company was not "debtor company" as defined in *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

Farley J.:

1 As argued this motion by Locals 1005, 5328 and 8782 United Steel Workers of America (collectively "Union") to rescind the initial order and dismiss the application of Stelco Inc. ("Stelco") and various of its subsidiaries (collectively "Sub Applicants") for access to the protection and process of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") was that this access should be denied on the basis that Stelco was not a "debtor company" as defined in s. 2 of the CCAA because it was not insolvent.

2 Allow me to observe that there was a great deal of debate in the materials and submissions as to the reason(s) that Stelco found itself in with respect to what Michael Locker (indicating he was "an expert in the area of corporate restructuring and a leading steel industry analyst") swore to at paragraph 12 of his affidavit was the "current crisis":

> 12. Contending with weak operating results and resulting tight cash flow, management has deliberately chosen not to fund its employee benefits. By contrast, Dofasco and certain other steel companies have consistently funded both their employee benefit obligations as well as debt service. If Stelco's management had chosen to fund pension obligations, presumably with borrowed money, *the current crisis* and related restructuring plans would focus on debt restructuring as opposed to the reduction of employee benefits and related liabilities. [Emphasis added.]

3 For the purpose of determining whether Stelco is insolvent and therefore could be considered to be a debtor company, it matters not what the cause or who caused the financial difficulty that Stelco is in as admitted by Locker on behalf of the Union. The management of a corporation could be completely incompetent, inadvertently or advertently; the corporation could be in the grip of ruthless, hard hearted and hard nosed outside financiers; the corporation could be the innocent victim of uncaring policy of a level of government; the employees (unionized or non-unionized) could be completely incompetent, inadvertently or advertently; the relationship of labour and management could be absolutely poisonous; the corporation could be the victim of unforeseen events affecting its viability such a as a fire destroying an essential area of its plant and equipment or of rampaging dumping. One or more or all of these factors (without being exhaustive), whether or not of varying degree and whether or not in combination of some may well have been the cause of a corporation's difficulty. The point here is that Stelco's difficulty exists; the only question is whether Stelco is insolvent within the meaning of that in the "debtor company" definition of the CCAA. However, I would point out, as I did in closing, that no matter how this motion turns out, Stelco does have a problem which has to be addressed - addressed within the CCAA process if Stelco is insolvent or addressed outside that process if Stelco is determined not to be insolvent. The status quo will lead to ruination of Stelco (and its Sub Applicants) and as a result will very badly affect its stakeholder, including pensioners, employees (unionized and non-unionized), management, creditors, suppliers, customers, local and other governments and the local communities. In such situations, time is a precious commodity; it cannot be wasted; no matter how much some would like to take time outs, the clock cannot be stopped. The watchwords of the Commercial List are equally applicable in such circumstances. They are communication, cooperation and common

sense. I appreciate that these cases frequently invoke emotions running high and wild; that is understandable on a human basis but it is the considered, rational approach which will solve the problem.

4 The time to determine whether a corporation is insolvent for the purpose of it being a "debtor company" and thus able to make an application to proceed under the CCAA is the date of filing, in this case January 29, 2004.

5 The Monitor did not file a report as to this question of insolvency as it properly advised that it wished to take a neutral role. I understand however, that it did provide some assistance in the preparation of Exhibit C to Hap Steven's affidavit.

6 If I determine in this motion that Stelco is not insolvent, then the initial order would be set aside. See *Montreal Trust Co. of Canada v. Timber Lodge Ltd.* (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 14 (P.E.I. C.A.). The onus is on Stelco as I indicated in my January 29, 2004 endorsement.

7 S. 2 of the CCAA defines "debtor company" as:

> "debtor company" means any company that:
>
> (a) is bankrupt or insolvent;
>
> (b) has committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ["BIA"] or deemed insolvent within the meaning of the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act*, whether or not proceedings in respect of the company have been taken under either of those Acts;
>
> (c) has made an authorized assignment against which a receiving order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*; or
>
> (d) is in the course of being wound-up under the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act* because the company is insolvent.

8 Counsel for the Existing Stelco Lenders and the DIP Lenders posited that Stelco would be able to qualify under (b) in light of the fact that as of January 29, 2004 whether or not it was entitled to receive the CCAA protection under (a) as being insolvent, it had ceased to pay its pre-filing debts. I would merely observe as I did at the time of the hearing that I do not find this argument attractive in the least. The most that could be said for that is that such game playing would be ill advised and in my view would not be rewarded by the exercise of judicial discretion to allow such an applicant the benefit of a CCAA stay and other advantages of the procedure for if it were capriciously done where there is not reasonable need, then such ought not to be granted. However, I would point out that if a corporation did capriciously do so, then one might well expect a creditor-initiated application so as to take control of the process (including likely the ouster of management including directors who authorized such unnecessary stoppage); in such a case, while the corporation would not likely be successful in a corporation application, it is likely that a creditor application would find favour of judicial discretion.

9 This judicial discretion would be exercised in the same way generally as is the case where s. 43(7) of the BIA comes into play whereby a bankruptcy receiving order which otherwise meets the test may be refused. See *Kenwood Hills Development Inc., Re* (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 44 (Ont. Bktcy.) where at p. 45 I observed:

> The discretion must be exercised judicially based on credible evidence; it should be used according to common sense and justice and in a manner which does not result in an injustice: See *Re Churchill Forest Industries (Manitoba) Ltd.* (1971), 16 C.B.R. (NS) 158 (Man. Q.B.).

10 Anderson J. in *MTM Electric Co., Re* (1982), 42 C.B.R. (N.S.) 29 (Ont. Bktcy.) at p. 30 declined to grant a bankruptcy receiving order for the eminently good sense reason that it would be counterproductive: "Having regard for the value of the enterprise and having regard to the evidence before me, I think it far from clear that a receiving order

would confer a benefit on anyone." This common sense approach to the judicial exercise of discretion may be contrasted by the rather more puzzling approach in *TDM Software Systems Inc., Re* (1986), 60 C.B.R. (N.S.) 92 (Ont. S.C.).

11 The Union, supported by the International United Steel Workers of America ("International"), indicated that if certain of the obligations of Stelco were taken into account in the determination of insolvency, then a very good number of large Canadian corporations would be able to make an application under the CCAA. I am of the view that this concern can be addressed as follows. The test of insolvency is to be determined on its own merits, not on the basis that an otherwise technically insolvent corporation should not be allowed to apply. However, if a technically insolvent corporation were to apply and there was no material advantage to the corporation and its stakeholders (in other words, a pressing need to restructure), then one would expect that the court's discretion would be judicially exercised against granting CCAA protection and ancillary relief. In the case of Stelco, it is recognized, as discussed above, that it is in crisis and in need of restructuring - which restructuring, if it is insolvent, would be best accomplished within a CCAA proceeding. Further, I am of the view that the track record of CCAA proceedings in this country demonstrates a healthy respect for the fundamental concerns of interested parties and stakeholders. I have consistently observed that much more can be achieved by negotiations outside the courtroom where there is a reasonable exchange of information, views and the exploration of possible solutions and negotiations held on a without prejudice basis than likely can be achieved by resorting to the legal combative atmosphere of the courtroom. A mutual problem requires a mutual solution. The basic interest of the CCAA is to rehabilitate insolvent corporations for the benefit of all stakeholders. To do this, the cause(s) of the insolvency must be fixed on a long term viable basis so that the corporation may be turned around. It is not achieved by positional bargaining in a tug of war between two parties, each trying for a larger slice of a defined size pie; it may be achieved by taking steps involving shorter term equitable sacrifices and implementing sensible approaches to improve productivity to ensure that the pie grows sufficiently for the long term to accommodate the reasonable needs of the parties.

12 It appears that it is a given that the Sub Applicants are in fact insolvent. The question then is whether Stelco is insolvent.

13 There was a question as to whether Stelco should be restricted to the material in its application as presented to the Court on January 29, 2004. I would observe that CCAA proceedings are not in the nature of the traditional adversarial lawsuit usually found in our courtrooms. It seems to me that it would be doing a disservice to the interest of the CCAA to artificially keep the Court in the dark on such a question. Presumably an otherwise deserving "debtor company" would not be allowed access to a continuing CCAA proceeding that it would be entitled to merely because some potential evidence were excluded for traditional adversarial technical reasons. I would point out that in such a case, there would be no prohibition against such a corporation reapplying (with the additional material) subsequently. In such a case, what would be the advantage for anyone of a "pause" before being able to proceed under the rehabilitative process under the CCAA. On a practical basis, I would note that all too often corporations will wait too long before applying, at least this was a significant problem in the early 1990s. In *Inducon Development Corp., Re* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.), I observed:

> Secondly, CCAA is designed to be remedial; it is not, however, designed to be preventative. CCAA should not be the *last* gasp of a dying company; it should be implemented, if it is to be implemented, at a stage prior to the death throe.

14 It seems to me that the phrase "death throe" could be reasonably replaced with "death spiral". In *Cumberland Trading Inc., Re* (1994), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 225 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), I went on to expand on this at p. 228:

> I would also observe that all too frequently debtors wait until virtually the last moment, the last moment, or in some cases, beyond the last moment before even beginning to think about reorganizational (and the attendant support that any successful reorganization requires from the creditors). I noted the lamentable tendency of debtors to deal with these situations as "last gasp" desperation moves in *Re Inducon Development Corp.* (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 308 (Ont. Gen. Div.). To deal with matters on this basis minimizes the chances of success, even if "success" may have been available with earlier spade work.

15 I have not been able to find in the CCAA reported cases any instance where there has been an objection to a corporation availing itself of the facilities of the CCAA on the basis of whether the corporation was insolvent. Indeed, as indicated above, the major concern here has been that an applicant leaves it so late that the timetable of necessary steps may get impossibly compressed. That is not to say that there have not been objections by parties opposing the application on various other grounds. Prior to the 1992 amendments, there had to be debentures (plural) issued pursuant to a trust deed; I recall that in *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), the initial application was rejected in the morning because there had only been one debenture issued but another one was issued prior to the return to court that afternoon. This case stands for the general proposition that the CCAA should be given a large and liberal interpretation. I should note that there was in *Enterprise Capital Management Inc. v. Semi-Tech Corp.* (1999), 10 C.B.R. (4th) 133 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) a determination that in a creditor application, the corporation was found not to be insolvent, but see below as to BIA test (c) my views as to the correctness of this decision.

16 In *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) I observed at p. 32:

> One of the purposes of the CCAA is to facilitate ongoing operations of a business where its assets have a greater value as part of an integrated system than individually. The CCAA facilitates reorganization of a company where the alternative, sale of the property piecemeal, is likely to yield far less satisfaction to the creditors.

17 In *Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re* (2002), 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.), the court stated to the same effect:

> The second submission is that the plan is contrary to the purposes of the CCAA. Courts have recognized that the purpose of the CCAA is to enable compromises to be made for the common benefit of the creditors and the company and to keep the company alive and out of the hands of liquidators.

18 Encompassed in this is the concept of saving employment if a restructuring will result in a viable enterprise. See *Diemaster Tool Inc. v. Skvortsoff (Trustee of)* (1991), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 133 (Ont. Gen. Div.). This concept has been a continuing thread in CCAA cases in this jurisdiction stretching back for at least the past 15 years, if not before.

19 I would also note that the jurisprudence and practical application of the bankruptcy and insolvency regime in place in Canada has been constantly evolving. The early jails of what became Canada were populated to the extent of almost half their capacity by bankrupts. Rehabilitation and a fresh start for the honest but unfortunate debtor came afterwards. Most recently, the *Bankruptcy Act* was revised to the BIA in 1992 to better facilitate the rehabilitative aspect of making a proposal to creditors. At the same time, the CCAA was amended to eliminate the threshold criterion of there having to be debentures issued under a trust deed (this concept was embodied in the CCAA upon its enactment in 1933 with a view that it would only be large companies with public issues of debt securities which could apply). The size restriction was continued as there was now a threshold criterion of at least $5 million of claims against the applicant. While this restriction may appear discriminatory, it does have the practical advantage of taking into account that the costs (administrative costs including professional fees to the applicant, and indeed to the other parties who retain professionals) is a significant amount, even when viewed from the perspective of $5 million. These costs would be prohibitive in a smaller situation. Parliament was mindful of the time horizons involved in proposals under BIA where the maximum length of a proceeding including a stay is six months (including all possible extensions) whereas under CCAA, the length is in the discretion of the court judicially exercised in accordance with the facts and the circumstances of the case. Certainly sooner is better than later. However, it is fair to observe that virtually all CCAA cases which proceed go on for over six months and those with complexity frequently exceed a year.

20 Restructurings are not now limited in practical terms to corporations merely compromising their debts with their creditors in a balance sheet exercise. Rather there has been quite an emphasis recently on operational restructuring as well

so that the emerging company will have the benefit of a long term viable fix, all for the benefit of stakeholders. See *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 314 where Borins J. states:

> The proposed plan exemplifies the policy and objectives of the Act as it proposes a regime for the court-supervised re-organization for the Applicant company intended to avoid the devastating social and economic effects of a creditor-initiated termination of its ongoing business operations and enabling the company to carry on its business in a manner in which it is intended to cause the least possible harm to the company, its creditors, its employees and former employees and the communities in which its carries on and carried on its business operations.

21 The CCAA does not define "insolvent" or "insolvency". Houlden & Morawetz, *The 2004 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Toronto, Carswell; 2003) at p. 1107 (N5) states:

> In interpreting "debtor company", reference must be had to the definition of "insolvent person" in s. 2(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* . . .
>
> To be able to use the Act, a company must be bankrupt or insolvent: *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)*, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] S.C.R. 659, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75. The company must, in its application, admit its insolvency.

22 It appears to have become fairly common practice for applicants and others when reference is made to insolvency in the context of the CCAA to refer to the definition of "insolvent person" in the BIA. That definition is as follows:

> s. 2(1) . . .
>
> > "insolvent person" means a person who is not bankrupt and who resides, carries on business or has property in Canada, and whose liability to creditors provable as claims under this Act amount to one thousand dollars, and
> >
> > > (a) who is for any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due,
> > >
> > > (b) who has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course of business as they generally become due, or
> > >
> > > (c) the aggregate of whose property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or, if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due.

23 Stelco acknowledges that it does not meet the test of (b); however, it does assert that it meets the test of both (a) and (c). In addition, however, Stelco also indicates that since the CCAA does not have a reference over to the BIA in relation to the (a) definition of "debtor company" as being a company that is "(a) bankrupt or insolvent", then this term of "insolvent" should be given the meaning that the overall context of the CCAA requires. See the modern rule of statutory interpretation which directs the court to take a contextual and purposive approach to the language of the provision at issue as illustrated by *Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) at p. 580:

> Today there is only one principle or approach, namely the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

24 I note in particular that the (b), (c) and (d) aspects of the definition of "debtor company" all refer to other statutes, including the BIA; (a) does not. S. 12 of the CCAA defines "claims" with reference over to the BIA (and otherwise refers to the BIA and the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act*). It seems to me that there is merit in considering that the test for insolvency under the CCAA may differ somewhat from that under the BIA, so as to meet the special circumstances of the CCAA and those corporations which would apply under it. In that respect, I am mindful of the above discussion regarding the time that is usually and necessarily (in the circumstances) taken in a CCAA reorganization restructuring

which is engaged in coming up with a plan of compromise and arrangement. The BIA definition would appear to have been historically focussed on the question of bankruptcy - and not reorganization of a corporation under a proposal since before 1992, secured creditors could not be forced to compromise their claims, so that in practice there were no reorganizations under the former *Bankruptcy Act* unless all secured creditors voluntarily agreed to have their secured claims compromised. The BIA definition then was essentially useful for being a pre-condition to the "end" situation of a bankruptcy petition or voluntary receiving order where the upshot would be a realization on the bankrupt's assets (not likely involving the business carried on - and certainly not by the bankrupt). Insolvency under the BIA is also important as to the Paulian action events (eg., fraudulent preferences, settlements) as to the conduct of the debtor *prior* to the bankruptcy; similarly as to the question of provincial preference legislation. Reorganization under a plan or proposal, on the contrary, is with a general objective of the applicant continuing to exist, albeit that the CCAA may also be used to have an orderly disposition of the assets and undertaking in whole or in part.

25 It seems to me that given the time and steps involved in a reorganization, and the condition of insolvency perforce requires an expanded meaning under the CCAA. Query whether the definition under the BIA is now sufficient in that light for the allowance of sufficient time to carry through with a realistically viable proposal within the maximum of six months allowed under the BIA? I think it sufficient to note that there would not be much sense in providing for a rehabilitation program of restructuring/reorganization under either statute if the entry test was that the applicant could not apply until a rather late stage of its financial difficulties with the rather automatic result that in situations of complexity of any material degree, the applicant would not have the financial resources sufficient to carry through to hopefully a successful end. This would indeed be contrary to the renewed emphasis of Parliament on "rescues" as exhibited by the 1992 and 1997 amendments to the CCAA and the BIA.

26 Allow me now to examine whether Stelco has been successful in meeting the onus of demonstrating with credible evidence on a common sense basis that it is insolvent within the meaning required by the CCAA in regard to the interpretation of "debtor company" in the context and within the purpose of that legislation. To a similar effect, see *PWA Corp. v. Gemini Group Automated Distribution Systems Inc.* (1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 609 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed [(1993), 49 C.P.R. (3d) ix (S.C.C.)] wherein it was determined that the trial judge was correct in holding that a party was not insolvent and that the statutory definition of insolvency pursuant to the BIA definition was irrelevant to determine that issue, since the agreement in question effectively provided its own definition by implication. It seems to me that the CCAA test of insolvency advocated by Stelco and which I have determined is a proper interpretation is that the BIA definition of (a), (b) or (c) of insolvent person is acceptable with the caveat that as to (a), a financially troubled corporation is insolvent if it is reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring. That is, there should be a reasonable cushion, which cushion may be adjusted and indeed become in effect an encroachment depending upon reasonable access to DIP between financing. In the present case, Stelco accepts the view of the Union's affiant, Michael Mackey of Deloitte and Touche that it will otherwise run out of funding by November 2004.

27 On that basis, allow me to determine whether Stelco is insolvent on the basis of (i) what I would refer to as the CCAA test as described immediately above, (ii) BIA test (a) or (iii) BIA test (c). In doing so, I will have to take into account the fact that Stephen, albeit a very experienced and skilled person in the field of restructurings under the CCAA, unfortunately did not appreciate that the material which was given to him in Exhibit E to his affidavit was modified by the caveats in the source material that in effect indicated that based on appraisals, the fair value of the real assets acquired was in excess of the purchase price for two of the U.S. comparators. Therefore the evidence as to these comparators is significantly weakened. In addition at Q. 175-177 in his cross examination, Stephen acknowledged that it was reasonable to assume that a purchaser would "take over some liabilities, some pension liabilities and OPEB liabilities, for workers who remain with the plant." The extent of that assumption was not explored; however, I do note that there was acknowledgement on the part of the Union that such an assumption would also have a reciprocal negative effect on the purchase price.

28 The BIA tests are disjunctive so that anyone meeting any of these tests is determined to be insolvent: see *Optical Recording Laboratories Inc., Re* (1990), 75 D.L.R. (4th) 747 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 756; *Viteway Natural Foods Ltd., Re* (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 157 (B.C. S.C.) at p. 161. Thus, if I determine that Stelco is insolvent on *any one* of these tests, then it would be a "debtor company" entitled to apply for protection under the CCAA.

29 In my view, the Union's position that Stelco is not insolvent under BIA (a) because it has not entirely used up its cash and cash facilities (including its credit line), that is, it is not yet as of January 29, 2004 run out of liquidity conflates inappropriately the (a) test with the (b) test. The Union's view would render the (a) test necessarily as being redundant. See *R. v. Proulx*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61 (S.C.C.) at p. 85 for the principle that no legislative provision ought to be interpreted in a manner which would "render it mere surplusage." Indeed the plain meaning of the phrase "unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due" requires a construction of test (a) which permits the court to take a purposive assessment of a debtor's ability to meet his future obligations. See *King Petroleum Ltd., Re* (1978), 29 C.B.R. (N.S.) 76 (Ont. S.C.) where Steele J. stated at p. 80:

> With respect to cl. (a), it was argued that at the time the disputed payments were made the company was able to meet its obligations as they generally became due because no major debts were in fact due at that time. This was premised on the fact that the moneys owed to Imperial Oil were not due until 10 days after the receipt of the statements and that the statements had not then been received. I am of the opinion that this is not a proper interpretation of cl. (a). *Clause (a) speaks in the present and future tenses and not in the past.* I am of the opinion that the company was an "insolvent person" within the meaning of cl. (a) because by the very payment-out of the money in question it placed itself in a position that it was unable to meet its obligations as they would generally become due. In other words, it had placed itself in a position that it would not be able to pay the obligations that it knew it had incurred and which it knew would become due in the immediate future. [Emphasis added.]

30 *King Petroleum Ltd.* was a case involving the question in a bankruptcy scenario of whether there was a fraudulent preference during a period when the corporation was insolvent. Under those circumstances, the "immediate future" does not have the same expansive meaning that one would attribute to a time period in a restructuring forward looking situation.

31 Stephen at paragraphs 40-49 addressed the restructuring question in general and its applicability to the Stelco situation. At paragraph 41, he outlined the significant stages as follows:

> The process of restructuring under the CCAA entails a number of different stages, the most significant of which are as follows:
>
> (a) identification of the debtor's stakeholders and their interests;
>
> (b) arranging for a process of meaningful communication;
>
> (c) dealing with immediate relationship issues arising from a CCAA filing;
>
> (d) sharing information about the issues giving rise to the debtor's need to restructure;
>
> (e) developing restructuring alternatives; and
>
> (f) building a consensus around a plan of restructuring.

32 I note that January 29, 2004 is just 9-10 months away from November 2004. I accept as correct his conclusion based on his experience (and this is in accord with my own objective experience in large and complicated CCAA proceedings) that Stelco would have the liquidity problem within the time horizon indicated. In that regard, I also think it fair to observe that Stelco realistically cannot expect any increase in its credit line with its lenders or access further outside funding. To bridge the gap it must rely upon the stay to give it the uplift as to prefiling liabilities (which the Union

misinterpreted as a general turnaround in its cash position without taking into account this uplift). As well, the Union was of the view that recent price increases would relieve Stelco's liquidity problems; however, the answers to undertaking in this respect indicated:

> With respect to the Business Plan, the average spot market sales price per ton was $514, and the average contract business sales price per ton was $599. The Forecast reflects an average spot market sales price per ton of $575, and average contract business sales price per ton of $611. The average spot price used in the forecast considers further announced price increases, recognizing, among other things, the timing and the extent such increases are expected to become effective. The benefit of the increase in sales prices from the Business Plan is essentially offset by the substantial increase in production costs, and in particular in raw material costs, primarily scrap and coke, as well as higher working capital levels and a higher loan balance outstanding on the CIT credit facility as of January 2004.

I accept that this is generally a cancel out or wash in all material respects.

33 I note that $145 million of cash resources had been used from January 1, 2003 to the date of filing. Use of the credit facility of $350 million had increased from $241 million on November 30, 2003 to $293 million on the date of filing. There must be a reasonable reserve of liquidity to take into account day to day, week to week or month to month variances and also provide for unforeseen circumstances such as the breakdown of a piece of vital equipment which would significantly affect production until remedied. Trade credit had been contracting as a result of appreciation by suppliers of Stelco's financial difficulties. The DIP financing of $75 million is only available if Stelco is under CCAA protection. I also note that a shut down as a result of running out of liquidity would be complicated in the case of Stelco and that even if conditions turned around more than reasonably expected, start-up costs would be heavy and quite importantly, there would be a significant erosion of the customer base (reference should be had to the Slater Hamilton plant in this regard). One does not liquidate assets which one would not sell in the ordinary course of business to thereby artificially salvage some liquidity for the purpose of the test: see *Pacific Mobile Corp., Re* (1979), 32 C.B.R. (N.S.) 209 (C.S. Que.) at p. 220. As a rough test, I note that Stelco (albeit on a consolidated basis with all subsidiaries) running significantly behind plan in 2003 from its budget of a profit of $80 million now to a projected loss of $192 million and cash has gone from a positive $209 million to a negative $114 million.

34 Locker made the observation at paragraph 8 of his affidavit that:

> 8. Stelco has performed poorly for the past few years primarily due to an inadequate business strategy, poor utilization of assets, inefficient operations and generally weak management leadership and decision-making. This point is best supported by the fact that Stelco's local competitor, Dofasco, has generated outstanding results in the same period.

Table 1 to his affidavit would demonstrate that Dofasco has had superior profitability and cashflow performance than its "neighbour" Stelco. He went on to observe at paragraphs 36-37:

> 36. Stelco can achieve significant cost reductions through means other than cutting wages, pensions and benefits for employees and retirees. Stelco could bring its cost levels down to those of restructured U.S. mills, with the potential for lowering them below those of many U.S. mills.
>
> 37. Stelco could achieve substantial savings through productivity improvements within the mechanisms of the current collective agreements. More importantly, a major portion of this cost reduction could be achieved through constructive negotiations with the USWA in an out-of-court restructuring that does not require intervention of the courts through the vehicle of CCAA protection.

I accept his constructive comments that there is room for cost reductions and that there are substantial savings to be achieved through productivity improvements. However, I do not see anything detrimental to these discussions and negotiations by having them conducted within the umbrella of a CCAA proceeding. See my comments above regarding the CCAA in practice.

35 But I would observe and I am mystified by Locker's observations at paragraph 12 (quoted above), that Stelco should have borrowed to fund pension obligations to avoid its current financial crisis. This presumes that the borrowed funds would not constitute an obligation to be paid back as to principal and interest, but rather that it would assume the character of a cost-free "gift".

36 I note that Mackey, without the "laundry list" he indicates at paragraph 17 of his second affidavit, is unable to determine at paragraph 19 (for himself) whether Stelco was insolvent. Mackey was unable to avail himself of all available information in light of the Union's refusal to enter into a confidentiality agreement. He does not closely adhere to the BIA tests as they are defined. In the face of positive evidence about an applicant's financial position by an experienced person with expertise, it is not sufficient to displace this evidence by filing evidence which goes no further than raising questions: see *Anvil Range Mining Corp.*, *supra* at p. 162.

37 The Union referred me to one of my decisions *Standard Trustco Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Standard Trust Co.* (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 7 (Ont. Gen. Div.) where I stated as to the MacGirr affidavit:

> The Trustee's cause of action is premised on MacGirr's opinion that STC was insolvent as at August 3, 1990 and therefore the STC common shares and promissory note received by Trustco in return for the Injection had no value at the time the Injection was made. Further, MacGirr ascribed no value to the opportunity which the Injection gave to Trustco to restore STC and salvage its thought to be existing $74 million investment. In stating his opinion MacGirr defined solvency as:
>
> (a) the ability to meet liabilities as they fall due; and
>
> (b) that assets exceed liabilities.
>
> On cross-examination MacGirr testified that in his opinion on either test STC was insolvent as at August 3, 1990 since as to (a) STC was experiencing then a negative cash flow and as to (b) the STC financial statements incorrectly reflected values. As far as (a) is concerned, I would comment that while I concur with MacGirr that at some time in the long run a company that is experiencing a negative cash flow will eventually not be able to meet liabilities as they fall due but that is not the test (which is a "present exercise"). On that current basis STC was meeting its liabilities on a timely basis.

38 As will be seen from that expanded quote, MacGirr gave his own definitions of insolvency which are not the same as the s. 2 BIA tests (a), (b) and (c) but only a very loose paraphrase of (a) and (c) and an omission of (b). Nor was I referred to the *King Petroleum Ltd.* or *Proulx* cases *supra*. Further, it is obvious from the context that "*sometime in the long run . . . eventually*" is not a finite time in the foreseeable future.

39 I have not given any benefit to the $313 - $363 million of improvements referred to in the affidavit of William Vaughan at paragraph 115 as those appear to be capital expenditures which will have to be accommodated within a plan of arrangement or after emergence.

40 It seems to me that if the BIA (a) test is restrictively dealt with (as per my question to Union counsel as to how far in the future should one look on a prospective basis being answered "24 hours") then Stelco would not be insolvent under that test. However, I am of the view that that would be unduly restrictive and a proper contextual and purposive interpretation to be given when it is being used for a restructuring purpose even under BIA would be to see whether there is a reasonably foreseeable (at the time of filing) expectation that there is a looming liquidity condition or crisis which will result in the applicant running out of "cash" to pay its debts as they generally become due in the future without the benefit of the say and ancillary protection and procedure by court authorization pursuant to an order. I think this is the more appropriate interpretation of BIA (a) test in the context of a reorganization or "rescue" as opposed to a threshold to bankruptcy consideration or a fraudulent preferences proceeding. On that basis, I would find Stelco insolvent from the date of filing. Even if one were not to give the latter interpretation to the BIA (a) test, clearly for the above reasons

and analysis, if one looks at the meaning of "insolvent" within the context of a CCAA reorganization or rescue solely, then of necessity, the time horizon must be such that the liquidity crisis would occur in the sense of running out of "cash" but for the grant of the CCAA order. On that basis Stelco is certainly insolvent given its limited cash resources unused, its need for a cushion, its rate of cash burn recently experienced and anticipated.

41 What about the BIA (c) test which may be roughly referred to as an assets compared with obligations test. See *New Quebec Raglan Mines Ltd. v. Blok-Andersen*, [1993] O.J. No. 727 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) as to fair value and fair market valuation. The Union observed that there was no intention by Stelco to wind itself up or proceed with a sale of some or all of its assets and undertaking and therefore some of the liabilities which Stelco and Stephen took into account would not crystallize. However, as I discussed at the time of the hearing, the (c) test is what one might reasonably call or describe as an "artificial" or notional/hypothetical test. It presumes certain things which are in fact not necessarily contemplated to take place or to be involved. In that respect, I appreciate that it may be difficult to get one's mind around that concept and down the right avenue of that (c) test. See my views at trial in *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp.*, [2001] O.J. No. 3394 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paragraphs 13, 21 and 33; affirmed [2003] O.J. No. 5242 (Ont. C.A.). At paragraph 33, I observed in closing:

> 33 . . . They (and their expert witnesses) all had to contend with dealing with rambling and complicated facts and, in Section 100 BIA, a section which is difficult to administer when fmv [fair market value] in a notational or hypothetical market involves ignoring what would often be regarded as self evidence truths but at the same time appreciating that this notational or hypothetical market requires that the objects being sold have to have realistic true to life attributes recognized.

42 The Court of Appeal stated at paragraphs 24-25 as follows:

> 24. Nor are the appellants correct to argue that the trial judge also assumed an imprudent vendor in arriving at his conclusion about the fair market value of the OYSF note would have to know that in order to realize value from the note any purchaser would immediately put OYSF and thus OYDL itself into bankruptcy to pre-empt a subsequent triggering event in favour of EIB. While this was so, and the trial judge clearly understood it, the error in this submission is that it seeks to inject into the analysis factors subjected to the circumstances of OYDL as vendor and not intrinsic to the value of the OYSF note. The calculation of fair market value does not permit this but rather must assume an unconstrained vendor.
>
> 25. The Applicants further argue that the trial judge eroded in determining the fair market value of the OYSF note by reference to a transaction which was entirely speculative because it was never considered by OYDL nor would have it been since it would have resulted in OYDL's own bankruptcy. I disagree. The transaction hypothesized by the trial judge was one between a notational, willing, prudent and informed vendor and purchaser based on factors relevant to the OYSF note itself rather than the particular circumstances of OYDL as the seller of the note. This is an entirely appropriate way to determine the fair market value of the OYSF note.

43 Test (c) deems a person to be insolvent if "the aggregate of [its] property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or of disposed at a fairly conducted sale under legal process would not be sufficient to enable payment of all [its] obligations, due and accruing due." The origins of this legislative test appear to be the decision of Spragge V-C in *Davidson v. Douglas* (1868), 15 Gr. 347 (Ont. Ch.) at p. 351 where he stated with respect to the solvency or insolvency of a debtor, the proper course is:

> to see and examine whether all his property, real and personal, be sufficient if presently realized for the payment of his debts, and in this view we must estimate his land, as well as his chattel property, not at what his neighbours or others may consider to be its value, but at what it would bring in the market at a forced sale, or a sale where the seller cannot await his opportunities, but must sell.

44 In *Clarkson v. Sterling* (1887), 14 O.R. 460 (Ont. C.P.) at p. 463, Rose J. indicted that the sale must be fair and reasonable, but that the determination of fairness and reasonableness would depend on the facts of each case.

45 The Union essentially relied on garnishment cases. Because of the provisions relating as to which debts may or may not be garnished, these authorities are of somewhat limited value when dealing with the test (c) question. However I would refer to one of the Union's cases *Bank of Montreal v. I.M. Krisp Foods Ltd.*, [1996] S.J. No. 655 (Sask. C.A.) where it is stated at paragraph 11:

> 11. Few phrases have been as problematic to define as "debt due or accruing due". The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed. defines "accruing" as "arising in due course", but an examination of English and Canadian authority reveals that not all debts "arising in due course" are permitted to be garnisheed. (See Professor Dunlop's extensive research for his British Columbia Law Reform Commission's Report on Attachment of Debts Act, 1978 at 17 to 29 and is text Creditor-Debtor Law in Canada, 2nd ed. at 374 to 385.)

46 In *Barsi v. Farcas* (1923), [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1154 (Sask. C.A.), Lamont J.A. was cited for his statement at p. 522 of *Webb v. Stenton* (1883), 11 Q.B.D. 518 (Eng. C.A.) that: "an accruing debt, therefore, is a debt not yet actually payable, but a debt which is represented by an existing obligation."

47 Saunders J. noted in *633746 Ontario Inc. (Trustee of) v. Salvati* (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 72 (Ont. S.C.) at p. 81 that a sale out of the ordinary course of business would have an adverse effect on that actually realized.

48 There was no suggestion by any of the parties that any of the assets and undertaking would have any enhanced value from that shown on the financial statements prepared according to GAAP.

49 In *King Petroleum Ltd.*, *supra* at p. 81 Steele J. observed:

> To consider the question of insolvency under cl. (c) I must look to the aggregate property of the company and come to a conclusion as to whether or not it would be sufficient to enable payment of all obligations due and accruing due. There are two tests to be applied: First, its fair value and, secondly, its value if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process. The balance sheet is a starting point, but the evidence relating to the fair value of the assets and what they might realize if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process must be reviewed in interpreting it. In this case, I find no difficulty in accepting the obligations shown as liabilities because they are known. I have more difficulty with respect to the assets.

50 To my view the preferable interpretation to be given to "sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due" is to be determined in the context of this test as a whole. What is being put up to satisfy those obligations is the debtor's assets and undertaking *in total*; in other words, the debtor in essence is taken as having sold everything. There would be no residual assets and undertaking to pay off any obligations which would not be encompassed by the phrase "all of his obligations, due and accruing due". Surely, there cannot be "orphan" obligations which are left hanging unsatisfied. It seems to me that the intention of "due and accruing due" was to cover off all obligations of whatever nature or kind and leave nothing in limbo.

51 S. 121(1) and (2) of the BIA, which are incorporated by reference in s. 12 of the CCAA, provide in respect to provable claims:

> S. 121(1) All debts and liabilities, present or future, to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt or to which bankrupt may become subject before the bankrupt's discharge by reason of any obligation incurred before the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt shall be deemed to be claims provable in proceedings under this Act.

> (2) The determination whether a contingent or unliquidated claim is a provable claim and the valuation of such claim shall be made in accordance with s. 135.

52 *Houlden and Morawetz 2004 Annotated supra* at p. 537 (G28(3)) indicates:

> The word "liability" is a very broad one. It includes all obligations to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which he becomes bankrupt except for contingent and unliquidated claims which are dealt with in s. 121(2).

However contingent and unliquidated claims would be encompassed by the term "obligations".

53 In *Gardner v. Newton* (1916), 29 D.L.R. 276 (Man. K.B.), Mathers C.J.K.B. observed at p. 281 that "contingent claim, that is, a claim which may or may not ripen into a debt, according as some future event does or does not happen." See *A Debtor (No. 64 of 1992), Re*, [1993] 1 W.L.R. 264 (Eng. Ch. Div.) at p. 268 for the definition of a "liquidated sum" which is an amount which can be readily ascertained and hence by corollary an "unliquidated claim" would be one which is not easily ascertained, but will have to be valued. In *Gagnier, Re* (1950), 30 C.B.R. 74 (Ont. S.C.), there appears to be a conflation of not only the (a) test with the (c) test, but also the invocation of the judicial discretion not to grant the receiving order pursuant to a bankruptcy petition, notwithstanding that "[the judge was] unable to find the debtor is bankrupt". The debtor was able to survive the (a) test as he had the practice (accepted by all his suppliers) of providing them with post dated cheques. The (c) test was not a problem since the judge found that his assets should be valued at considerably more than his obligations. However, this case does illustrate that the application of the tests present some difficulties. These difficulties are magnified when one is dealing with something more significantly complex and a great deal larger than a haberdashery store - in the case before us, a giant corporation in which, amongst other things, is engaged in a very competitive history including competition from foreign sources which have recently restructured into more cost efficient structures, having shed certain of their obligations. As well, that is without taking into account that a sale would entail significant transaction costs. Even of greater significance would be the severance and termination payments to employees not continued by the new purchaser. Lastly, it was recognized by everyone at the hearing that Stelco's plants, especially the Hamilton-Hilton works, have extremely high environmental liabilities lurking in the woodwork. Stephen observed that these obligations would be substantial, although not quantified.

54 It is true that there are no appraisals of the plant and equipment nor of the assets and undertaking of Stelco. Given the circumstances of this case and the complexities of the market, one may realistically question whether or not the appraisals would be all that helpful or accurate.

55 I would further observe that in the notional or hypothetical exercise of a sale, then all the obligations which would be triggered by such sale would have to be taken into account.

56 All liabilities, contingent or unliquidated would have to be taken into account. See *King Petroleum Ltd., supra* p. 81; *Salvati, supra* pp. 80-1; *Maybank Foods Inc. (Trustee of) v. Provisioners Maritimes Ltd.* (1989), 45 B.L.R. 14 (N.S. T.D.) at p. 29; *Challmie, Re* (1976), 22 C.B.R. (N.S.) 78 (B.C. S.C.), at pp. 81-2. In *Challmie* the debtor ought to have known that his guarantee was very much exposed given the perilous state of his company whose liabilities he had guaranteed. It is interesting to note what was stated in *Maybank Foods Inc. (Trustee of)*, even if it is rather patently obvious. Tidman J. said in respect of the branch of the company at p. 29:

> Mr. MacAdam argues also that the $4.8 million employees' severance obligation was not a liability on January 20, 1986. The *Bankruptcy Act* includes as obligations both those due and accruing due. Although the employees' severance obligation was not due and payable on January 20, 1986 it was an obligation "accruing due". The Toronto facility had experienced severe financial difficulties for some time; in fact, it was the major, if not the sole cause, of Maybank's financial difficulties. I believe it is reasonable to conclude that a reasonably astute perspective buyer of the company has a going concern would have considered that obligation on January 20, 1986 and that it would have substantially reduced the price offered by that perspective buyer. Therefore that obligation must be considered as an obligation of the company on January 20, 1986.

57 With the greatest of respect for my colleague, I disagree with the conclusion of Ground J. in *Enterprise Capital Management Inc., supra* as to the approach to be taken to "due and accruing due" when he observed at pp. 139-140:

> It therefore becomes necessary to determine whether the principle amount of the Notes constitutes an obligation "due or accruing due" as of the date of this application.
>
> There is a paucity of helpful authority on the meaning of "accruing due" for purposes of a definition of insolvency. Historically, in 1933, in *P. Lyall & Sons Construction Co. v. Baker*, [1933] O.R. 286 (Ont. C.A.), the Ontario Court of Appeal, in determining a question of set-off under the *Dominion Winding-Up Act* had to determine whether the amount claimed as set-off was a debt due or accruing due to the company in liquidation for purposes of that Act. Marsten J. at pp. 292-293 quoted from Moss J.A. in *Mail Printing Co. v. Clarkson* (1898), 25 O.R. 1 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 8:
>
> > A debt is defined to be a sum of money which is certainly, and at all event, payable without regard to the fact whether it be payable now or at a future time. And an accruing debt is a debt not yet actually payable, but a debt which is represented by an existing obligation: Per Lindley L.J. in *Webb v. Stenton* (1883), 11 Q.D.D. at p. 529.
>
> Whatever relevance such definition may have had for purposes of dealing with claims by and against companies in liquidation under the old winding-up legislation, it is apparent to me that it should not be applied to definitions of insolvency. To include every debt payable at some future date in "accruing due" for the purposes of insolvency tests would render numerous corporations, with long term debt due over a period of years in the future and anticipated to be paid out of future income, "insolvent" for the purposes of the BIA and therefore the CCAA. For the same reason, I do not accept the statement quoted in the Enterprise factum from the decision of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in *Centennial Textiles Inc., Re*, 220 B.R. 165 (U.S.N.Y.D.C. 1998) that "if the present saleable value of assets are less than the amount required to pay existing debt as they mature, the debtor is insolvent". In my view, the obligations, which are to be measured against the fair valuation of a company's property as being obligations due and accruing due, must be limited to obligations currently payable or properly chargeable to the accounting period during which the test is being applied as, for example, a sinking fund payment due within the current year. Black's Law Dictionary defines "accrued liability" as "an obligation or debt which is properly chargeable in a given accounting period, but which is not yet paid or payable". The principal amount of the Notes is neither due nor accruing due in this sense.

58 There appears to be some confusion in this analysis as to "debts" and "obligations", the latter being much broader than debts. Please see above as to my views concerning the floodgates argument under the BIA and CCAA being addressed by judicially exercised discretion even if "otherwise warranted" applications were made. I pause to note that an insolvency test under general corporate litigation need not be and likely is not identical, or indeed similar to that under these insolvency statutes. As well, it is curious to note that the cut off date is the end of the current fiscal period which could have radically different results if there were a calendar fiscal year and the application was variously made in the first week of January, mid-summer or the last day of December. Lastly, see above and below as to my views concerning the proper interpretation of this question of "accruing due".

59 It seems to me that the phrase "accruing due" has been interpreted by the courts as broadly identifying obligations that will "become due". See *Viteway Natural Foods Ltd.* below at pp. 163-4 - at least at some point in the future. Again, I would refer to my conclusion above that *every obligation* of the corporation in the hypothetical or notional sale must be treated as "accruing due" to avoid orphan obligations. In that context, it matters not that a wind-up pension liability may be discharged over 15 years; in a test (c) situation, it is crystallized on the date of the test. See *Optical Recording Laboratories Inc. supra* at pp. 756-7; *Viteway Natural Foods Ltd., Re* (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 157 (B.C. S.C.) at pp. 164-63-4; *Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd., Re* (1986), 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 156 (B.C. S.C.) at p. 163. In *Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd.*, Spencer J. at pp. 162-3 stated:

> In my opinion, a futures broker is not in that special position. The third definition of "insolvency" may apply to a futures trader at any time even though he has open long positions in the market. Even though Consolidated's long positions were not required to be closed on 10th December, the chance that they might show a profit by March 1981 or even on the following day and thus wipe out Consolidated's cash deficit cannot save it from a condition of insolvency on that day. The circumstances fit precisely within the third definition; if all Consolidated's assets had been sold on that day at a fair value, the proceeds would not have covered its obligations due and accruing due, including its obligations to pay in March 1981 for its long positions in rapeseed. The market prices from day to day establish a fair valuation. . . .
>
> The contract to buy grain at a fixed price at a future time imposes a present obligation upon a trader taking a long position in the futures market to take delivery in exchange for payment at that future time. It is true that in the practice of the market, that obligation is nearly always washed out by buying an offsetting short contract, but until that is done the obligation stands. The trader does not know who will eventually be on the opposite side of his transaction if it is not offset but all transactions are treated as if the clearing house is on the other side. It is a present obligation due at a future time. It is therefore an obligation accruing due within the meaning of the third definition of "insolvency".

60 The possibility of an expectancy of future profits or a change in the market is not sufficient; *Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd.* at p. 162 emphasizes that the test is to be done on that day, the day of filing in the case of an application for reorganization.

61 I see no objection to using Exhibit C to Stephen's affidavit as an aid to review the balance sheet approach to test (c). While Stephen may not have known who prepared Exhibit C, he addressed each of its components in the text of his affidavit and as such he could have mechanically prepared the exhibit himself. He was comfortable with and agreed with each of its components. Stelco's factum at paragraphs 70-1 submits as follows:

> 70. In Exhibit C to his Affidavit, Mr. Stephen addresses a variety of adjustments to the Shareholder's Equity of Stelco necessary to reflect the values of assets and liabilities as would be required to determine whether Stelco met the test of insolvency under Clause C. In cross examination of both Mr. Vaughan and Mr. Stephen only one of these adjustments was challenged - the "Possible Reductions in Capital Assets."
>
> 71. The basis of the challenge was that the comparative sales analysis was flawed. In the submission of Stelco, none of these challenges has any merit. Even if the entire adjustment relating to the value in capital assets is ignored, the remaining adjustments leave Stelco with assets worth over $600 million less than the value of its obligations due and accruing due. This fundamental fact is not challenged.

62 Stelco went on at paragraphs 74-5 of its factum to submit:

> 74. The values relied upon by Mr. Stephen if anything, understate the extent of Stelco's insolvency. As Mr. Stephen has stated, and no one has challenged by affidavit evidence or on cross examination, in a fairly conducted sale under legal process, the value of Stelco's working capital and other assets would be further impaired by: (i) increased environmental liabilities not reflected on the financial statements, (ii) increased pension deficiencies that would be generated on a wind up of the pension plans, (iii) severance and termination claims and (iv) substantial liquidation costs that would be incurred in connection with such a sale.
>
> 75. No one on behalf of the USWA has presented any evidence that the capital assets of Stelco are in excess of book value on a stand alone basis. Certainly no one has suggested that these assets would be in excess of book value if the related environmental legacy costs and collective agreements could not be separated from the assets.

63 Before turning to that exercise, I would also observe that test (c) is also disjunctive. There is an insolvency condition if the total obligation of the debtor exceed either (i) a fair valuation of its assets or (ii) the proceeds of a sale fairly conducted under legal process of its assets.

64 As discussed above and confirmed by Stephen, if there were a sale under legal process, then it would be unlikely, especially in this circumstance that values would be enhanced; in all probability they would be depressed from book value. Stephen took the balance sheet GAAP calculated figure of equity at November 30, 2003 as $804.2 million. From that, he deducted the loss for December 2003 - January 2004 of $17 million to arrive at an equity position of $787.2 million as at the date of filing.

65 From that, he deducted, reasonably in my view, those "booked" assets that would have no value in a test (c) sale namely: (a) $294 million of future income tax recourse which would need taxable income in the future to realize; (b) $57 million for a write-off of the Platemill which is presently hot idled (while Locker observed that it would not be prohibitive in cost to restart production, I note that neither Stephen nor Vaughn were cross examined as to the decision not to do so); and (c) the captialized deferred debt issue expense of $3.2 million which is being written off over time and therefore, truly is a "nothing". This totals $354.2 million so that the excess of value over liabilities before reflecting obligations not included in the financials directly, but which are, substantiated as to category in the notes would be $433 million.

66 On a windup basis, there would be a pension deficiency of $1252 million; however, Stephen conservatively in my view looked at the Mercer actuary calculations on the basis of a going concern finding deficiency of $656 million. If the $1252 million windup figure had been taken, then the picture would have been even bleaker than it is as Stephen has calculated it for test (c) purposes. In addition, there are deferred pension costs of $198.7 million which under GAAP accounting calculations is allowed so as to defer recognition of past bad investment experience, but this has no realizable value. Then there is the question of Employee Future Benefits. These have been calculated as at December 31, 2003 by the Mercer actuary as $909.3 million but only $684 million has been accrued and booked on the financial statements so that there has to be an increased provision of $225.3 million. These off balance sheet adjustments total $1080 million.

67 Taking that last adjustment into account would result in a *negative* equity of ($433 million minus $1080 million) or *negative* $647 million. On that basis without taking into account possible reductions in capital assets as dealt with in the somewhat flawed Exhibit E nor environmental and other costs discussed above, Stelco is insolvent according to the test (c). With respect to Exhibit E, I have not relied on it in any way, but it is entirely likely that a properly calculated Exhibit E would provide comparators (also being sold in the U.S. under legal process in a fairly conducted process) which tend to require a further downward adjustment. Based on test (c), Stelco is significantly, not marginally, under water.

68 In reaching my conclusion as to the negative equity (and I find that Stephen approached that exercise fairly and constructively), please note my comments above regarding the possible assumption of pension obligations by the purchaser being offset by a reduction of the purchase price. The 35% adjustment advocated as to pension and employee benefits in this regard is speculation by the Union. Secondly, the Union emphasized cash flow as being important in evaluation, but it must be remembered that Stelco has been negative cash flow for some time which would make that analysis unreliable and to the detriment of the Union's position. The Union treated the $773 million estimated contribution to the shortfall in the pension deficiency by the Pension Benefits Guarantee Fund as eliminating that as a Stelco obligation. That is not the case however as that Fund would be subrogated to the claims of the employees in that respect with a result that Stelco would remain liable for that $773 million. Lastly, the Union indicated that there should be a $155 million adjustment as to the negative equity in Sub Applicants when calculating Stelco's equity. While Stephen at Q. 181-2 acknowledged that there was no adjustment for that, I agree with him that there ought not to be since Stelco was being examined (and the calculations were based) on an unconsolidated basis, not on a consolidated basis.

69 In the end result, I have concluded on the balance of probabilities that Stelco is insolvent and therefore it is a "debtor company" as at the date of filing and entitled to apply for the CCAA initial order. My conclusion is that (i) BIA test (c) strongly shows Stelco is insolvent; (ii) BIA test (a) demonstrates, to a less certain but sufficient basis, an insolvency

and (iii) the "new" CCAA test again strongly supports the conclusion of insolvency. I am further of the opinion that I properly exercised my discretion in granting Stelco and the Sub Applicants the initial order on January 29, 2004 and I would confirm that as of the present date with effect on the date of filing. The Union's motion is therefore dismissed.

70 I appreciate that all the employees (union and non-union alike) and the Union and the International have a justifiable pride in their work and their workplace - and a human concern about what the future holds for them. The pensioners are in the same position. Their respective positions can only be improved by engaging in discussion, an exchange of views and information reasonably advanced and conscientiously listened to and digested, leading to mutual problem solving, ideas and negotiations. Negative attitudes can only lead to the detriment to all stakeholders. Unfortunately there has been some finger pointing on various sides; that should be put behind everyone so that participants in this process can concentrate on the future and not inappropriately dwell on the past. I understand that there have been some discussions and interchange over the past two weeks since the hearing and that is a positive start.

Motion dismissed.

APPENDIX

TAB B

1993 CarswellOnt 183
Ontario Court of Justice (General Division — Commercial List)

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re

1993 CarswellOnt 183, [1993] O.J. No. 14, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 37 A.C.W.S. (3d) 847, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275

Re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36; Re Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43; Re plan of compromise in respect of LEHNDORFF GENERAL PARTNER LTD. (in its own capacity and in its capacity as general partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA), LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) and LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) II) and in respect of certain of their nominees LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA) LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS II LTD., BAYTEMP PROPERTIES LIMITED and 102 BLOOR STREET WEST LIMITED and in respect of THG LEHNDORFF VERMÖGENSVERWALTUNG GmbH (in its capacity as limited partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA))

Farley J.

Heard: December 24, 1992
Judgment: January 6, 1993
Docket: Doc. B366/92

Counsel: *Alfred Apps, Robert Harrison* and *Melissa J. Kennedy* , for applicants.
L. Crozier , for Royal Bank of Canada.
R.C. Heintzman , for Bank of Montreal.
J. Hodgson, Susan Lundy and *James Hilton* , for Canada Trustco Mortgage Corporation.
Jay Schwartz , for Citibank Canada.
Stephen Golick , for Peat Marwick Thorne * Inc., proposed monitor.
John Teolis , for Fuji Bank Canada.
Robert Thorton , for certain of the advisory boards.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.2 Initial application
XIX.2.b Grant of stay
XIX.2.b.i General principles

Headnote

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act — Arrangements — Effect of arrangement — Stay of proceedings

Corporations — Arrangements and compromises — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Stay of proceedings — Stay being granted even where it would affect non-applicants that were not companies within meaning of Act — Business operations of applicants and non-applicants being so intertwined as to make stay appropriate.

The applicant companies were involved in property development and management and sought the protection of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") in order that they could present a plan of compromise. They also

sought a stay of all proceedings against the individual company applicants either in their own capacities or because of their interest in a larger group of companies. Each of the applicant companies was insolvent and had outstanding debentures issued under trust deeds. They proposed a plan of compromise among themselves and the holders of the debentures as well as those others of their secured and unsecured creditors deemed appropriate in the circumstances.

A question arose as to whether the court had the power to grant a stay of proceedings against non-applicants that were not companies and, therefore, not within the express provisions of the CCAA.

Held:

The application was allowed.

It was appropriate, given the significant financial intertwining of the applicant companies, that a consolidated plan be approved. Further, each of the applicant companies had a realistic possibility of being able to continue operating even though each was currently unable to meet all of its expenses. This was precisely the sort of situation in which all of the creditors would likely benefit from the application of the CCAA and in which it was appropriate to grant an order staying proceedings.

The inherent power of the court to grant stays can be used to supplement s. 11 of the CCAA when it is just and reasonable to do so. Clearly, the court had the jurisdiction to grant a stay in respect of any of the applicants that were companies fitting the criteria in the CCAA. However, the stay requested also involved limited partnerships where (1) the applicant companies acted on behalf of the limited partnerships, or (2) the stay would be effective against any proceedings taken by any party against the property assets and undertakings of the limited partnerships in which they held a direct interest. The business operations of the applicant companies were so intertwined with the limited partnerships that it would be impossible for a stay to be granted to the applicant companies that would affect their business without affecting the undivided interest of the limited partnerships in the business. As a result, it was just and reasonable to supplement s. 11 and grant the stay.

While the provisions of the CCAA allow for a cramdown of a creditor's claim, as well as the interest of any other person, anyone wishing to start or continue proceedings against the applicant companies could use the comeback clause in the order to persuade the court that it would not be just and reasonable to maintain the stay. In such a motion, the onus would be on the applicant companies to show that it was appropriate in the circumstances to continue the stay.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

Amirault Fish Co., Re, 32 C.B.R. 186, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 203 (N.S. T.D.) — *referred to*

Associated Investors of Canada Ltd., Re, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 , Alta. L.R. (2d) 259, [1988] 2 W.W.R. 211, 38 B.L.R. 148, (sub nom. *Re First Investors Corp.)* 46 D.L.R. (4th) 669 (Q.B.) , reversed (1988), 71 C.B.R. 71, 60 Alta. L.R. (2d) 242, 89 A.R. 344 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

Canada Systems Group (EST) v. Allen-Dale Mutual Insurance Co. (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. H.C.) [affirmed (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 135, 33 C.P.C. 210, 145 D.L.R. (3d) 266 (C.A.)] — *referred to*

Empire-Universal Films Ltd. v. Rank, [1947] O.R. 775 [H.C.] — *referred to*

Feifer v. Frame Manufacturing Corp., Re, 28 C.B.R. 124, [1947] Que. K.B. 348 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Fine's Flowers Ltd. v. Fine's Flowers (Creditors of) (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 87, 4 B.L.R. (2d) 293, 87 D.L.R. (4th) 391, 7 O.R. (3d) 193 (Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

Gaz Métropolitain v. Wynden Canada Inc. (1982), 44 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (C.S. Que.) [affirmed (1982), 45 C.B.R. (N.S.) 11 (Que. C.A.)] — *referred to*

Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Inducon Development Corp. Re (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

International Donut Corp. v. 050863 N.B. Ltd. (1992), 127 N.B.R. (2d) 290, 319 A.P.R. 290 (Q.B.) — *considered*

Keppoch Development Ltd., Re (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 95 (N.S. T.D.) — *referred to*

Langley's Ltd., Re, [1938] O.R. 123, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 230 (C.A.) — *referred to*

McCordic v. Bosanquet (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 (H.C.) — *referred to*

Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank, 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 109, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215, 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 150, 53 A.R. 39, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576 (Q.B.) — *referred to*

Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd. (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 1 (Q.B.) — *referred to*

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 141 (B.C. S.C.) — *referred to*

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey)* 41 O.A.C. 282, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.) , affirming (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 291, 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.) , leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 164 (note), 55 B.C.L.R. (2d) xxxiii (note), 135 N.R. 317 (note) — *referred to*

Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada), [1934] S.C.R. 659, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75 — *referred to*

Seven Mile Dam Contractors v. R. (1979), 13 B.C.L.R. 137, 104 D.L.R. (3d) 274 (S.C.) , affirmed (1980), 25 B.C.L.R. 183 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

Slavik, Re (1992), 12 C.B.R. (3d) 157 (B.C. S.C.) — *considered*

Stephanie's Fashions Ltd., Re (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C. S.C.) — *referred to*

Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of) (1990), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 151, (sub nom. *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon)* 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

United Maritime Fishermen Co-operative, Re (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44, 84 N.B.R. (2d) 415, 214 A.P.R. 415 (Q.B.) , varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170, 87 N.B.R. (2d) 333, 221 A.P.R. 333 (Q.B.) , reversed (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161, 88 N.B.R. (2d) 253, 224 A.P.R. 253, (sub nom. *Cdn. Co-op. Leasing Services v. United Maritime Fishermen Co-op.)* 51 D.L.R. (4th) 618 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 —

s. 85

s. 142

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 — preamble

s. 2

s. 3

s. 4

s. 5

s. 6

s. 7

s. 8

s. 11

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43.

Judicature Act, The, R.S.O. 1937, c. 100.

Limited Partnerships Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.16 —

s. 2(2)

s. 3(1)

s. 8

s. 9

s. 11

s. 12(1)

s. 13

s. 15(2)

s. 24

Partnership Act, R.S.A. 1980, c.P-2 — Pt. 2

s. 75

Rules considered:

Ontario, Rules of Civil Procedure —

r. 8.01

r. 8.02

Application under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to file consolidated plan of compromise and for stay of proceedings.

Farley J.:

1 These are my written reasons relating to the relief granted the applicants on December 24, 1992 pursuant to their application under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA") and the *Courts of Justice Act* , R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 ("CJA"). The relief sought was as follows:

(a) short service of the notice of application;

(b) a declaration that the applicants were companies to which the CCAA applies;

(c) authorization for the applicants to file a consolidated plan of compromise;

(d) authorization for the applicants to call meetings of their secured and unsecured creditors to approve the consolidated plan of compromise;

(e) a stay of all proceedings taken or that might be taken either in respect of the applicants in their own capacity or on account of their interest in Lehndorff United Properties (Canada) ("LUPC"), Lehndorff Properties (Canada) ("LPC") and Lehndorff Properties (Canada) II ("LPC II") and collectively (the "Limited Partnerships") whether as limited partner, as general partner or as registered titleholder to certain of their assets as bare trustee and nominee; and

(f) certain other ancillary relief.

2 The applicants are a number of companies within the larger Lehndorff group ("Group") which operates in Canada and elsewhere. The group appears to have suffered in the same way that a number of other property developers and managers which have also sought protection under the CCAA in recent years. The applicants are insolvent; they each have outstanding debentures issues under trust deeds; and they propose a plan of compromise among themselves and the holders of these debentures as well as those others of their secured and unsecured creditors as they deemed appropriate in the circumstances. Each applicant except THG Lehndorff Vermögensverwaltung GmbH ("GmbH") is an Ontario corporation. GmbH is a company incorporated under the laws of Germany. Each of the applicants has assets or does business in Canada. Therefore each is a "company" within the definition of s. 2 of the CCAA. The applicant Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. ("General Partner Company") is the sole general partner of the Limited Partnerships. The General Partner Company has sole control over the property and businesses of the Limited Partnerships. All major decisions concerning the applicants (and the Limited Partnerships) are made by management operating out of the Lehndorff Toronto Office. The applicants aside from the General Partner Company have as their sole purpose the holding of title to properties as bare trustee or nominee on behalf of the Limited Partnerships. LUPC is a limited partnership registered under the *Limited Partnership Act* , R.S.O. 1990, c. L.16 ("Ontario LPA"). LPC and LPC II are limited partnerships registered under Part 2 of the *Partnership Act* , R.S.A. 1980, c. P-2 ("Alberta PA") and each is registered in Ontario as an extra provincial limited partnership. LUPC has over 2,000 beneficial limited partners, LPC over 500 and LPC II over 250, most of whom are residents of Germany. As at March 31, 1992 LUPC had outstanding indebtedness of approximately $370 million, LPC $45 million and LPC II $7 million. Not all of the members of the Group are making an application under the CCAA. Taken together the Group's indebtedness as to Canadian matters (including that of the applicants) was approximately $543 million. In the summer of 1992 various creditors (Canada Trustco Mortgage Company, Bank of Montreal, Royal Bank of Canada, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and the Bank of Tokyo Canada) made demands for repayment of their loans. On November 6, 1992 Funtanua Investments Limited, a minor secured lendor also made a demand. An interim standstill agreement was worked out following a meeting of July 7, 1992. In conjunction with Peat Marwick Thorne Inc. which has been acting as an informal monitor to date and Fasken Campbell Godfrey the applicants have held multiple meetings with their senior secured creditors over the past half year and worked on a restructuring plan. The business affairs of the applicants (and the Limited Partnerships) are significantly intertwined as there are multiple instances of intercorporate debt, cross-default provisions and guarantees and they operated a centralized cash management system.

3 This process has now evolved to a point where management has developed a consolidated restructuring plan which plan addresses the following issues:

(a) The compromise of existing conventional, term and operating indebtedness, both secured and unsecured.

(b) The restructuring of existing project financing commitments.

(c) New financing, by way of equity or subordinated debt.

(d) Elimination or reduction of certain overhead.

(e) Viability of existing businesses of entities in the Lehndorff Group.

(f) Restructuring of income flows from the limited partnerships.

(g) Disposition of further real property assets aside from those disposed of earlier in the process.

(h) Consolidation of entities in the Group; and

(i) Rationalization of the existing debt and security structure in the continuing entities in the Group.

Formal meetings of the beneficial limited partners of the Limited Partnerships are scheduled for January 20 and 21, 1993 in Germany and an information circular has been prepared and at the time of hearing was being translated into

German. This application was brought on for hearing at this time for two general reasons: (a) it had now ripened to the stage of proceeding with what had been distilled out of the strategic and consultative meetings; and (b) there were creditors other than senior secured lenders who were in a position to enforce their rights against assets of some of the applicants (and Limited Partnerships) which if such enforcement did take place would result in an undermining of the overall plan. Notice of this hearing was given to various creditors: Barclays Bank of Canada, Barclays Bank PLC, Bank of Montreal, Citibank Canada, Canada Trustco Mortgage Corporation, Royal Trust Corporation of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, the Bank of Tokyo Canada, Funtauna Investments Limited, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Fuji Bank Canada and First City Trust Company. In this respect the applicants have recognized that although the initial application under the CCAA may be made on an ex parte basis (s. 11 of the CCAA; *Re Langley's Ltd.*, [1938] O.R. 123, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 230 (C.A.) ; *Re Keppoch Development Ltd.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 95 (N.S. T.D.) . The court will be concerned when major creditors have not been alerted even in the most minimal fashion (*Re Inducon Development Corp.* (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 310). The application was either supported or not opposed.

4 "Instant" debentures are now well recognized and respected by the courts: see *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-operative* (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44 (N.B. Q.B.) , at pp. 55-56, varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170 (N.B. Q.B.) , reversed on different grounds (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161 (N.B. C.A.) , at pp. 165-166; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C. S.C.) at pp. 250-251; *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101 (C.A.) per Doherty J.A., dissenting on another point, at pp. 306-310 (O.R.); *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon*) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.) at p. 327. The applicants would appear to me to have met the technical hurdle of s. 3 and as defined s. 2) of the CCAA in that they are debtor companies since they are insolvent, they have outstanding an issue of debentures under a trust deed and the compromise or arrangement that is proposed includes that compromise between the applicants and the holders of those trust deed debentures. I am also satisfied that because of the significant intertwining of the applicants it would be appropriate to have a consolidated plan. I would also understand that this court (Ontario Court of Justice (General Division)) is the appropriate court to hear this application since all the applicants except GmbH have their head office or their chief place of business in Ontario and GmbH, although it does not have a place of business within Canada, does have assets located within Ontario.

5 The CCAA is intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy and, as such, is remedial legislation entitled to a liberal interpretation. It seems to me that the purpose of the statute is to enable insolvent companies to carry on business in the ordinary course or otherwise deal with their assets so as to enable plan of compromise or arrangement to be prepared, filed and considered by their creditors and the court. In the interim, a judge has great discretion under the CCAA to make order so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors. See the preamble to and sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 of the CCAA; *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, [1934] S.C.R. 659 at p. 661, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75 ; *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 219-220; *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361 (Q.B.) , at pp. 12-13 (C.B.R.); *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (B.C. C.A.) , at pp. 310-311, affirming (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 291, 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.) , leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 164 (S.C.C.) .; *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* , supra, at p. 307 (O.R.); *Fine's Flowers v. Fine's Flowers (Creditors of)* (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 193 (Gen. Div.) , at p. 199 and "Reorganizations Under The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act", Stanley E. Edwards (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587 at p. 592.

6 The CCAA is intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. Where a debtor company realistically plans to continue operating or to otherwise deal with its assets but it requires the protection of the court in order to do so and it is otherwise too early for the court to determine whether the debtor company will succeed, relief should be granted under the CCAA. see *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* , supra at pp. 297 and 316; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* , supra, at pp. 251-252 and *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)* , supra, at p. 328 and p. 330. It has been held that

the intention of the CCAA is to prevent any manoeuvres for positioning among the creditors during the period required to develop a plan and obtain approval of creditors. Such manoeuvres could give an aggressive creditor an advantage to the prejudice of others who are less aggressive and would undermine the company's financial position making it even less likely that the plan will succeed: see *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank* , supra, at p. 220 (W.W.R.). The possibility that one or more creditors may be prejudiced should not affect the court's exercise of its authority to grant a stay of proceedings under the CCAA because this affect is offset by the benefit to all creditors and to the company of facilitating a reorganization. The court's primary concerns under the CCAA must be for the debtor and *all* of the creditors: see *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* , supra, at pp. 108-110; *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (C.A.) , at pp. 315-318 (C.B.R.) and *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* , supra, at pp. 251-252.

7 One of the purposes of the CCAA is to facilitate ongoing operations of a business where its assets have a greater value as part of an integrated system than individually. The CCAA facilitates reorganization of a company where the alternative, sale of the property piecemeal, is likely to yield far less satisfaction to the creditors. Unlike the *Bankruptcy Act* , R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, before the amendments effective November 30, 1992 to transform it into the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ("BIA"), it is possible under the CCAA to bind secured creditors it has been generally speculated that the CCAA will be resorted to by companies that are generally larger and have a more complicated capital structure and that those companies which make an application under the BIA will be generally smaller and have a less complicated structure. Reorganization may include partial liquidation where it is intended as part of the process of a return to long term viability and profitability. See *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* , supra, at p. 318 and *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.* (1987), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 245, reversed on other grounds at (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 71 (Alta. C.A.) . It appears to me that the purpose of the CCAA is also to protect the interests of creditors and to enable an orderly distribution of the debtor company's affairs. This may involve a winding-up or liquidation of a company or simply a substantial downsizing of its business operations, provided the same is proposed in the best interests of the creditors generally. See *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.* , supra, at p. 318; *Re Amirault Fish Co.*, 32 C.B.R. 186, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 203 (N.S. T.D.) at pp. 187-188 (C.B.R.).

8 It strikes me that each of the applicants in this case has a realistic possibility of being able to continue operating, although each is currently unable to meet all of its expenses albeit on a reduced scale. This is precisely the sort of circumstance in which all of the creditors are likely to benefit from the application of the CCAA and in which it is appropriate to grant an order staying proceedings so as to allow the applicant to finalize preparation of and file a plan of compromise and arrangement.

9 Let me now review the aspect of the stay of proceedings. Section 11 of the CCAA provides as follows:

> 11. Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy Act* or the *Winding-up Act* , whenever an application has been made under this Act in respect of any company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit,
>
> (*a*) make an order staying, until such time as the court may prescribe or until any further order, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy Act* and the *Winding-up Act* or either of them;
>
> (*b*) restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company on such terms as the court sees fit; and
>
> (*c*) make an order that no suit, action or other proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court imposes.

10 The power to grant a stay of proceeding should be construed broadly in order to permit the CCAA to accomplish its legislative purpose and in particular to enable continuance of the company seeking CCAA protection. The power to grant a stay therefore extends to a stay which affected the position not only of the company's secured and unsecured

creditors, but also all non-creditors and other parties who could potentially jeopardize the success of the plan and thereby the continuance of the company. See *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* , supra, at pp. 12-17 (C.B.R.) and *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* , supra, at pp. 296-298 (B.C. S.C.) and pp. 312-314 (B.C. C.A.) and *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank* , supra, at pp. 219 ff. Further the court has the power to order a stay that is effective in respect of the rights arising in favour of secured creditors under all forms of commercial security: see *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* , supra, at p. 320 where Gibbs J.A. for the court stated:

> The trend which emerges from this sampling will be given effect here by holding that where the word "security" occurs in the C.C.A.A., it includes s. 178 security and, where the word creditor occurs, it includes a bank holding s. 178 security. To the extent that there may be conflict between the two statutes, therefore, the broad scope of the C.C.A.A. prevails.

11 The power to grant a stay may also extend to preventing persons seeking to terminate or cancel executory contracts, including, without limitation agreements with the applying companies for the supply of goods or services, from doing so: see *Gaz Métropolitain v. Wynden Canada Inc.* (1982), 44 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (C.S. Que.) at pp. 290-291 and *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* , supra, at pp. 311-312 (B.C. C.A.). The stay may also extend to prevent a mortgagee from proceeding with foreclosure proceedings (see *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 141 (B.C. S.C.) or to prevent landlords from terminating leases, or otherwise enforcing their rights thereunder (see *Feifer v. Frame Manufacturing Corp.* (1947), 28 C.B.R. 124 (C.A. Que.)). Amounts owing to landlords in respect of arrears of rent or unpaid rent for the unexpired portion of lease terms are properly dealt with in a plan of compromise or arrangement: see *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.) especially at p. 318. The jurisdiction of the court to make orders under the CCAA in the interest of protecting the debtor company so as to enable it to prepare and file a plan is effective notwithstanding the terms of any contract or instrument to which the debtor company is a party. Section 8 of the CCAA provides:

> 8. This Act extends and does not limit the provisions of any instrument now or hereafter existing that governs the rights of creditors or any class of them and has full force and effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in that instrument.

The power to grant a stay may also extend to prevent persons from exercising any right of set off in respect of the amounts owed by such a person to the debtor company, irrespective of whether the debtor company has commenced any action in respect of which the defense of set off might be formally asserted: see *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* , supra, at pp. 312-314 (B.C.C.A.).

12 It was submitted by the applicants that the power to grant a stay of proceedings may also extend to a stay of proceedings against non-applicants who are not companies and accordingly do not come within the express provisions of the CCAA. In support thereof they cited a CCAA order which was granted staying proceedings against individuals who guaranteed the obligations of a debtor-applicant which was a qualifying company under the terms of the CCAA: see *Re Slavik* , unreported, [1992] B.C.J. No. 341 [now reported at 12 C.B.R. (3d) 157 (B.C. S.C.)]. However in the *Slavik* situation the individual guarantors were officers and shareholders of two companies which had sought and obtained CCAA protection. Vickers J. in that case indicated that the facts of that case included the following unexplained and unamplified fact [at p. 159]:

> 5. The order provided further that all creditors of Norvik Timber Inc. be enjoined from making demand for payment upon that firm or upon any guarantor of an obligation of the firm until further order of the court.

The CCAA reorganization plan involved an assignment of the claims of the creditors to "Newco" in exchange for cash and shares. However the basis of the stay order originally granted was not set forth in this decision.

13 It appears to me that Dickson J. in *International Donut Corp. v. 050863 N.D. Ltd.* , unreported, [1992] N.B.J. No. 339 (N.B. Q.B.) [now reported at 127 N.B.R. (2d) 290, 319 A.P.R. 290] was focusing only on the stay arrangements of the CCAA when concerning a limited partnership situation he indicated [at p. 295 N.B.R.]:

> In August 1991 the limited partnership, through its general partner the plaintiff, applied to the Court under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* , R.S.C., c. C-36 for an order delaying the assertion of claims by creditors until an opportunity could be gained to work out with the numerous and sizable creditors a compromise of their claims. An order was obtained but it in due course expired without success having been achieved in arranging with creditors a compromise. *That effort may have been wasted, because it seems questionable that the federal Act could have any application to a limited partnership in circumstances such as these* . (Emphasis added.)

14 I am not persuaded that the words of s. 11 which are quite specific as relating as to a *company* can be enlarged to encompass something other than that. However it appears to me that Blair J. was clearly in the right channel in his analysis in *Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd.* unreported, [1992] O.J. No. 1946 [now reported at 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.)] at pp. 4-7 [at pp. 308-310 C.B.R.].

The Power to Stay

The court has always had an inherent jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings whenever it is just and convenient to do so, in order to control its process or prevent an abuse of that process: see *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co.* (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. H.C.) , and cases referred to therein. In the civil context, this general power is also embodied in the very broad terms of s. 106 of the *Courts of Justice Act* , R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, which provides as follows:

> 106. A court, on its own initiative or on motion by any person, whether or not a party, may stay any proceeding in the court on such terms as are considered just.

Recently, Mr. Justice O'Connell has observed that this discre tionary power is "highly dependent on the facts of each particular case": *Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim* (unreported) [(June 25, 1992), Doc. 24127/88 (Ont. Gen. Div.)], [1992] O.J. No. 1330.

Apart from this inherent and general jurisdiction to stay proceedings, there are many instances where the court is specifically granted the power to stay in a particular context, by virtue of statute or under the *Rules of Civil Procedure* . The authority to prevent multiplicity of proceedings in the same court, under r. 6.01(1), is an example of the latter. The power to stay judicial and extra-judicial proceedings under s. 11 of the C.C.A.A., is an example of the former. Section 11 of the C.C.A.A. provides as follows.

The Power to Stay in the Context of C.C.A.A. Proceedings

By its formal title the C.C.A.A. is known as "An Act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors". To ensure the effective nature of such a "facilitative" process it is essential that the debtor company be afforded a respite from the litigious and other rights being exercised by creditors, while it attempts to carry on as a going concern and to negotiate an acceptable corporate restructuring arrangement with such creditors.

In this respect it has been observed that the C.C.A.A. is "to be used as a practical and effective way of restructuring corporate indebtedness.": see the case comment following the report of *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 81 (Q.B.) , and the approval of that remark as "a perceptive observation about the attitude of the courts" by Gibbs J.A. in *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.) at p. 113 [B.C.L.R.].

Gibbs J.A. continued with this comment:

> To the extent that a general principle can be extracted from the few cases directly on point, and the others in which there is persuasive obiter, it would appear to be that the courts have concluded that under s. 11 there is *a discretionary power to restrain judicial or extra-judicial conduct* against the debtor company *the effect of which is, or would be, seriously to impair the ability of the debtor company to continue in business during the compromise or arrangement negotiating period* .
>
> (emphasis added)

I agree with those sentiments and would simply add that, in my view, the restraining power extends as well to conduct which could seriously impair the debtor's ability to focus and concentrate its efforts on the business purpose of negotiating the compromise or arrangement. [In this respect, see also *Sairex GmbH v. Prudential Steel Ltd.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 62 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 77.]

I must have regard to these foregoing factors while I consider, as well, the general principles which have historically governed the court's exercise of its power to stay proceedings. These principles were reviewed by Mr. Justice Montgomery in *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance* , supra (a "Mississauga Derailment" case), at pp. 65-66 [C.P.C.]. The balance of convenience must weigh significantly in favour of granting the stay, as a party's right to have access to the courts must not be lightly interfered with. The court must be satisfied that a continuance of the proceeding would serve as an injustice to the party seeking the stay, in the sense that it would be oppressive or vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court in some other way. The stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff.

It is quite clear from *Empire-Universal Films Limited v. Rank*, [1947] O.R. 775 (H.C.) that McRuer C.J.H.C. considered that *The Judicature Act* [R.S.O. 1937, c. 100] then [and now the CJA] merely confirmed a statutory right that previously had been considered inherent in the jurisdiction of the court with respect to its authority to grant a stay of proceedings. See also *McCordic v. Bosanquet* (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 (H.C.) and *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allen-Dale Mutual Insurance Co.* (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60 (H.C.) at pp. 65-66.

15 Montgomery J. in *Canada Systems* , supra, at pp. 65-66 indicated:

> Goodman J. (as he then was) in *McCordic v. Bosanquet* (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 in granting a stay reviewed the authorities and concluded that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to grant a stay of proceedings may be made whenever it is just and reasonable to do so. "This court has ample jurisdiction to grant a stay whenever it is just and reasonable to do so." (Per Lord Denning M.R. in *Edmeades v. Thames Board Mills Ltd.*, [1969] 2 Q.B. 67 at 71, [1969] 2 All E.R. 127 (C.A.)). Lord Denning's decision in *Edmeades* was approved by Lord Justice Davies in *Lane v. Willis; Lane v. Beach (Executor of Estate of George William Willis)*, [1972] 1 All E.R. 430, (sub nom. *Lane v. Willis; Lane v. Beach)* [1972] 1 W.L.R. 326 (C.A.) .
>
> . . . . .
>
> In *Weight Watchers Int. Inc. v. Weight Watchers of Ont. Ltd.* (1972), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 419, 5 C.P.R. (2d) 122 , appeal allowed by consent without costs (sub nom. *Weight Watchers of Ont. Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Inc. Inc.)* 42 D.L.R. (3d) 320n, 10 C.P.R. (2d) 96n (Fed. C.A.) , Mr. Justice Heald on an application for stay said at p. 426 [25 D.L.R.]:
>
> > The principles which must govern in these matters are clearly stated in the case of *Empire Universal Films Ltd. et al. v. Rank et al.*, [1947] O.R. 775 at p. 779, as follows [quoting *St. Pierre et al. v. South American Stores (Gath & Chaves), Ltd. et al.*, [1936] 1 K.B. 382 at p. 398]:
> >
> > > (1.) A mere balance of convenience is not a sufficient ground for depriving a plaintiff of the advantages of prosecuting his action in an English Court if it is otherwise properly brought. The right of access to the King's Court must not be lightly refused. (2.) In order to justify a stay two conditions must be satisfied, one positive and the other negative: (a) the defendant must satisfy the Court that the continuance of the action would work an injustice because it would be oppressive or vexatious to him or would be an abuse

> of the process of the Court in some other way; and (b) the stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff. On both the burden of proof is on the defendant.

16 Thus it appears to me that the inherent power of this court to grant stays can be used to supplement s. 11 of the CCAA when it is just and reasonable to do so. Is it appropriate to do so in the circumstances? Clearly there is jurisdiction under s. 11 of the CCAA to grant a stay in respect of any of the applicants which are all companies which fit the criteria of the CCAA. However the stay requested also involved the limited partnerships to some degree either (i) with respect to the applicants acting on behalf of the Limited Partnerships or (ii) the stays being effective vis-à-vis any proceedings taken by any party against the property assets and undertaking of the Limited Partnerships in respect of which they hold a direct interest (collectively the "Property") as set out in the terms of the stay provisions of the order paragraphs 4 through 18 inclusive attached as an appendix to these reasons. [Appendix omitted.] I believe that an analysis of the operations of a limited partnership in this context would be beneficial to an understanding of how there is a close inter-relationship to the applicants involved in this CCAA proceedings and how the Limited Partnerships and their Property are an integral part of the operations previously conducted and the proposed restructuring.

17 A limited partnership is a creation of statute, consisting of one or more general partners and one or more limited partners. The limited partnership is an investment vehicle for passive investment by limited partners. It in essence combines the flow through concept of tax depreciation or credits available to "ordinary" partners under general partnership law with limited liability available to shareholders under corporate law. See Ontario LPA sections 2(2) and 3(1) and Lyle R. Hepburn, *Limited Partnerships* , (Toronto: De Boo, 1991), at p. 1-2 and p. 1-12. I would note here that the limited partnership provisions of the Alberta PA are roughly equivalent to those found in the Ontario LPA with the interesting side aspect that the Alberta legislation in s. 75 does allow for judgment against a limited partner to be charged against the limited partner's interest in the limited partnership. A general partner has all the rights and powers and is subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a partnership. In particular a general partner is fully liable to each creditor of the business of the limited partnership. The general partner has sole control over the property and business of the limited partnership: see Ontario LPA ss. 8 and 13. Limited partners have no liability to the creditors of the limited partnership's business; the limited partners' financial exposure is limited to their contribution. The limited partners do not have any "independent" ownership rights in the property of the limited partnership. The entitlement of the limited partners is limited to their contribution plus any profits thereon, after satisfaction of claims of the creditors. See Ontario LPA sections 9, 11, 12(1), 13, 15(2) and 24. The process of debtor and creditor relationships associated with the limited partnership's business are between the general partner and the creditors of the business. In the event of the creditors collecting on debt and enforcing security, the creditors can only look to the assets of the limited partnership together with the assets of the general partner including the general partner's interest in the limited partnership. This relationship is recognized under the *Bankruptcy Act* (now the BIA) sections 85 and 142.

18 A general partner is responsible to defend proceedings against the limited partnership in the firm name, so in procedural law and in practical effect, a proceeding against a limited partnership is a proceeding against the general partner. See Ontario *Rules of Civil Procedure* , O. Reg. 560/84, Rules 8.01 and 8.02.

19 It appears that the preponderance of case law supports the contention that contention that a partnership including a limited partnership is not a separate legal entity. See *Lindley on Partnership* , 15th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984), at pp. 33-35; *Seven Mile Dam Contractors v. R.* (1979), 13 B.C.L.R. 137 (S.C.) , affirmed (1980), 25 B.C.L.R. 183 (C.A.) and "Extra-Provincial Liability of the Limited Partner", Brad A. Milne, (1985) 23 Alta. L. Rev. 345, at pp. 350-351. Milne in that article made the following observations:

> The preponderance of case law therefore supports the contention that a limited partnership is not a separate legal entity. It appears, nevertheless, that the distinction made in *Re Thorne* between partnerships and trade unions could not be applied to limited partnerships which, like trade unions, must rely on statute for their validity. The mere fact that limited partnerships owe their existence to the statutory provision is probably not sufficient to endow the limited partnership with the attribute of legal personality as suggested in *Ruzicks* unless it appeared that the Legislature clearly intended that the limited partnership should have a separate legal existence. A review of the

various provincial statutes does not reveal any procedural advantages, rights or powers that are fundamentally different from those advantages enjoyed by ordinary partnerships. The legislation does not contain any provision resembling section 15 of the *Canada Business Corporation Act* [S.C. 1974-75, c. 33, as am.] which expressly states that a corporation has the capacity, both in and outside of Canada, of a natural person. It is therefore difficult to imagine that the Legislature intended to create a new category of legal entity.

20 It appears to me that the operations of a limited partnership in the ordinary course are that the limited partners take a completely passive role (they must or they will otherwise lose their limited liability protection which would have been their sole reason for choosing a limited partnership vehicle as opposed to an "ordinary" partnership vehicle). For a lively discussion of the question of "control" in a limited partnership as contrasted with shareholders in a corporation, see R. Flannigan, "The Control Test of Investor Liability in Limited Partnerships" (1983) 21 Alta. L. Rev. 303; E. Apps, "Limited Partnerships and the 'Control' Prohibition: Assessing the Liability of Limited Partners" (1991) 70 Can. Bar Rev. 611; R. Flannigan, "Limited Partner Liability: A Response" (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 552. The limited partners leave the running of the business to the general partner and in that respect the care, custody and the maintenance of the property, assets and undertaking of the limited partnership in which the limited partners and the general partner hold an interest. The ownership of this limited partnership property, assets and undertaking is an undivided interest which cannot be segregated for the purpose of legal process. It seems to me that there must be afforded a protection of the whole since the applicants' individual interest therein cannot be segregated without in effect dissolving the partnership arrangement. The limited partners have two courses of action to take if they are dissatisfied with the general partner or the operation of the limited partnership as carried on by the general partner — the limited partners can vote to (a) remove the general partner and replace it with another or (b) dissolve the limited partnership. However Flannigan strongly argues that an unfettered right to remove the general partner would attach general liability for the limited partners (and especially as to the question of continued enjoyment of favourable tax deductions) so that it is prudent to provide this as a conditional right: *Control Test* , (1992), supra, at pp. 524-525. Since the applicants are being afforded the protection of a stay of proceedings in respect to allowing them time to advance a reorganization plan and complete it if the plan finds favour, there should be a stay of proceedings (vis-à-vis any action which the limited partners may wish to take as to replacement or dissolution) through the period of allowing the limited partners to vote on the reorganization plan itself.

21 It seems to me that using the inherent jurisdiction of this court to supplement the statutory stay provisions of s. 11 of the CCAA would be appropriate in the circumstances; it would be just and reasonable to do so. The business operations of the applicants are so intertwined with the limited partnerships that it would be impossible for relief as to a stay to be granted to the applicants which would affect their business without at the same time extending that stay to the undivided interests of the limited partners in such. It also appears that the applicants are well on their way to presenting a reorganization plan for consideration and a vote; this is scheduled to happen within the month so there would not appear to be any significant time inconvenience to any person interested in pursuing proceedings. While it is true that the provisions of the CCAA allow for a cramdown of a creditor's claim (as well as an interest of any other person), those who wish to be able to initiate or continue proceedings against the applicants may utilize the comeback clause in the order to persuade the court that it would not be just and reasonable to maintain that particular stay. It seems to me that in such a comeback motion the onus would be upon the applicants to show that in the circumstances it was appropriate to continue the stay.

22 The order is therefore granted as to the relief requested including the proposed stay provisions.

Application allowed.

Footnotes

* As amended by the court.

End of Document

TAB C

2011 ONSC 2061
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Priszm Income Fund, Re

2011 CarswellOnt 2258, 2011 ONSC 2061, [2011] O.J. No. 1491, 200 A.C.W.S. (3d) 626, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

And In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Priszm Income Fund, Priszm Canadian Operating Trust, Priszm Inc. and Kit Finance Inc. (Applicants)

Morawetz J.

Heard: March 31, 2011
Judgment: March 31, 2011
Docket: CV-11-915900CL

Counsel: A.J. Taylor, M. Konyukhova for Priszm Entities
G. Finlayson — Conflict Counsel for the Priszm Entities
M. Wasserman for Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.
P. Shea for Prudential Insurance
P. Huff for Directors of Priszm
C. Cosgriffe for Yum! Restaurants International (Canada) LP
D. Ullmann for 2279549 Ontario Inc.

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.2 Initial application
XIX.2.b Grant of stay
XIX.2.b.viii Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Grant of stay — Miscellaneous

P Fund, P Trust, P GP, P LP and K Inc. were collectively referred to as P Entities — P Entities owned and operated 428 quick service restaurants — P LP was franchisee of franchisor, Y LP — Business of P LP was to develop, acquire, make investments in and conduct business in connection with quick service restaurant business — P Entities ceased paying certain obligations to Y LP and could not meet their liabilities as they came due; it became insolvent — P Fund, P Trust, P GP, and K Inc., applicants, sought relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act (CCAA) and also sought to have stay of proceedings of initial order under CCAA extended to P LP — Application granted — Applicants' submission that they were debtor companies to which CCAA applied was accepted — P Entities were in process of coordinating sale process for certain assets, and stay of proceedings was appropriate — While CCAA definition of eligible company does not expressly include partnerships, CCAA courts have exercised jurisdiction to stay proceedings with respect to partnerships and limited partnerships where it is just and convenient to do so — Courts have held that this relief is appropriate where operations of debtor companies are so intertwined with those of partnerships, that not extending stay would significantly impair effectiveness of stay in respect of debtor companies — It was appropriate to extend CCAA protection to P LP.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 6184, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — followed

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 338 N.R. 196 (note), 2004 CarswellOnt 5200, 2004 CarswellOnt 5201 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 2 "insolvent person" — considered

s. 11.2(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.4(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.5(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.5(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

APPLICATION by affiliated debtor companies for relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act and to have stay of proceedings of initial order extended to limited partnership.

***Morawetz J.*:**

1 Priszm Income Fund ("Priszm Fund"), Priszm Canadian Operating Trust ("Priszm Trust"), Priszm Inc. ("Priszm GP") and KIT Finance Inc. ("KIT Finance") (collectively, the "Applicants") seek relief under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "CCAA"). The Applicants also seek to have the stay of proceedings and other benefits of an initial order under the CCAA extended to Priszm Limited Partnership ("Priszm LP"). Priszm Fund, Priszm Trust, Priszm GP, Priszm LP and KIT Finance are collectively referred to as the "Priszm Entities".

Background

2 The Priszm Entities own and operate 428 KFC, Taco Bell and Pizza Hut restaurants in seven provinces across Canada. As a result of declining sales and the inability to secure additional or alternate financing, the Priszm Entities cannot meet their liabilities as they come due and are therefore insolvent.

3 The Priszm Entities seek a stay of proceedings under the CCAA to allow them to secure a going concern solution for the business including approximately 6,500 employees and numerous suppliers, landlords and other creditors and to maximize recovery for the Priszm Entities' stakeholders.

4 On the return of the motion, the only party that took issue with the proposed relief was Yum! Restaurants International (Canada) LP (the "Franchisor"). Counsel to the Franchisor indicated that the Franchisor was not opposing the form of order, but explicitly does not consent to the stated intention of the Priszm Entities not to pay franchise royalties to the Franchisor.

5 The background facts with respect to this application are set out in the Affidavit of Deborah J. Papernick, sworn March 31, 2011 (the "Papernick Affidavit"). Further details are also contained in a pre-filing report submitted by FTI Consulting Canada Inc. ("FTI") in its capacity as proposed monitor. FTI has been acting as financial advisor to the Priszm Entities since December 13, 2010.

6 Priszm LP is a franchisee of the Franchisor and is Canada's largest independent quick service restaurant operator. Priszm LP is the largest operator of the KFC concept in Canada, accounting for approximately 60% of all KFC product sales in Canada. In addition, Priszm LP operates a number of multi-branded restaurants that combine a KFC restaurant with either a Taco Bell or a Pizza Hut restaurant.

7 As of March 25, 2011, the Priszm Entities operated 428 restaurants in seven provinces: British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.

8 The business of Priszm LP is to develop, acquire, make investments in and conduct the business and ownership, operation and lease of assets and property in connection with the quick service restaurant business in Canada.

9 Priszm Fund is an income trust indirectly holding approximately 60% of Priszm LP's trust units.

10 Priszm Trust is an unincorporated, limited purpose trust wholly-owned by Priszm Fund created to acquire and hold 60% of the outstanding partnership units of Priszm LP, as well as approximately 60% of Priszm GP's units, for Priszm Fund.

11 Priszm GP is a corporation which acts as general partner of Priszm LP.

12 KIT Finance is a corporation created to act as borrower for the Prudential Loan, described below.

13 The principal and head offices of Priszm Fund, Priszm LP and Priszm GP are located in Vaughan, Ontario.

14 As at March 31, 2011, the Priszm Entities had short-term and long-term indebtedness totalling: $98.8 million pursuant to the following instruments:

(a) Note purchase and private shelf agreement dated January 12, 2006 ("Note Purchase Agreement") between KIT Finance, Priszm GP and Prudential Investment Management ("Prudential") - $67.3 million;

(b) Subordinated Debentures issued by Priszm Fund due June 30, 2012 - $30 million - $31.5 million.

15 The indebtedness under the Note Purchase Agreement (the "Prudential Loan") is guaranteed by and secured by substantially all of the assets of Priszm GP, KIT Finance and Priszm LP and by limited recourse guarantees and pledge agreements granted by Priszm Fund and Priszm Trust.

16 In addition, the Priszm Entities have approximately $39.1 million of accrued and unpaid liabilities.

17 As a result of slower than forecast sales, on September 5, 2010, Priszm Fund breached the Prudential Financial covenant and remains in non-compliance. As a result, the Prudential Loan became callable.

18 Priszm Fund has also failed to make an interest payment of $975,000 due on December 31, 2010 in respect to the Subordinated Debentures.

19 The Priszm Entities have also ceased paying certain obligations to the Franchisor as they come due.

Findings

20 I am satisfied that Priszm GP and KIT Finance are "companies" within the definition of the CCAA. I am also satisfied that Priszm Fund and Priszm Trust fall within the definition of "income trust" under the CCAA and are "companies" to which the CCAA applies.

21 I am also satisfied that the Priszm Entities are insolvent. In arriving at this determination, I have considered the definition of "insolvent" in the context of the CCAA as set out in *Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), leave to appeal refused, 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 2004 CarswellOnt 5200 (S.C.C.). In *Stelco* , Farley J. applied an expanded definition of insolvent in the CCAA context to reflect the "rescue" emphasis of the CCAA, modifying the definition of "insolvent person" within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("BIA") to include a financially troubled corporation that is "reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring".

22 In this case, the Priszm Entities are unable to meet their obligations to creditors and have ceased paying certain obligations as they become due.

23 Further, the Priszm Entities are affiliated debtor companies with total claims against in excess of $100 million.

24 I accept the submission put forth by counsel to the Applicants to the effect that the Applicants are "debtor companies" to which the CCAA applies.

25 At the present time, the Priszm Entities are in the process of coordinating a sale process for certain assets. In these circumstances, I have been persuaded that a stay of proceedings is appropriate. In arriving at this determination, I have considered *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) and *Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

26 The CCAA definition of an eligible company does not expressly include partnerships. However, CCAA courts have exercised jurisdiction to stay proceedings with respect to partnerships and limited partnerships where it is just and convenient to do so. See *Lehndorff, supra*, and *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 6184 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

27 The courts have held that this relief is appropriate where the operations of the debtor companies are so intertwined with those of the partnerships or limited partnerships in question, that not extending the stay would significantly impair the effectiveness of a stay in respect of the debtor companies.

28 Having reviewed the affidavit of Ms. Papernick, I have been persuaded that it is appropriate to extend CCAA protection to Priszm LP.

29 The Priszm Entities are also seeking an order: (a) declaring certain of their suppliers to be critical suppliers within the meaning of the CCAA; (b) requiring such suppliers to continue to supply on terms and conditions consistent with existing arrangements and past practice as amended by the initial order; (c) granting a charge over the Property as security for payment for goods and services supplied after the date of the Initial Order.

30 Section 11.4 of the CCAA provides the court jurisdiction to declare a person to be a critical supplier. The CCAA does not contain a definition of "critical supplier" but pursuant to 11.4(1), the court must be satisfied that the person sought to be declared a critical supplier "is a supplier of goods or services to the company and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operations".

31 Counsel submits that the Priszm Entities' business is virtually entirely reliant on their ability to prepare, cook and sell their products and that given the perishable nature of their products, the Priszm Entities maintain very little inventory and rely on an uninterrupted flow of deliveries and continued availability of various products. In addition, the

Priszm Entities are highly dependent on continued and timely provision of waste disposal and information technology services and various utilities.

32 With the assistance of the proposed monitor, the Priszm Entities have identified a number of suppliers which are critical to their ongoing operation and have organized these suppliers into five categories:

(a) chicken suppliers;

(b) other food and restaurant consumables;

(c) utility service providers;

(d) suppliers of waste disposal services;

(e) providers of appliance repair and information technology services.

33 A complete list of the suppliers considered critical by the Priszm Entities (the "Critical Suppliers") is attached at Schedule "A" to the proposed Initial Order.

34 Having reviewed the record, I have been satisfied that any interruption of supply by the Critical Suppliers could have an immediate material adverse impact on the Priszm Entities business, operations and cash flow such that it is, in my view, appropriate to declare the Critical Suppliers as "critical suppliers" pursuant to the CCAA.

35 Further, I accept the submission of counsel to the Priszm Entities that it is appropriate to grant a Critical Suppliers' Charge to rank behind the Administrative Charge.

36 The Priszm Entities also seek approval of the DIP Facility in the amount up to $3 million to be secured by the DIP Lenders' Charge.

37 Subsection 11.2(4) of the CCAA sets out the factors to be considered by the court in deciding whether to grant a DIP Financing Charge. These factors include:

(a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under the CCAA;

(b) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;

(c) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;

(d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;

(e) the nature and value of the company's property;

(f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and

(g) the monitor's report.

38 Counsel submits that the following factors support the granting of the DIP Lenders' Charge:

(a) the Priszm Entities expect to continue daily operations during the proceedings;

(b) management will be overseen by the monitor who will oversee spending under the DIP Financing;

(c) while it is not anticipated that the Priszm Entities will require any additional financing prior to June 30, 2011, actual funding requirements may vary;

(d) the ability to borrow funds from a court-approved DIP Facility will be crucial to retain the confidence of stakeholders;

(e) secured creditors have either been given notice of the DIP Lenders' Charge or are not affected by it;

(f) the DIP Lenders' Charge does not secure an obligation that existed before the granting of the Initial Order; and

(g) the proposed monitor is supportive of the DIP Facility and the DIP Lenders' Charge.

39 Based on the foregoing, I am of the view that it is appropriate to approve the DIP Facility and grant the DIP Lenders' Charge.

40 The trustees and directors of the Priszm Entities have stated their intention to resign. In order to ensure ongoing corporate governance, the Priszm Entities seek an order appointing 2279549 Ontario Inc. as the CRO. They have also requested that the Chief Restructuring Officer be afforded the protections outlined in the draft Initial Order.

41 The Applicants are seeking an Administration Charge over the property in the amount of $1.5 million to secure the fees of the proposed monitor, its counsel, counsel to the Priszm Entities and the CRO. It is proposed that this charge will rank in priority to all other security interests in the Priszm assets, other than any "secured creditor", as defined in the CCAA, who has not received notice of the application for CCAA protection.

42 The authority to provide such a charge is set out in s. 11.5(2) of the CCAA.

43 The Priszm Entities submit that the following factors support the granting of the Administration Charge:

(a) the Priszm Entities operate an extensive business;

(b) the beneficiaries will provide essential legal and financial advice and leadership;

(c) there is no anticipated unwarranted duplication of roles;

(d) secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge were provided with notice and do not object to the Administration Charge; and

(e) the proposed monitor, in its pre-filing report, supports the Administration Charge.

44 I am satisfied that this is an appropriate case in which to grant the Administration Charge in the form requested.

45 I am also satisfied that it is appropriate to grant a Directors' Charge in the amount of $9.8 million to protect directors and officers and the CRO from certain potential liabilities. In arriving at this determination, I have considered the provisions of s. 11.5(1) of the CCAA which addresses the issue of directors' and officers' charges. I have also considered that the Priszm Entities maintain directors' and officers' liability insurance ("D&O Insurance"). The current policy provides a total of $31 million in coverage. It is expected that the D&O Insurance will provide coverage sufficient to protect the directors and officers and the draft Initial Order provides that the Directors' Charge shall only apply to the extent that the D&O Insurance is not adequate.

46 For the foregoing reasons, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the CCAA Initial Order in the form requested.

47 Paragraph 14 of the form of order provides for a stay of proceedings up to and including April 29, 2011. Paragraph 59 provides for the standard comeback provision.

48 The Initial Order was signed 9:30 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time on March 31, 2011.

Application granted.

End of Document

TAB D

2016 ONSC 3288
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Urbancorp Toronto Management Inc., Re

2016 CarswellOnt 8410, 2016 ONSC 3288, 267 A.C.W.S. (3d) 23, 37 C.B.R. (6th) 44

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. c-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Urbancorp Toronto Management Inc., Urbancorp (St. Clair Village) Inc., Urbancorp (Patricia) Inc., Urbancorp (Mallow) Inc., Urbancorp (Lawrence) Inc., Urbancorp Downsview Park Development Inc., Urbancorp Residential Inc., Urbancorp (952 Queen West) Inc., King Residential Inc., Urbancorp 60 St. Clair Inc., High Res. Inc., Bridge on King Inc. (Collectively the "Applicants") and The Affilliated Entities Listed in Schedule "A" Hereto

In the Matter of Urbancorp Inc. Application of Guy Gissin, The Foreign Representative of Urbancorp Inc., under Section 46 of the Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

Newbould J.

Heard: May 18, 2016
Judgment: May 25, 2016
Docket: CV-16-11389-00CL, CV-16-11392-00CL

Counsel: Edmund F.B. Lamek, Rachael Belanger, for Applicants
L. Joseph Latham, Tamryn Jacobson, for Guy Gissin, Foreign Representative of Urbancorp Inc.
Robin B. Schwill, Jay Swartz, for KSV Kofman Inc.
Jane Dietrich, for Mattany (Downsview) Inc.
Scott Bomhof, for King Liberty North Corporation
Adam Slavens, for Tarion Warranty Corporation
Heather Meredith, for Bank of Nova Scotia
Clifton P. Prophet, Frank Lamie, for Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
John Paul Ventrella, for Atrium Mortgage Investment Mortgage
Aubrey E. Kauffman, for Travelers Guarantee Company of Canada
Brian Empey, for Parc Downsview Park Inc.

Subject: Insolvency; International

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.2 Initial application
XIX.2.a Procedure
XIX.2.a.iv Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Procedure — Miscellaneous

Company issued debentures that traded on Tel Aviv Stock Exchange — Indenture trustees of Israel debentures asserted that company defaulted under terms of debenture trust and initiated court proceedings against company in Israel — Israeli court issued injunction to prevent company from taking any further steps to deal with it's assets — Israeli court

appointed functionary officer of company with full management control and powers over subsidiaries — Applicants were company subsidiaries and were insolvent — Applicants were unable to raise necessary financing to advance their major projects beyond their current stages of development — Applicants applied for relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act CCAA — Some of applicants earlier filed notice of intent (NOI) to make proposal under Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act but did not file proposals — Those applicants applied to continue NOI proceedings in CCAA proceeding — Application granted — Foreign proceeding in Israeli court was to be recognized as foreign main proceeding under CCAA and initial recognition order was to provide stay of any proceeding against company and prohibit it from selling property in Canada without leave of court — Parties agreed that while Israeli proceeding would be considered to be foreign main proceeding, functionary officer appointed by Israeli court as foreign representative agreed that his sole control of company and its assets would be exercised by monitor acting under CCAA so long as monitor acted in good faith collaboratively with functionary officer — Proposed continuation of NOI proceedings as CCAA proceeding was consistent with purposes of CCAA — Continuation also assisted in co-operative proceedings with functionary officer — Interim lender's charge to secure interim funding was granted.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Newbould J.*:

Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2006), 2006 ABQB 153, 2006 CarswellAlta 446, 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re (2010), 2010 ONSC 222, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Clothing for Modern Times Ltd., Re (2011), 2011 ONSC 7522, 2011 CarswellOnt 14402, 88 C.B.R. (5th) 329 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Comstock Canada Ltd., Re (2013), 2013 ONSC 4756, 2013 CarswellOnt 9796, 4 C.B.R. (6th) 47, 25 C.L.R. (4th) 175 (Ont. S.C.J.) — followed

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Priszm Income Fund, Re (2011), 2011 ONSC 2061, 2011 CarswellOnt 2258, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 1211, 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, [2004] O.T.C. 284 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 5200, 2004 CarswellOnt 5201, 338 N.R. 196 (note) (S.C.C.) — referred to

4519922 Canada Inc., Re (2015), 2015 ONSC 124, 2015 CarswellOnt 178, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 44 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

s. 50.4(1) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 19] — considered

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

Pt. IV — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11.2(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.6(a) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 45(1) — considered

s. 45(2) — considered

s. 46(1) — considered

s. 47(1) — considered

s. 47(2) — considered

s. 48(1) — considered

s. 49(1) — considered

APPLICATION by company subsidiaries for continuation of notice of intent to make bankruptcy proposal in *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* proceeding.

***Newbould J.*:**

1 A number of Urbancorp Inc. ("UC Inc.") subsidiaries applied on May 18, 2016 for relief under the CCAA, including relief in respect of a number of non-applicant affiliated limited partnerships which may not be insolvent. [1] Some of the applicants earlier filed a notice of intent to make a proposal under section 50.4(1) of the BIA. These applicants apply to continue the NOI proceedings in this CCAA proceeding.

2 UC Inc. is not an applicant in this CCAA proceeding. However, it issued debentures which traded on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. The trustee of those bonds alleged default by UC Inc. and, after the NOI proceedings were started in Canada, initiated a claim for relief in the District Court of Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel (the "Israeli Court"). Orders were made granting relief to the trustee and Mr. Guy Gissin was appointed by the Israeli Court as the functionary officer and foreign representative of UC Inc. He has brought proceedings under Part IV of the CCAA for an initial recognition order and a supplemental order recognizing orders made by the Israeli Court.

3 It is evident that these two competing applications, if not resolved in some consensual way, would cause great difficulty in any restructuring of the Urbancorp Group. Fortunately, due to the efforts of Mr. Gissin and KSV, the proposal trustee and now the proposed Monitor, and their counsel, an agreement in principle to co-operate on a process to realize upon the assets of the Urbancorp Group has been reached and is contained in a Co-operation Protocol signed by Mr. Gissin and KSV.

4 At the conclusion of the hearing, I granted the Initial Order and the recognition and supplemental orders sought by Mr. Gissin as the foreign representative, including the approval of the Co-Operation Protocol, for reasons to follow. These are my reasons.

Factual background

5 The Urbancorp Group was founded in 1991 by Alan Saskin. As is typical in the real estate development industry, the Urbancorp Group generally uses single purpose project specific corporations to engage in the development, construction and sale of residential properties in the greater Toronto area. Since 2015, the Urbancorp Group has essentially been organized into two branches — the corporations which are owned directly or indirectly by Mr. Saskin or members of his family, which includes UTMI, and the entities that, as of December 2015, became UC Inc. subsidiaries. The majority of the Urbancorp corporations that are applicants in this proceeding have been formed as single purposes entities in connection with the construction and ownership of specific development projects.

6 The Urbancorp Group has redeveloped over 100 acres of former industrial lands in the GTA, turning them into downtown neighbourhoods. The Urbancorp Group was the first developer in the King West village area of Toronto and created the neighbourhood named "King West Village". In the West Queen West Triangle area of Toronto, across from the Drake hotel, the Urbancorp Group developed most of the homes, over 1,600 in that neighbourhood. In partnership with Artscape, a nonprofit provider of affordable artist housing, the Urbancorp Group developed 72 units of affordable

artist housing in West Queen West. The Urbancorp Group has donated land and paid for public parks in the City of Toronto, including four public parks in the King and Queen West areas.

7 The Urbancorp Group has built over 5500 homes. It delivered 1,028 homes in the past two years, and currently has 1,058 additional homes under construction.

8 However, as a result of the recent lack of liquidity described in detail in the affidavit of Mr. Siskin, the applicants are insolvent and cannot meet their liabilities generally as they become due, and as a result, the operations of all of the Urbancorp applicants and related entities has been put at risk.

9 Mr. Saskin in his affidavit states that the primary financial challenge facing the Urbancorp applicants and related entities at this time, particularly the entities that filed NOI proceedings, is their inability to raise the necessary financing to advance their major projects beyond their current stages of development. This is due to a number of events, including the recent steps by Tarion Warranty Corporation to revoke certain Tarion registration certificates, and events relating to UC Inc. and its issuance of debentures in Israel. These events and the publicity and press surrounding them have materially threatened the ability of the non-applicant UC entities to carry on business in the ordinary course.

10 UC Inc. is an Ontario company created for the purpose of issuing debentures to the Israeli public on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. Prior to listing the debentures Mr. Saskin and his family members agreed to transfer into UC Inc. their interests in five corporations within the Urbancorp Group that directly or indirectly held interests in several investment properties, rental properties and geothermal assets in Toronto

11 UC Inc. issued NIS 180,583,000 (approx. $64 million based on the exchange rate at that time) par value of debentures which traded on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. The terms of the debentures contemplate UC Inc. repaying the debentures in five unequal installments on December 31, 2017, June 30, 2018, December 31, 2018, June 30, 2019 and December 31, 2019. The exclusive jurisdiction to determine all matters related to the debentures lies with a competent court in the State of Israel and pursuant to the governing laws of Israel.

12 On March 31, 2015, Tarion Warranty Corporation, which provides warranties on new residential builds in Ontario for registered builders, issued a notice of proposal to revoke 17 of the Urbancorp Group's registrations as a result of concerns about the Urbancorp Group's financial position and the high number of warranty claims made against two non UC Inc. entities. The Urbancorp Group has since appealed Tarion's decision for 11 of the 17 registrations, and allowed the balance to expire. No decision has been rendered in connection with the appeal as of this date.

13 The indenture trustee of the Israeli debentures alleged that UC Inc. had defaulted under the terms of the debenture trust. On April 24, 2016, the trustee initiated court proceedings against UC Inc. in the Israeli Court. Prior to those proceedings being initiated, the Urbancorp Group's Israeli auditors, Israeli legal counsel and UC Inc.'s board of directors resigned, leaving Mr. Saskin as the sole director of UC Inc. The trustee's application was initially heard on the morning of Sunday, April 24, 2016, at which time the Vice President of the Israeli Court issued an injunction to prevent UC Inc. or Mr. Saskin from taking any further steps to deal with UC Inc.'s assets.

14 On Monday, April 25, 2016, the Israeli Court appointed Mr. Gissin as the functionary officer of UC Inc., with full management control and powers over its subsidiaries. The authority granted to Mr. Gissin under the order included the authority to seize all of UC Inc.'s assets, to exercise UC Inc.'s power of control over its subsidiaries and to approach the Canadian court as an authorized representative of UC Inc. The orders of the Israeli Court would clearly have prevented Mr. Siskin from taking steps to cause the subsidiaries of UC Inc. to file for protection under the CCAA and would have permitted Mr. Gissin to take steps to prevent the applicants from doing so.

15 On May 4, 2016, Mr. Gissin and his counsel met with KSV and its counsel, the result of which was an agreement in principle to co-operate on a process to realize upon the assets of the Urbancorp Group through a CCAA process, with KSV having augmented powers to control management and operations of the Urbancorp Group entities which

would be filing, effectively removing Saskin as a decision-maker for those companies, all as set forth in a Co-operation Protocol finalized on May 13, 2016.

16 On May 13, 2016, each of the Urbancorp CCAA applicants and related entities, as borrowers, and UC King South, as lender, entered into an intercompany interim credit facility term sheet whereby UC King South agreed to make available to the Urbancorp entities that had filed a NOI proceeding a revolving credit facility in the amount of $1.9 million to finance their day-to-day operations and ongoing projects. UC King South is not an applicant in this proceeding. All proceeds of the interim loan continue to be held by KSV in its trust account. Based upon the anticipated cash flow needs of the Urbancorp CCAA applicants and related entities during these restructuring proceedings, including professional fees associated with these proceedings, it is likely that the $1.9 million may not be sufficient to see the restructuring through to its completion. As a result, the applicants intend to commence a process to secure third party debtor-in-possession financing in the near term.

Issues and analysis

(1) Recognition of Foreign Proceeding

17 Section 46(1) of the CCAA provides for the application by a foreign representative to recognize a foreign proceeding. Pursuant to section 47(1) of the CCAA, the court shall make an order recognizing the foreign proceeding if (i) the proceeding is a foreign proceeding and (ii) the applicant is a foreign representative of that proceeding.

18 A foreign proceeding is broadly defined in section 47(1) to mean a judicial or an administrative proceeding in a jurisdiction outside Canada dealing with creditor's collective interests generally under any law relating to bankruptcy or insolvency in which a debtor's property and affairs are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation.

19 It is clear in this case that the proceeding in the Israeli Court is a foreign proceeding within the meaning of the CCAA. It is a judicial proceeding brought under Israel's regulations relating to requests for compromise or arrangements, and the relief granted by the Israeli Court, including the appointment of a functionary officer, was for the purpose of enhancing creditors' collective interests.

20 Section 45(1) of the CCAA defines a foreign representative as a person or body who is authorized in a foreign proceeding in respect of a debtor company to (a) administer the debtor's property or affairs for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation or (b) act as a representative in respect of the foreign proceeding.

21 It is also the case that the Mr. Gissin is a foreign representative in respect of the foreign proceeding. He was appointed to monitor UCI's business and financial affairs and to act as a representative in respect of the foreign proceeding. He was provided with the express authority to seize all of UC Inc.'s assets, to exercise UC Inc.'s power of control of its subsidiaries and to approach the Canadian court as an authorized representative of UC Inc.

22 Thus the foreign proceeding in the Israeli Court is to be recognized as a foreign proceeding under section 47(1) of the CCAA.

23 Section 47(2) requires a finding as to whether the foreign proceeding is a foreign main proceeding or a foreign non-main proceeding. If the foreign proceeding is recognized as a main proceeding, there is an automatic stay provided in section 48(1) of the CCAA against law suits concerning the debtor's property, debts, liabilities or obligations and prohibitions against selling or disposing of property in Canada. If the foreign proceeding is recognized as a non-main proceeding, there is no such automatic stay and prohibition and it is necessary for an application to be made under section 49(1) to obtain such relief. For that reason, it is advantageous for a foreign representative to seek an order recognizing the foreign proceeding as a main proceeding. Mr. Gissin in this case has made such a request.

24 A foreign main proceeding is defined in section 45(1) as a foreign proceeding in a jurisdiction where the debtor company has the centre of its main interests (COMI). Section 45(2) provides that in the absence of proof to the contrary, a debtor company's registered office is deemed to be the centre of its main interests.

25 In this case, UC Inc.'s registered office is in Ontario. Pursuant to the Co-operation Protocol Mr. Gissin as the foreign representative has applied to have the Israeli Court proceeding recognized as a foreign main proceeding.

26 The Co-operation Protocol sets out in some detail an agreement to work cooperatively to maximize recoveries through an orderly process for the stakeholders of UC Inc. and the applicants. Without such an agreement, there would no doubt have been contentious proceedings between the two spheres, being the Israeli sphere and the Canadian sphere. That has been avoided. The Co-operation Protocol provides that Mr. Gissin will apply under Part IV of the CCAA to be recognized as the foreign representative of a foreign main proceeding. The applicants in the CCAA proceedings will propose that the Monitor have augmented powers to control the ordinary course management and receipt and disbursements of funds for the applicants and acknowledge that Mr. Gissin shall have standing in these proceedings to represent UC Inc. The Monitor and Mr. Gissin shall attempt to agree on the restructuring or sale process but if they cannot agree the decision will be made by this Court on the application of the Monitor. It is agreed that so long as the Monitor acts in good faith and has not engaged in wilful conduct or gross negligence, Mr. Gissin will not take any steps to remove KSV as the Monitor or to suggest that KSV must take instruction from Mr. Gissin or the Israeli Court.

27 Thus the parties have agreed that while the Israeli proceeding will be considered to be a foreign main proceeding, Mr. Gissin as the foreign representative has agreed that his sole control of UC Inc. and its assets that was granted to him by the Israeli Court will to a large extent be exercised by the Monitor acting under the CCAA so long as the Monitor acts in good faith collaboratively with Mr. Gissin in accordance with the Co-operation Protocol. This is a very unusual situation in that as a practical matter it is not intended that orders will be made in the future in the foreign main proceeding directing the restructuring of UC Inc. and its subsidiaries with recognition orders being sought in Canada to have such orders carried out in Canada.

28 It is not clear that the COMI of UC Inc. is in Israeli. The proceedings started in Israel because the Prospectus and the Deed of Trust made clear that Israeli courts were to have exclusive jurisdiction to deal with matters related to UC Inc., and that insolvency proceedings regarding UC Inc. could only be brought in the State of Israel.

29 I am reluctant however to upset the balance that has been struck in this case by the Co-operation Protocol. Mr. Gissin in his affidavit has emphasized the importance of the proceedings to the stakeholders of UC Inc. in Israel and the importance of the different legal regimes working together. He has stated:

> 32. This matter is one of incredible significance to stakeholders in the State of Israel, including the real estate capital markets in general. To date, to the best of my knowledge, a total of 17 North American real estate companies have issued over NIS 11 billion of bonds in Israel. UCI [UC Inc.] was the first such North American company to have gone into insolvency proceedings, and that within four months from the issuance of the Debentures. Given the size of this industry in Israel, this case is being watched very carefully to see how the different legal regimes can work together. I am hopeful that the co-operation evidenced to date in this matter, and in particular through the Co-Operation Protocol, can be continued for the benefit of all affected stakeholders.

30 In this case, so long as the Co-operation Protocol exists, it may not be of much importance in Canada whether the foreign proceeding is a foreign main proceeding, as Mr. Gissin would be entitled as a matter of discretion under a foreign non-main proceeding to a granting of a stay of proceedings against UC Inc. and to an order prohibiting a sale of its property in Canada without leave of the Court. It probably is of more importance in Israel in insuring that if the co-operation between the foreign representative and the Monitor no longer exists and the Monitor acts in bad faith or engages in wilful conduct or gross negligence, the foreign representative will have the ability to go back to the Israeli

Court as the court in a foreign main proceeding to seek appropriate relief that could then be sought to be recognized in Canada.

31 The applicants, the Monitor and the foreign representative are all in agreement that an order be sought declaring the Israeli proceedings as the foreign main proceedings and no one appearing is opposing the order sought. In these unusual circumstances I am prepared to make an order that the proceeding in Israel is a foreign main proceeding. It follows that the initial recognition order is to provide a stay of any proceedings against UC Inc. and prohibit UC Inc. from selling or disposing of property in Canada without leave of the Court.

32 It would be expected that if the Israeli Court in the future changed Mr. Gissin's mandate to increase or decrease his authorities or functions or provide any additional mandate in respect of UC Inc., such orders would be brought to the attention of this Court and any application made in connection with them would be made in these Part IV proceedings.

33 It is also appropriate that a supplemental order be made (i) recognizing the decision made in the foreign proceeding by the Israeli Court, (ii) appointing KSV as the information officer, (iii) approving the Co-operation Protocol, (iv) staying any proceedings against or in respect of Mr. Gissin as foreign representative of UC Inc., (v) granting an administration charge of $400,000 for the costs of the foreign representative, its legal and financial advisors and of the information officer and its counsel and (vi) approval of the funding of the costs of the foreign representative, its legal and financial advisors and of the information officer and its counsel to be covered by the interim funding charge.

34 With respect to the administration charge, there are no secured creditors of UC Inc. The principal creditors are the Israeli bondholders under the debentures. The foreign representative and the information officer are important to the process and the quantum of the charge is reasonable.

35 With respect to the interim financing and the charge for it, KSV presently has the amount of CAD $1,900,000 in a trust account, which funds KSV received from UC KING SOUTH, and which funds KSV proposes to utilize as a form of interim funding for certain costs in connection with the CCAA proceedings. It is appropriate for this charge to also cover the professional fees and other reasonable costs incurred by the foreign representative in the CCAA proceedings and of the Information Officer and its counsel.

(2) Continuation under the CCAA

36 Section 11.6(a) provides:

> 11.6 Notwithstanding the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act,
>
> > (a) proceedings commenced under Part III of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act may be taken up and continued under this Act only if a proposal within the meaning of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act has not been filed under that Part;

37 None of the Urbancorp entities that filed a notice of intention under Subsection 50.4(1) of the BIA has filed a proposal.

38 In *Clothing for Modern Times Ltd., Re*, 2011 ONSC 7522 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), Brown J. (as he then was) expressed the view that on a motion to continue under the CCAA an applicant company should place before the court evidence that the proposed continuation would be consistent with the purposes of the CCAA. Morawetz J. (as he then was) referred to and adopted the same point of view in *Comstock Canada Ltd., Re* (2013), 4 C.B.R. (6th) 47 (Ont. S.C.J.). I take this to be a reflection of the fact that an initial order should be made in a CCAA proceeding only if the purpose of the application is consistent with the purposes of the CCAA.

39 In my view, the proposed continuation of the NOI proceedings as a CCAA proceeding is in accordance and consistent with the purposes of the CCAA. The purpose here is to attempt a restructuring of the Urbancorp business which is the subject of this application, including those entities which had filed NOI proceedings and other highly

interconnected entities. It is under the CCAA and the jurisprudence that has developed that permits protection being provided both to the applicant companies and its related limited partnership entities that may not be insolvent. The continuation also assists in the co-operative proceeding with Mr. Gissin as the foreign representative of UC Inc. who is being recognized under Part IV of the CCAA.

40 I am satisfied that the NOI proceedings commenced under the BIA should be taken up and continued under the CCAA.

(3) Protection under the CCAA

41 The applicants and their related entities have total claims against them in excess of $5 million.

42 I am satisfied that the applicants meet the *Stelco* test of insolvency enunciated by Justice Farley in *Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); leave to appeal to C.A. refused, [2004] O.J. No. 1903 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336 (S.C.C.). The applicants are currently unable or will imminently be unable to meet such claims generally as they become due. The primary financial challenge facing the Urbancorp applicants and their related entities is their inability to raise the necessary financing to advance their major projects beyond their current stages of development. This is due to a number of events, including the recent steps by Tarion to revoke certain Tarion registration certificates, and events relating to UC Inc. and the Israeli debentures. These events and the publicity and press surrounding them have materially threatened the ability of the non-applicant Urbancorp entities to carry on business in the ordinary course.

43 A CCAA court may exercise its jurisdiction to extend protection by way of the stay of proceedings to a partnership related to an applicant where it is just and reasonable or just and convenient to do so. The courts have held that this relief is appropriate where the operations of a debtor company are so intertwined with those of a partner or limited partnership in question that not extending the stay would significantly impair the effectiveness of a stay in respect of the debtor company. See *Priszm Income Fund, Re* (2011), 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213 (Ont. S.C.J.) per Morawetz J. The stay is not granted under section 11 of the CCAA but rather under the court's inherent jurisdiction. It has its genesis in *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) and has been followed in several cases, including *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re* (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re* (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187 (Alta. Q.B.) and *4519922 Canada Inc., Re* (2015), 22 C.B.R. (6th) 44 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

44 I am satisfied that the stay of proceedings provided for in the Initial Order should extend to the related limited partnerships. Each is significantly interrelated to the business of the insolvent applicants as they and their stakeholders, assets (in many cases beneficial ownership of the assets of applicants), and intercompany payables and receivables in particular, form an integral part of the operations of the Urbancorp Group. Although they are not currently technically insolvent, the evidence is that it was reasonably expected at the time of filing that, without the benefit of a stay of proceedings, they will run out of liquidity before the time that would reasonably be required to implement a restructuring.

45 The applicants seek an interim lender's charge to secure the interim funding from UC King South. It is to be secured against those Urbancorp entities that utilize any of the funds. The applicants also seek the authority for the Monitor to utilize an aggregate of up to $1 million of cash which exists within the Urbancorp CCAA entities, to fund the cash flow requirements of other Urbancorp CCAA affiliates on an intercompany basis during these proceedings, secured by an intercompany lender's charge over the borrower entity's assets, properties and undertakings in favour of the lender entity, to rank *pari passu* with the interim lender's charge.

46 I am satisfied after a consideration of the factors set out in section 11.2(4) of the CCAA that these charges should be granted. The charges will be subordinate to existing secured creditors and lienholders and will not secure any pre-filing obligations [2]. The money is clearly needed for the restructuring process and the charges are supported by the proposed

Monitor who will have enhanced powers to operate the business during the restructuring with the authority to approve the advances.

47 Other charges normal in CCAA cases are proposed. They are a director's and officer's charge in the amount of $300,000 for the sole remaining director of the applicants after Mr. Siskin's retirement as a director and an administrative charge in the amount of $750,000. These charges are reasonable and supported by the proposed Monitor. They are approved.

48 At the conclusion of the hearing on May 18, 2016 I signed the Initial Order in the applicants' CCAA application and the Initial Order and supplemental orders on the application of Mr. Gissin under Part IV of the CCAA.

Application granted.

Footnotes

1 Urbancorp New Kings Inc. was inadvertently included as an applicant when this proceeding was first commenced. It has been removed as an applicant as it is not an insolvent corporation.

2 An exception to the subordination to secured creditors is the Reznick Trust under the Israeli debenture which is to be subordinate to the Charges. Apparently there is still some issue because of the lack of time to deal with it as to what security if any there is to support the Reznick Trust. It may be that some future motion may be necessary to deal with this subordination exception.

TAB E

2015 ONSC 303
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Target Canada Co., Re

2015 CarswellOnt 620, 2015 ONSC 303, [2015] O.J. No. 247, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323, 248 A.C.W.S. (3d) 753

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Target Canada Co., Target Canada Health Co., Target Canada Mobile GP Co., Target Canada Pharmacy (BC) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (SK) Corp., and Target Canada Property LLC.

Morawetz R.S.J.

Heard: January 15, 2015
Judgment: January 16, 2015
Docket: CV-15-10832-00CL

Counsel: Tracy Sandler, Jeremy Dacks for Applicants, Target Canada Co., Target Canada Health Co., Target Canada Mobile GP Co., Target Canada Pharmacy (BC) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (SK) Corp., and Target Canada Property LLC
Jay Swartz for Target Corporation
Alan Mark, Melaney Wagner, Jesse Mighton for Proposed Monitor, Alvarez and Marsal Canada ULC ("Alvarez")
Terry O'Sullivan for Honourable J. Ground, Trustee of the Proposed Employee Trust
Susan Philpott for Proposed Employee Representative Counsel, for Employees of the Applicants

Subject: Insolvency; Property
Related Abridgment Classifications
Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.2 Initial application
XIX.2.e Proceedings subject to stay
XIX.2.e.vi Miscellaneous
Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.2 Initial application
XIX.2.h Miscellaneous
Headnote
Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Proceedings subject to stay — Miscellaneous
Applicant group of companies were involved in Canadian operations of U.S. retailer T Co. — Canadian operations suffered significant loss in every quarter — T Co. decided to stop funding Canadian operations — Applicants sought to wind down Canadian operations and applied for relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Application granted — Initial order granted — Stay of proceedings granted — Stay extended to certain limited partnerships, which were related to or carried on operations integral to applicants' business — Stay of proceedings extended to rights of third party tenants against landlords that arose out of insolvency — Stay extended to T Co. and its U.S. subsidiaries in relation to claims derivative of claims against Canadian operations.
Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Miscellaneous

Applicant group of companies were involved in Canadian operations of U.S. retailer T Co. — Canadian operations suffered significant loss in every quarter — T Co. decided to stop funding Canadian operations — Applicants sought to wind down Canadian operations and applied for relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Application granted — Initial order granted — Stay of proceedings granted — It was appropriate to grant broad relief to ensure status quo was maintained — Applicants were all insolvent — Although there was no prospect restructured "going concern" solution would result, use of CCAA protection was appropriate in circumstances — Creation of employee trust to cover payments to employees was approved — Key employee retention program (KERP) and charge as security for KERP payments were approved — Appointment of Employee Representative Counsel was approved — DIP Lenders' Charge and DIP Facility were approved — Administration charge and Directors' and Officers' charge approved.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz R.S.J.*:

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 6184, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4699, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 1330 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 53 C.B.R. (5th) 196, 75 C.C.P.B. 206, 2009 CarswellOnt 3028 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Priszm Income Fund, Re (2011), 2011 ONSC 2061, 2011 CarswellOnt 2258, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, 2002 CSC 41 (S.C.C.) — followed

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, [2004] O.T.C. 284, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 338 N.R. 196 (note), 2004 CarswellOnt 5200, 2004 CarswellOnt 5201 (S.C.C.) — referred to

T. Eaton Co., Re (1997), 1997 CarswellOnt 1914, 46 C.B.R. (3d) 293 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re (2010), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (A.G.))* [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada)* 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada)* 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re)* 503 W.A.C. 1, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re)* 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 2010 SCC 60, 2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 409 N.R. 201, (sub nom. *Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd., Re)* 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383 (S.C.C.) — considered

U.S. Steel Canada Inc., Re (2014), 2014 ONSC 6145, 2014 CarswellOnt 16465 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 2 "insolvent person" — considered

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11.02 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.02(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.2(4) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.7(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 36 — considered

Rules considered:

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194

Generally — referred to

Words and phrases considered:

insolvent

"Insolvent" is not expressly defined in the [*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (CCAA)]. However, for the purposes of the CCAA, a debtor is insolvent if it meets the definition of an "insolvent person" in section 2 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* . . . or if it is "insolvent" as described in Stelco Inc. (Re), [2004] O.J. No. 1257, [Stelco], leave to appeal refused, [2004] O.J. No. 1903, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336, where Farley, J. found that "insolvency" includes a corporation "reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within [a] reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring".

APPLICATION for relief under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

Morawetz R.S.J.:

1 Target Canada Co. ("TCC") and the other applicants listed above (the "Applicants") seek relief under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "CCAA"). While the limited partnerships listed in Schedule "A" to the draft Order (the "Partnerships") are not applicants in this proceeding, the Applicants seek to have a stay of proceedings and other benefits of an initial order under the CCAA extended to the Partnerships, which are related to or carry on operations that are integral to the business of the Applicants.

2 TCC is a large Canadian retailer. It is the Canadian operating subsidiary of Target Corporation, one of the largest retailers in the United States. The other Applicants are either corporations or partners of the Partnerships formed to carry on specific aspects of TCC's Canadian retail business (such as the Canadian pharmacy operations) or finance leasehold improvements in leased Canadian stores operated by TCC. The Applicants, therefore, do not represent the entire Target enterprise; the Applicants consist solely of entities that are integral to the Canadian retail operations. Together, they are referred as the "Target Canada Entities".

3 In early 2011, Target Corporation determined to expand its retail operations into Canada, undertaking a significant investment (in the form of both debt and equity) in TCC and certain of its affiliates in order to permit TCC to establish and operate Canadian retail stores. As of today, TCC operates 133 stores, with at least one store in every province of Canada. All but three of these stores are leased.

4 Due to a number of factors, the expansion into Canada has proven to be substantially less successful than expected. Canadian operations have shown significant losses in every quarter since stores opened. Projections demonstrate little or no prospect of improvement within a reasonable time.

5 After exploring multiple solutions over a number of months and engaging in extensive consultations with its professional advisors, Target Corporation concluded that, in the interest of all of its stakeholders, the responsible course of action is to cease funding the Canadian operations.

6 Without ongoing investment from Target Corporation, TCC and the other Target Canada Entities cannot continue to operate and are clearly insolvent. Due to the magnitude and complexity of the operations of the Target Canada Entities, the Applicants are seeking a stay of proceedings under the CCAA in order to accomplish a fair, orderly and controlled wind-down of their operations. The Target Canada Entities have indicated that they intend to treat all of their stakeholders as fairly and equitably as the circumstances allow, particularly the approximately 17,600 employees of the Target Canada Entities.

7 The Applicants are of the view that an orderly wind-down under Court supervision, with the benefit of inherent jurisdiction of the CCAA, and the oversight of the proposed monitor, provides a framework in which the Target Canada Entities can, among other things:

> a) Pursue initiatives such as the sale of real estate portfolios and the sale of inventory;
>
> b) Develop and implement support mechanisms for employees as vulnerable stakeholders affected by the wind-down, particularly (i) an employee trust (the "Employee Trust") funded by Target Corporation; (ii) an employee representative counsel to safeguard employee interests; and (iii) a key employee retention plan (the "KERP") to provide essential employees who agree to continue their employment and to contribute their services and expertise to the Target Canada Entities during the orderly wind-down;
>
> c) Create a level playing field to ensure that all affected stakeholders are treated as fairly and equitably as the circumstances allow; and
>
> d) Avoid the significant maneuvering among creditors and other stakeholders that could be detrimental to all stakeholders, in the absence of a court-supervised proceeding.

8 The Applicants are of the view that these factors are entirely consistent with the well-established purpose of a CCAA stay: to give a debtor the "breathing room" required to restructure with a view to maximizing recoveries, whether the restructuring takes place as a going concern or as an orderly liquidation or wind-down.

9 TCC is an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of Target Corporation and is the operating company through which the Canadian retail operations are carried out. TCC is a Nova Scotia unlimited liability company. It is directly owned by Nicollet Enterprise 1 S. à r.l. ("NE1"), an entity organized under the laws of Luxembourg. Target Corporation (which is incorporated under the laws of the State of Minnesota) owns NE1 through several other entities.

10 TCC operates from a corporate headquarters in Mississauga, Ontario. As of January 12, 2015, TCC employed approximately 17,600 people, almost all of whom work in Canada. TCC's employees are not represented by a union, and there is no registered pension plan for employees.

11 The other Target Canada Entities are all either: (i) direct or indirect subsidiaries of TCC with responsibilities for specific aspects of the Canadian retail operation; or (ii) affiliates of TCC that have been involved in the financing of certain leasehold improvements.

12 A typical TCC store has a footprint in the range of 80,000 to 125,000 total retail square feet and is located in a shopping mall or large strip mall. TCC is usually the anchor tenant. Each TCC store typically contains an in-store Target brand pharmacy, Target Mobile kiosk and a Starbucks café. Each store typically employs approximately 100 - 150 people, described as "Team Members" and "Team Leaders", with a total of approximately 16,700 employed at the "store level" of TCC's retail operations.

13 TCC owns three distribution centres (two in Ontario and one in Alberta) to support its retail operations. These centres are operated by a third party service provider. TCC also leases a variety of warehouse and office spaces.

14 In every quarter since TCC opened its first store, TCC has faced lower than expected sales and greater than expected losses. As reported in Target Corporation's Consolidated Financial Statements, the Canadian segment of the Target business has suffered a significant loss in every quarter since TCC opened stores in Canada.

15 TCC is completely operationally funded by its ultimate parent, Target Corporation, and related entities. It is projected that TCC's cumulative pre-tax losses from the date of its entry into the Canadian market to the end of the 2014 fiscal year (ending January 31, 2015) will be more than $2.5 billion. In his affidavit, Mr. Mark Wong, General Counsel and Secretary of TCC, states that this is more than triple the loss originally expected for this period. Further, if TCC's operations are not wound down, it is projected that they would remain unprofitable for at least 5 years and would require significant and continued funding from Target Corporation during that period.

16 TCC attributes its failure to achieve expected profitability to a number of principal factors, including: issues of scale; supply chain difficulties; pricing and product mix issues; and the absence of a Canadian online retail presence.

17 Following a detailed review of TCC's operations, the Board of Directors of Target Corporation decided that it is in the best interests of the business of Target Corporation and its subsidiaries to discontinue Canadian operations.

18 Based on the stand-alone financial statements prepared for TCC as of November 1, 2014 (which consolidated financial results of TCC and its subsidiaries), TCC had total assets of approximately $5.408 billion and total liabilities of approximately $5.118 billion. Mr. Wong states that this does not reflect a significant impairment charge that will likely be incurred at fiscal year end due to TCC's financial situation.

19 Mr. Wong states that TCC's operational funding is provided by Target Corporation. As of November 1, 2014, NE1 (TCC's direct parent) had provided equity capital to TCC in the amount of approximately $2.5 billon. As a result of continuing and significant losses in TCC's operations, NE1 has been required to make an additional equity investment of $62 million since November 1, 2014.

20 NE1 has also lent funds to TCC under a Loan Facility with a maximum amount of $4 billion. TCC owed NE1 approximately $3.1 billion under this Facility as of January 2, 2015. The Loan Facility is unsecured. On January 14, 2015, NE1 agreed to subordinate all amounts owing by TCC to NE1 under this Loan Facility to payment in full of proven claims against TCC.

21 As at November 1, 2014, Target Canada Property LLC ("TCC Propco") had assets of approximately $1.632 billion and total liabilities of approximately $1.643 billion. Mr. Wong states that this does not reflect a significant impairment charge that will likely be incurred at fiscal year end due to TCC Propco's financial situation. TCC Propco has also borrowed approximately $1.5 billion from Target Canada Property LP and TCC Propco also owes U.S. $89 million to Target Corporation under a Demand Promissory Note.

22 TCC has subleased almost all the retail store leases to TCC Propco, which then made real estate improvements and sub-sub leased the properties back to TCC. Under this arrangement, upon termination of any of these sub-leases, a "make whole" payment becomes owing from TCC to TCC Propco.

23 Mr. Wong states that without further funding and financial support from Target Corporation, the Target Canada Entities are unable to meet their liabilities as they become due, including TCC's next payroll (due January 16, 2015). The Target Canada Entities, therefore state that they are insolvent.

24 Mr. Wong also states that given the size and complexity of TCC's operations and the numerous stakeholders involved in the business, including employees, suppliers, landlords, franchisees and others, the Target Canada Entities have determined that a controlled wind-down of their operations and liquidation under the protection of the CCAA,

under Court supervision and with the assistance of the proposed monitor, is the only practical method available to ensure a fair and orderly process for all stakeholders. Further, Mr. Wong states that TCC and Target Corporation seek to benefit from the framework and the flexibility provided by the CCAA in effecting a controlled and orderly wind-down of the Canadian operations, in a manner that treats stakeholders as fairly and as equitably as the circumstances allow.

25 On this initial hearing, the issues are as follows:

a) Does this court have jurisdiction to grant the CCAA relief requested?

a) Should the stay be extended to the Partnerships?

b) Should the stay be extended to "Co-tenants" and rights of third party tenants?

c) Should the stay extend to Target Corporation and its U.S. subsidiaries in relation to claims that are derivative of claims against the Target Canada Entities?

d) Should the Court approve protections for employees?

e) Is it appropriate to allow payment of certain pre-filing amounts?

f) Does this court have the jurisdiction to authorize pre-filing claims to "critical" suppliers;

g) Should the court should exercise its discretion to authorize the Applicants to seek proposals from liquidators and approve the financial advisor and real estate advisor engagement?

h) Should the court exercise its discretion to approve the Court-ordered charges?

26 "Insolvent" is not expressly defined in the CCAA. However, for the purposes of the CCAA, a debtor is insolvent if it meets the definition of an "insolvent person" in section 2 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. B-3 ("BIA") or if it is "insolvent" as described in *Stelco Inc., Re*, [2004] O.J. No. 1257 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), [*Stelco*], leave to appeal refused, [2004] O.J. No. 1903 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336 (S.C.C.), where Farley, J. found that "insolvency" includes a corporation "reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within [a] reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring" (at para 26). The decision of Farley, J. in *Stelco* was followed in *Priszm Income Fund, Re*, [2011] O.J. No. 1491 (Ont. S.C.J.), 2011 and *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, [2009] O.J. No. 4286 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) [*Canwest*].

27 Having reviewed the record and hearing submissions, I am satisfied that the Target Canada Entities are all insolvent and are debtor companies to which the CCAA applies, either by reference to the definition of "insolvent person" under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (the "BIA") or under the test developed by Farley J. in *Stelco*.

28 I also accept the submission of counsel to the Applicants that without the continued financial support of Target Corporation, the Target Canada Entities face too many legal and business impediments and too much uncertainty to wind-down their operations without the "breathing space" afforded by a stay of proceedings or other available relief under the CCAA.

29 I am also satisfied that this Court has jurisdiction over the proceeding. Section 9(1) of the CCAA provides that an application may be made to the court that has jurisdiction in (a) the province in which the head office or chief place of business of the company in Canada is situated; or (b) any province in which the company's assets are situated, if there is no place of business in Canada.

30 In this case, the head office and corporate headquarters of TCC is located in Mississauga, Ontario, where approximately 800 employees work. Moreover, the chief place of business of the Target Canada Entities is Ontario. A

number of office locations are in Ontario; 2 of TCC's 3 primary distribution centres are located in Ontario; 55 of the TCC retail stores operate in Ontario; and almost half the employees that support TCC's operations work in Ontario.

31 The Target Canada Entities state that the purpose for seeking the proposed initial order in these proceedings is to effect a fair, controlled and orderly wind-down of their Canadian retail business with a view to developing a plan of compromise or arrangement to present to their creditors as part of these proceedings. I accept the submissions of counsel to the Applicants that although there is no prospect that a restructured "going concern" solution involving the Target Canada Entities will result, the use of the protections and flexibility afforded by the CCAA is entirely appropriate in these circumstances. In arriving at this conclusion, I have noted the comments of the Supreme Court of Canada in *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, 2010 SCC 60 (S.C.C.) ("*Century Services*") that "courts frequently observe that the CCAA is skeletal in nature", and does not "contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred". The flexibility of the CCAA, particularly in the context of large and complex restructurings, allows for innovation and creativity, in contrast to the more "rules-based" approach of the BIA.

32 Prior to the 2009 amendments to the CCAA, Canadian courts accepted that, in appropriate circumstances, debtor companies were entitled to seek the protection of the CCAA where the outcome was not going to be a going concern restructuring, but instead, a "liquidation" or wind-down of the debtor companies' assets or business.

33 The 2009 amendments did not expressly address whether the CCAA could be used generally to wind-down the business of a debtor company. However, I am satisfied that the enactment of section 36 of the CCAA, which establishes a process for a debtor company to sell assets outside the ordinary course of business while under CCAA protection, is consistent with the principle that the CCAA can be a vehicle to downsize or wind-down a debtor company's business.

34 In this case, the sheer magnitude and complexity of the Target Canada Entities business, including the number of stakeholders whose interests are affected, are, in my view, suited to the flexible framework and scope for innovation offered by this "skeletal" legislation.

35 The required audited financial statements are contained in the record.

36 The required cash flow statements are contained in the record.

37 Pursuant to s. 11.02 of the CCAA, the court may make an order staying proceedings, restraining further proceedings, or prohibiting the commencement of proceedings, "on any terms that it may impose" and "effective for the period that the court considers necessary" provided the stay is no longer than 30 days. The Target Canada Entities, in this case, seek a stay of proceedings up to and including February 13, 2015.

38 Certain of the corporate Target Canada Entities (TCC, TCC Health and TCC Mobile) act as general or limited partners in the partnerships. The Applicants submit that it is appropriate to extend the stay of proceedings to the Partnerships on the basis that each performs key functions in relation to the Target Canada Entities' businesses.

39 The Applicants also seek to extend the stay to Target Canada Property LP which was formerly the sub-leasee/ sub-sub lessor under the sub-sub lease back arrangement entered into by TCC to finance the leasehold improvements in its leased stores. The Applicants contend that the extension of the stay to Target Canada Property LP is necessary in order to safeguard it against any residual claims that may be asserted against it as a result of TCC Propco's insolvency and filing under the CCAA.

40 I am satisfied that it is appropriate that an initial order extending the protection of a CCAA stay of proceedings under section 11.02(1) of the CCAA should be granted.

41 Pursuant to section 11.7(1) of the CCAA, Alvarez & Marsal Inc. is appointed as Monitor.

42 It is well established that the court has the jurisdiction to extend the protection of the stay of proceedings to Partnerships in order to ensure that the purposes of the CCAA can be achieved (see: *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.,*

Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Priszm Income Fund, Re*, 2011 ONSC 2061 (Ont. S.C.J.); *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) ("*Canwest Publishing*") and *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 6184 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) ("*Canwest Global*").

43 In these circumstances, I am also satisfied that it is appropriate to extend the stay to the Partnerships as requested.

44 The Applicants also seek landlord protection in relation to third party tenants. Many retail leases of non-anchored tenants provide that tenants have certain rights against their landlords if the anchor tenant in a particular shopping mall or centre becomes insolvent or ceases operations. In order to alleviate the prejudice to TCC's landlords if any such non-anchored tenants attempt to exercise these rights, the Applicants request an extension of the stay of proceedings (the "Co-Tenancy Stay") to all rights of these third party tenants against the landlords that arise out of the insolvency of the Target Canada Entities or as a result of any steps taken by the Target Canada Entities pursuant to the Initial Order.

45 The Applicants contend that the authority to grant the Co-Tenancy Stay derives from the broad jurisdiction under sections 11 and 11.02(1) of the CCAA to make an initial order on any terms that the court may impose. Counsel references *T. Eaton Co., Re*, 1997 CarswellOnt 1914 (Ont. Gen. Div.) as a precedent where a stay of proceedings of the same nature as the Co-Tenancy Stay was granted by the court in Eaton's second CCAA proceeding. The Court noted that, if tenants were permitted to exercise these "co-tenancy" rights during the stay, the claims of the landlord against the debtor company would greatly increase, with a potentially detrimental impact on the restructuring efforts of the debtor company.

46 In these proceedings, the Target Canada Entities propose, as part of the orderly wind-down of their businesses, to engage a financial advisor and a real estate advisor with a view to implementing a sales process for some or all of its real estate portfolio. The Applicants submit that it is premature to determine whether this process will be successful, whether any leases will be conveyed to third party purchasers for value and whether the Target Canada Entities can successfully develop and implement a plan that their stakeholders, including their landlords, will accept. The Applicants further contend that while this process is being resolved and the orderly wind-down is underway, the Co-Tenancy Stay is required to postpone the contractual rights of these tenants for a finite period. The Applicants contend that any prejudice to the third party tenants' clients is significantly outweighed by the benefits of the Co-Tenancy Stay to all of the stakeholders of the Target Canada Entities during the wind-down period.

47 The Applicants therefore submit that it is both necessary and appropriate to grant the Co-Tenancy Stay in these circumstances.

48 I am satisfied the Court has the jurisdiction to grant such a stay. In my view, it is appropriate to preserve the status quo at this time. To the extent that the affected parties wish to challenge the broad nature of this stay, the same can be addressed at the "comeback hearing".

49 The Applicants also request that the benefit of the stay of proceedings be extended (subject to certain exceptions related to the cash management system) to Target Corporation and its U.S. subsidiaries in relation to claims against these entities that are derivative of the primary liability of the Target Canada Entities.

50 I am satisfied that the Court has the jurisdiction to grant such a stay. In my view, it is appropriate to preserve the status quo at this time and the stay is granted, again, subject to the proviso that affected parties can challenge the broad nature of the stay at a comeback hearing directed to this issue.

51 With respect to the protection of employees, it is noted that TCC employs approximately 17,600 individuals.

52 Mr. Wong contends that TCC and Target Corporation have always considered their employees to be integral to the Target brand and business. However, the orderly wind-down of the Target Canada Entities' business means that the

vast majority of TCC employees will receive a notice immediately after the CCAA filing that their employment is to be terminated as part of the wind-down process.

53 In order to provide a measure of financial security during the orderly wind-down and to diminish financial hardship that TCC employees may suffer, Target Corporation has agreed to fund an Employee Trust to a maximum of $70 million.

54 The Applicants seek court approval of the Employee Trust which provides for payment to eligible employees of certain amounts, such as the balance of working notice following termination. Counsel contends that the Employee Trust was developed in consultation with the proposed monitor, who is the administrator of the trust, and is supported by the proposed Representative Counsel. The proposed trustee is The Honourable J. Ground. The Employee Trust is exclusively funded by Target Corporation and the costs associated with administering the Employee Trust will be borne by the Employee Trust, not the estate of Target Canada Entities. Target Corporation has agreed not to seek to recover from the Target Canada Entities estates any amounts paid out to employee beneficiaries under the Employee Trust.

55 In my view, it is questionable as to whether court authorization is required to implement the provisions of the Employee Trust. It is the third party, Target Corporation, that is funding the expenses for the Employee Trust and not one of the debtor Applicants. However, I do recognize that the implementation of the Employee Trust is intertwined with this proceeding and is beneficial to the employees of the Applicants. To the extent that Target Corporation requires a court order authorizing the implementation of the employee trust, the same is granted.

56 The Applicants seek the approval of a KERP and the granting of a court ordered charge up to the aggregate amount of $6.5 million as security for payments under the KERP. It is proposed that the KERP Charge will rank after the Administration Charge but before the Directors' Charge.

57 The approval of a KERP and related KERP Charge is in the discretion of the Court. KERPs have been approved in numerous CCAA proceedings, including *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 1330 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) [*Nortel Networks (KERP)*], and *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4699 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). In *U.S. Steel Canada Inc., Re*, 2014 ONSC 6145 (Ont. S.C.J.), I recently approved the KERP for employees whose continued services were critical to the stability of the business and for the implementation of the marketing process and whose services could not easily be replaced due, in part, to the significant integration between the debtor company and its U.S. parent.

58 In this case, the KERP was developed by the Target Canada Entities in consultation with the proposed monitor. The proposed KERP and KERP Charge benefits between 21 and 26 key management employees and approximately 520 store-level management employees.

59 Having reviewed the record, I am of the view that it is appropriate to approve the KERP and the KERP Charge. In arriving at this conclusion, I have taken into account the submissions of counsel to the Applicants as to the importance of having stability among the key employees in the liquidation process that lies ahead.

60 The Applicants also request the Court to appoint Koskie Minsky LLP as employee representative counsel (the "Employee Representative Counsel"), with Ms. Susan Philpott acting as senior counsel. The Applicants contend that the Employee Representative Counsel will ensure that employee interests are adequately protected throughout the proceeding, including by assisting with the Employee Trust. The Applicants contend that at this stage of the proceeding, the employees have a common interest in the CCAA proceedings and there appears to be no material conflict existing between individual or groups of employees. Moreover, employees will be entitled to opt out, if desired.

61 I am satisfied that section 11 of the CCAA and the *Rules of Civil Procedure* confer broad jurisdiction on the court to appoint Representative Counsel for vulnerable stakeholder groups such as employee or investors (see *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 3028 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) (Nortel Networks Representative Counsel)). In my view, it is appropriate to approve the appointment of Employee Representative Counsel and to provide for the payment of fees for such counsel by the Applicants. In arriving at this conclusion, I have taken into account:

(i) the vulnerability and resources of the groups sought to be represented;

(ii) the social benefit to be derived from the representation of the groups;

(iii) the avoidance of multiplicity of legal retainers; and

(iv) the balance of convenience and whether it is fair and just to creditors of the estate.

62 The Applicants also seek authorization, if necessary, and with the consent of the Monitor, to make payments for pre-filing amounts owing and arrears to certain critical third parties that provide services integral to TCC's ability to operate during and implement its controlled and orderly wind-down process.

63 Although the objective of the CCAA is to maintain the status quo while an insolvent company attempts to negotiate a plan of arrangement with its creditors, the courts have expressly acknowledged that preservation of the status quo does not necessarily entail the preservation of the relative pre-stay debt status of each creditor.

64 The Target Canada Entities seek authorization to pay pre-filing amounts to certain specific categories of suppliers, if necessary and with the consent of the Monitor. These include:

a) Logistics and supply chain providers;

b) Providers of credit, debt and gift card processing related services; and

c) Other suppliers up to a maximum aggregate amount of $10 million, if, in the opinion of the Target Canada Entities, the supplier is critical to the orderly wind-down of the business.

65 In my view, having reviewed the record, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant this requested relief in respect of critical suppliers.

66 In order to maximize recovery for all stakeholders, TCC indicates that it intends to liquidate its inventory and attempt to sell the real estate portfolio, either en bloc, in groups, or on an individual property basis. The Applicants therefore seek authorization to solicit proposals from liquidators with a view to entering into an agreement for the liquidation of the Target Canada Entities inventory in a liquidation process.

67 TCC's liquidity position continues to deteriorate. According to Mr. Wong, TCC and its subsidiaries have an immediate need for funding in order to satisfy obligations that are coming due, including payroll obligations that are due on January 16, 2015. Mr. Wong states that Target Corporation and its subsidiaries are no longer willing to provide continued funding to TCC and its subsidiaries outside of a CCAA proceeding. Target Corporation (the "DIP Lender") has agreed to provide TCC and its subsidiaries (collectively, the "Borrower") with an interim financing facility (the "DIP Facility") on terms advantageous to the Applicants in the form of a revolving credit facility in an amount up to U.S. $175 million. Counsel points out that no fees are payable under the DIP Facility and interest is to be charged at what they consider to be the favourable rate of 5%. Mr. Wong also states that it is anticipated that the amount of the DIP Facility will be sufficient to accommodate the anticipated liquidity requirements of the Borrower during the orderly wind-down process.

68 The DIP Facility is to be secured by a security interest on all of the real and personal property owned, leased or hereafter acquired by the Borrower. The Applicants request a court-ordered charge on the property of the Borrower to secure the amount actually borrowed under the DIP Facility (the "DIP Lenders Charge"). The DIP Lenders Charge will rank in priority to all unsecured claims, but subordinate to the Administration Charge, the KERP Charge and the Directors' Charge.

69 The authority to grant an interim financing charge is set out at section 11.2 of the CCAA. Section 11.2(4) sets out certain factors to be considered by the court in deciding whether to grant the DIP Financing Charge.

70 The Target Canada Entities did not seek alternative DIP Financing proposals based on their belief that the DIP Facility was being offered on more favourable terms than any other potentially available third party financing. The Target Canada Entities are of the view that the DIP Facility is in the best interests of the Target Canada Entities and their stakeholders. I accept this submission and grant the relief as requested.

71 Accordingly, the DIP Lenders' Charge is granted in the amount up to U.S. $175 million and the DIP Facility is approved.

72 Section 11 of the CCAA provides the court with the authority to allow the debtor company to enter into arrangements to facilitate a restructuring under the CCAA. The Target Canada Entities wish to retain Lazard and Northwest to assist them during the CCCA proceeding. Both the Target Canada Entities and the Monitor believe that the quantum and nature of the remuneration to be paid to Lazard and Northwest is fair and reasonable. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to approve the engagement of Lazard and Northwest.

73 With respect to the Administration Charge, the Applicants are requesting that the Monitor, along with its counsel, counsel to the Target Canada Entities, independent counsel to the Directors, the Employee Representative Counsel, Lazard and Northwest be protected by a court ordered charge and all the property of the Target Canada Entities up to a maximum amount of $6.75 million as security for their respective fees and disbursements (the "Administration Charge"). Certain fees that may be payable to Lazard are proposed to be protected by a Financial Advisor Subordinated Charge.

74 In *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), Pepall J. (as she then was) provided a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in approving an administration charge, including:

a. The size and complexity of the business being restructured;

b. The proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;

c. Whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles;

d. Whether the quantum of the proposed Charge appears to be fair and reasonable;

e. The position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the Charge; and

f. The position of the Monitor.

75 Having reviewed the record, I am satisfied, that it is appropriate to approve the Administration Charge and the Financial Advisor Subordinated Charge.

76 The Applicants seek a Directors' and Officers' charge in the amount of up to $64 million. The Directors Charge is proposed to be secured by the property of the Target Canada Entities and to rank behind the Administration Charge and the KERP Charge, but ahead of the DIP Lenders' Charge.

77 Pursuant to section 11.51 of the CCAA, the court has specific authority to grant a "super priority" charge to the directors and officers of a company as security for the indemnity provided by the company in respect of certain obligations.

78 I accept the submissions of counsel to the Applicants that the requested Directors' Charge is reasonable given the nature of the Target Canada Entities retail business, the number of employees in Canada and the corresponding potential exposure of the directors and officers to personal liability. Accordingly, the Directors' Charge is granted.

79 In the result, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the Initial Order in these proceedings.

80 The stay of proceedings is in effect until February 13, 2015.

81 A comeback hearing is to be scheduled on or prior to February 13, 2015. I recognize that there are many aspects of the Initial Order that go beyond the usual first day provisions. I have determined that it is appropriate to grant this broad relief at this time so as to ensure that the status quo is maintained.

82 The comeback hearing is to be a "true" comeback hearing. In moving to set aside or vary any provisions of this order, moving parties do not have to overcome any onus of demonstrating that the order should be set aside or varied.

83 Finally, a copy of Lazard's engagement letter (the "Lazard Engagement Letter") is attached as Confidential Appendix "A" to the Monitor's pre-filing report. The Applicants request that the Lazard Engagement Letter be sealed, as the fee structure contemplated in the Lazard Engagement Letter could potentially influence the structure of bids received in the sales process.

84 Having considered the principles set out in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)* (2002), 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.), I am satisfied that it is appropriate in the circumstances to seal Confidential Appendix "A" to the Monitor's pre-filing report.

85 The Initial Order has been signed in the form presented.

Application granted.

TAB F

2013 ONSC 6167
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

8440522 Canada Inc., Re

2013 CarswellOnt 13921, 2013 ONSC 6167, 233 A.C.W.S. (3d) 286, 8 C.B.R. (6th) 86

In Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1985, c.C-36 as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of 8440522 Canada Inc., Data & Audio-Visual Enterprises Wireless Inc., and Data & Audio-Visual Enterprises Holdings Incorporation

Newbould J.

Heard: September 30, 2013
Judgment: October 4, 2013
Docket: 13-CV-16274-OOCL

Counsel: Robert Frank, Virginie Gauthier, Evan Cobb for Applicants
David C. Moore for Catalyst Capital Group Inc.
John Porter, Leanne M. Williams for Ernst & Young Inc, the proposed Monitor
Robert J. Chadwick for proposed DIP lender and the ad hoc Committee of Noteholders
Kevin P. McElcheran, James D. Gage for Quadrangle, a shareholder and, for subordinated note holders

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.2 Initial application
XIX.2.h Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Miscellaneous

Applicants consisted of operating company and holding company who carried on business as Canadian wireless telecommunications carrier — Applicants raised in excess of $400 million in debt financing to fund capital expenditures and operations since 2008 — Indebtedness consisted of second lien notes, senior unsecured debentures and convertible unsecured notes — Cash interest payment under indebtedness was payment of over $9 million on first lien notes which became due on September 30, 2013, date of Initial Order — Applicants continued to engage with potential acquirers — In two weeks preceding application applicants developed transaction structure for proposed transaction with prospective purchaser, which was currently being considered by Industry Canada — Applicants applied for protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Application granted — Initial Order signed — It was clear applicants were insolvent and that without protection of CCAA, shutdown of operations would be inevitable as applicants would cease to be able to pay trade creditors in ordinary course and would cease to be able to make interest payments on outstanding debt securities — As part of Initial Order, court approved debtor-in-possession financing and appointment of chief restructuring officer.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Newbould J.*:

Crystallex International Corp., Re (2012), 2012 CarswellOnt 7329, 2012 ONCA 404, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 207, 293 O.A.C. 102, 4 B.L.R. (5th) 1 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re (1999), 1999 CarswellOnt 625, 6 C.B.R. (4th) 314, 96 O.T.C. 272 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — distinguished

Sino-Forest Corp., Re (May 8, 2012), Doc. CV-12-9667-00CL (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Timminco Ltd., Re (2012), 2012 ONSC 2515, 2012 CarswellOnt 5390 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44

Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11.2(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

APPLICATION for protection under *Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act*.

Newbould J.:

1 On September 30, the applicants ("Mobilicity Group") applied for protection under the CCAA. At the conclusion of the hearing I ordered that the application should be granted for reasons to follow, and an Initial Order was signed. These are my reasons.

Background facts

2 The Mobilicity Group consists of Data & Audio-Visual Enterprises Wireless Inc., the operating company ("Wireless" or "Mobilicity"), its holding company Data & Audio-Visual Enterprises Holdings Inc. ("Holdings") and 8440522 Canada Inc., wholly owned by Wireless and which has no material assets or liabilities.

3 Mobilicity carries on business as a Canadian wireless telecommunications carrier. It provides cellular service to Canadians in five urban markets: Ottawa, Toronto, Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver and has roaming agreements with third party service providers to provide continuity of service outside of these markets. Mobilicity also offers hardware (handsets and accessories) to its customers.

4 Mobilicity was founded on the concept of offering low cost cellular services to value-conscious consumers seeking less expensive cellular services than those offered by the established players in the market, being Bell Canada Inc., TELUS Corporation and Rogers Communications Inc.

5 In addition to four corporately-owned stores, the Mobilicity dealer network consists of approximately 314 points of distribution which include approximately 94 "platinum-level" stores that exclusively sell Mobilicity-branded services and only offer wireless-related products at their stores, and approximately 150 "gold" and "silver" level stores that sell Mobilicity-branded services, but also sell non-wireless related products. With the exception of the four corporately owned stores, these points of distribution are operated independently from the Mobilicity Group and are compensated for sales on a commission basis 45 days after the end of the month in which a subscriber is signed on, subject to certain customer retention requirements. These dealers often operate with very low liquidity and any disruption to the stream of revenue derived from commissions would cause many of them to cease operations due to a lack of funding

6 Mobilicity operates on a "pay in advance" billing system which provides set monthly plans for its subscribers. Mobilicity has approximately 194,000 subscribers who together generate gross revenues of approximately $6.3 million per month.

7 Mobilicity's business model provides for outsourcing of certain business functions: network building and maintenance, real-time billing and rating, provisioning systems, handset logistics and distribution and call centre operations. Suppliers of such business functions include: Ericsson Canada Inc., Amdocs Canadian Managed Services Inc. and Ingram Micro Inc.

8 The single most significant capital expenditure made by Mobilicity was the acquisition of its 10 spectrum licenses from the Government of Canada effective in 2009. Mobilicity acquired the spectrum licenses for $243 million using funds contributed by Holdings.

9 After purchasing the spectrum licences, Mobilicity incurred significant costs by establishing an office, hiring a management team to develop the wireless carrier business, and contracting with Ericsson Canada Inc. to build a network system.

Outstanding indebtedness

10 In aggregate, the Mobilicity Group has raised in excess of $400 million in debt financing to fund capital expenditures and operations since 2008. A description of that indebtedness is below:

> a. Wireless is the borrower under certain first lien notes issued in a principal amount of $195,000,000 due April 29, 2018. Holdings is a guarantor of the first lien notes and each of Wireless and Holdings has entered into a general security agreement in connection with the first lien notes. The Catalyst Capital Group Inc. ("Catalyst") holds approximately 32% of the first lien notes.
>
> b. Wireless is the borrower of $43.25 million in second lien notes (the "Bridge Notes") due September 30, 2013. These Bridge Notes are also guaranteed by Holdings and the obligations thereunder are secured by the assets of Wireless and Holdings. The Bridge Notes rank behind the first lien notes in right of payment and the security on the Bridge Notes is subordinate to the first lien notes security.
>
> c. Holdings has issued 15% Senior Unsecured Debentures in the total principal amount of $95 million due September 25, 2018. As of July 31, 2013, the amount outstanding on the Unsecured Senior Notes (including payment in kind interest) was approximately $154.4 million.
>
> d. Holdings has also issued 12% Convertible Unsecured Notes due September 25, 2018. Initially, convertible notes in the principal amount of $59,741,000 were issued (the "Unsecured Pari Passu Notes"). Subsequently, additional convertible notes in the principal amount of $35,000,000 were issued (the "Unsecured Subordinated Notes"). The Unsecured Subordinated Notes rank subordinate in right of payment to the Unsecured Pari Passu Notes and the Unsecured Senior Notes and the Unsecured Pari Passu Notes rank pari passu in right of payment with the Unsecured Senior Notes. As of July 31, 2013, the amount outstanding on the Unsecured Pari Passu Notes and the Unsecured Subordinated Notes (including payment in kind interest) respectively, was approximately $88.4 million and approximately $38.6 million.

11 The cash interest payment under the above described indebtedness is a payment of over $9 million on the first lien notes which became due on September 30, 2013, the date of the Initial Order.

Mobilicity Group's financial difficulties

12 Wireless telecom start-ups are highly capital-intensive. As indicated by the substantial indebtedness incurred by the Mobilicity Group to date, significant fixed costs must be incurred before revenue can be generated. During the period where a wireless carrier is building its customer base, revenue is typically insufficient to cover previously incurred investments and ongoing operating costs. It can take several years for a customer base to be adequately built to provide profitability. The applicants submit that Mobilicity ran out of "financial runway" before profitability was achieved and it now faces an imminent liquidity crisis.

13 For the seven months ended July 31, 2013, the Mobilicity Group recognized revenue of $46,864,490. During that period, the Mobilicity Group recorded a net loss of $71,958,543. As of July 31, 2013, the Mobilicity Group had on a consolidated basis accumulated a net deficit of $431,807,958.

14 In July 2012, the Mobilicity Group engaged National Bank and Canaccord Genuity (together, the "financial advisors") as their financial advisors in an effort to raise additional financing.

15 With the assistance of the financial advisors, the Mobilicity Group solicited more than 30 potential investors in an attempt to raise financing. In this regard, an investor roadshow was completed in August and September of 2012 without success.

16 The Bridge Notes facility was entered into on February 6, 2013 to allow Mobilicity to continue operations while it pursued strategic alternatives. The Bridge note lenders are the first lien note holders other than Catalyst, and certain existing holders of Unsecured Senior Notes. Catalyst has started oppression proceedings attacking the Bridge Notes facility.

17 Mr. William Aziz was retained in late April of 2013 through BlueTree Advisors II Inc. as Chief Restructuring Officer to provide assistance in dealing with restructuring matters. Mr. Aziz has extensive experience in the area of corporate restructuring.

18 The Mobilicity Group proposed alternative plans of arrangement earlier this year. During the course of those proceedings, a transaction was agreed to sell the Mobilicity Group to TELUS Corporation for $380 million pursuant to a plan of arrangement under the *Canada Business Corporations Act*. The plan of arrangement was approved on May 28, 2013. However, On June 4, 2013, the Minister of Industry announced that TELUS Corporation's application to transfer the spectrum licenses would not be approved at that time. Accordingly, the TELUS transaction was not completed.

19 The Mobilicity Group has continued to engage with potential acquirers. As part of those efforts, the Mobilicity Group solicited and received an expression of interest and engaged in detailed discussions with a significant U.S.-based wireless service provider. However, after significant due diligence these discussions did not ultimately result in a binding offer due to uncertainty surrounding the Government's upcoming spectrum auction.

20 In the two weeks preceding this application the Mobilicity Group developed a transaction structure for a proposed transaction with a prospective purchaser, which is currently being considered by Industry Canada. The government's assent to the proposed transaction was not obtained prior to this application being made.

Analysis

21 It is clear from the affidavit of Mr. Aziz that the Mobilicity Group is insolvent and that without the protection of the CCAA, a shutdown of operations would be inevitable as the Mobilicity Group will cease to be able to pay its trade creditors in the ordinary course and will cease to be able to make interest payments on its outstanding debt securities. Thus the applicants are entitled to relief under the CCAA.

22 The Initial Order contained provisions permitting a charge for directors and an administration charge. These were not opposed except as to part of the administrative charge discussed below. The applicants also sought authorization to continue the engagement of the financial advisors who had initially been retained in 2012, which was not opposed, and approval of KERP agreements for a small number of employees, also not opposed. The Monitor supported these provisions and they appeared to be reasonable, and were approved.

23 I will deal with issues that were raised by Catalyst, not in opposition to the Initial Order, but in opposition to certain parts of it.

DIP financing

24 The Mobilicity Group has obtained a $30 million DIP facility available in five tranches, to be used only in accordance with the cash flow forecasts of the applicants. They seek approval of this facility and a charge to secure the facility. The facility was obtained after a solicitation process undertaken by the Mobilicity Group and its financial advisors, described

in some particularity in Mr. Aziz's affidavit. The lenders are the holders of the second lien notes under the Bridge Loan and other unsecured lenders of the Mobilicity Group.

25 The DIP financing ranks pari passu with the Bridge Notes, and subordinate to the first lien notes, with the exception of cash interest payments under the DIP Financing. Since the DIP financing ranks subordinate to the first lien notes, the holders of the first lien notes, including Catalyst, will not be adversely affected by the DIP Financing.

26 In the solicitation process, the Mobilicity Group received DIP financing proposals from not less than four parties, including existing creditors as well as third parties with no prior financial involvement with the Mobilicity Group. One such proposal was provided by the holders of the Bridge Notes and another was provided by Catalyst. The Mobilicity Group engaged its financial advisors and legal counsel to assist in the evaluation of the DIP Financing options that were presented.

27 Upon review, the Mobilicity Group determined, with advice from its advisors, that the proposals provided by the non-creditor third parties likely could not be implemented. Therefore, the financial advisors held discussions with the holders of the Bridge Notes and Catalyst to obtain what the Mobilicity Group believed to be the best available offer from each party either in the form of a final definitive term sheet or definitive agreements. These discussions occurred over the course of several weeks.

28 The financial advisors and counsel to the Mobilicity Group evaluated these DIP financing options, including the Catalyst DIP term sheet, based upon, among other things, quantum, conditions, price, ranking and execution risk and provided their expert views to the board of directors of the Mobilicity Group. After consideration of the DIP financing options, and after considering the advice of its legal and financial advisors, the board of directors of the Mobilicity Group concluded that the DIP financing option presented by the holders of the Bridge Notes was the best available option.

29 Catalyst contends that the DIP lending should not be approved at this time. It points to the cash flow forecast of the applicants that indicates that no DIP borrowing will be required until the week ending November 8, 2013 and says that there is time to give consideration to other DIP facilities that might be available. Mr. Moore said that he expects to obtain instructions from Catalyst to propose DIP financing that will rank equally as the DIP lending proposed by the applicants but provide more money and on better terms than that provided for in the proposal before the court.

30 Mr. Moore relies on the statement of Blair. J. (as he then was) in *Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re* (1999), 6 C.B.R. (4th) 314 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) that extraordinary relief such as DIP financing with super priority status should be kept in the Initial Order to what is reasonably necessary to meet the debtor's urgent needs during the sorting out period. Each case, of course, depends on its particular facts. Unlike *Royal Oak Mines Inc.*, the proposed DIP financing does not give the DIP lender super priority of the kind in *Royal Oak Mines Inc.*. It will rank behind the first lien notes held by Mr. Moore's client. The issue is whether approval of DIP financing is necessary at this time.

31 As to that question, I accept the position of Mobilicity that it is important that now that the CCAA proceedings have commenced, approving a DIP facility will provide some assurance of stability to the market place, including the customers of Mobilicity and its suppliers and dealers. If no DIP financing were approved, there is a serious risk that customers of Mobilicity, who do not have long term contracts, will go elsewhere. That would negatively affect the cash flow of Mobilicity and the assumption that advances under the DIP loan would not be required until November.

32 Should this DIP facility be approved with its proposed security? In my view it should. On the record before me, the facility was approved by the board of directors of the Mobilicity Group with the benefit of expert advice after a process undertaken to obtain bids for the loan. I recognize that board approval is a factor that may be taken into account but it is not determinative. See *Crystallex International Corp., Re* (2012), 91 C.B.R. (5th) 207 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 85.

33 The factors in s.11.2 (4) of the CCAA must be considered. I will deal with each of them.

(a) The period during which the company is expected to be subject to the CCAA proceedings.

34 Mobilicity hopes to be able to enter into a transaction with a proposed purchaser within a relatively short period of time. The applicants submit that it is reasonable to estimate that the proceedings could last to February, 2014 and that subject to its conditions, the DIP facility can provide funding until that time.

(b) How the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings.

35 The Mobilicity Group retained Mr. Aziz in April, 2013 as its CRO, and he will continue in that capacity. He is a person of known ability. The business will continue to be run on a day to day basis by management who are looking for stability to enable it to keep its customer base.

(c) Whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors.

36 Catalyst, as the holder of approximately 34% of the first lien notes, says it has no confidence in Mr. Aziz or the way that it alleges the Mobilicity Group has ignored the different interests of Mobilicity and its holding company. That is the subject of its claim for oppression. However, the balance of first lien note holders, all of the Bridge Note holders, approximately 92% of the unsecured debenture holders and all of the holders of the pari passu notes support the company's management and the approval of the DIP facility. That is, holders of $444 million of the Mobilicity Group's debt, or 88% of that debt, support management and the DIP facility.

(d) Whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement.

37 The Mobilicity Group's preferred course is to achieve a going concern transaction that will be of benefit to all stakeholders, including the first lien note holders. The DIP facility permits some stability and breathing room to enable this to happen.

(e) The nature and value of the company's property.

38 The earlier TELUS deal was for $380 plus assumption of obligations of the company. If the value of the Mobilicity Group is anywhere near that size, the $30 million DIP facility appears reasonable, particularly as it is to be drawn down in tranches when needed.

(f) Whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security.

39 No creditors will be materially prejudiced as a result of the DIP facility charge. The secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge have consented to it. The charge is junior to the security granted to the holders of first lien notes and is subordinate to any encumbrances that may have priority over the first lien notes either by contract or by operation of law.

(g) The position of the Monitor as set out in its report.

40 In its pre-filing report, E & Y, the proposed Monitor, has reviewed the process leading to the DIP facility and its terms. It states that it is of the view that the DIP facility charge is required and is reasonable in the circumstances in view of the applicants' liquidity needs.

41 In all of the circumstances, I approved the DIP facility and its charge. There is a come-back clause in the Initial Order, which Catalyst may or may not wish to utilize. I would observe that if Catalyst seeks to have a DIP facility proposed by it to replace the approved DIP facility, some consideration of the *Soundair* and *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* principles may be appropriate.

Stay of oppression action

42 The Initial Order sought by the applicants contained a usual stay order preventing the commencement or continuance of proceedings against or in respect of the applicants and the Monitor. Included in the protection were the

DIP lenders, the holders of Bridge Notes and the Collateral Agent under the Bridge notes. The applicants submitted, and I agree with them, that this expanded group was appropriate in the circumstances as the holders of Bridge Notes and the Trustee have each been named in the oppression application brought by Catalyst. The holders of the Bridge Notes and the Trustee are parties to the oppression application by Catalyst solely due to their lending arrangements with the applicants and, as a result, the applicants are central parties to that litigation and would need to participate actively in any steps taken in that litigation. Further, any continuation of the oppression application against the holders of the Bridge Notes and the Trustee would distract from the goals of these proceedings and also result in unwarranted expenditure of resources by the holders of the Bridge Notes and the Trustee, each of which are indemnified in a customary manner by the applicants for these types of expenditures. As the DIP lenders are also Bridge Note holders and as such parties are stepping into a similar financial position as the Bridge Note holders, the extension of the stay to those parties is appropriate and reasonable. See *Sino-Forest Corp., Re* (May 8, 2012), Doc. CV-12-9667-00CL (Ont. S.C.J.); *Timminco Ltd., Re*, 2012 ONSC 2515 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 23 and 24.

43 Catalyst contended, however, that the stay provisions should exclude its oppression application. Why this is so is not clear. Mr. Moore said there had been no steps taken in the application since the August cross-examination of Mr. Aziz, and that Catalyst would undertake not to take further steps until the come-back date. I see no reason why the oppression application should be excluded from the stay contained in the Initial Order. It may be that Catalyst will be paid out in the near future if the transaction now on the table can be concluded. In any event, it is open to any party to apply to lift a stay on proper grounds. Catalyst is no different.

Ad hoc committee charge

44 The Initial Order contains an administration charge to cover fees and disbursements to be paid out to the Monitor and its counsel, counsel to the applicants, counsel to the DIP lenders and counsel to the ad hoc committee of Noteholders. Catalyst contends that there is no basis for counsel for the ad hoc committee of Noteholders to be included in this charge or to be paid by the applicant.

45 In this case, counsel to the DIP lenders is also counsel to the ad hoc committee of noteholders. That committee includes the balance of the first lien noteholders other than Catalyst who are the Bridge Note holders. It was the Bridge Notes that permitted the Mobilicity Group to continue since February of this year. Those noteholders making up the ad hoc committee have been working in a supportive capacity in an attempt to have the Mobilicity Group re-organized in a constructive way. I am satisfied that the ad hoc committee has been of assistance to the process and that the charge is appropriate and necessary. I would also note that the administrative charge is junior to the first lien notes and thus the security position of Catalyst is not affected by the charge. As well the administrative charge is supported by the proposed Monitor.

Appointment of chief restructuring officer

46 The Initial Order authorizes the applicants to continue the engagement of William Aziz as the chief restructuring officer of the Mobilicity Group on the terms set out in the CRO engagement letter. This letter has been sealed as confidential. Catalyst said it should see the letter and until then no order should be made. On the day before this application was heard, counsel for the Mobilicity Group offered to send the complete record to counsel for Catalyst if an undertaking was given that the material would be kept confidential prior to the hearing. Mr. Moore objected to such a pre-condition and was served shortly before the hearing with the application record without the confidential documents.

47 Catalyst contends that no order should be made until it has had a chance to see the terms of the engagement letter. I do not think this wise. To proceed with the CCAA process without the continuation of Mr. Aziz as the chief restructuring officer would send the entirely wrong signal to all stakeholders, let alone the Government of Canada with whom Mr. Aziz has been dealing regarding a proposed transaction.

48 Mr. Aziz has a thorough knowledge of the affairs of the Mobilicity Group, having been its chief restructuring officer since April of this year. He has been central to the efforts of the applicants to restructure. He is very knowledgeable and experienced. In is appropriate that his engagement now be continued. The proposed Monitor has reviewed the engagement letter and is of the view that the fee arrangement is reasonable and consistent with the fee arrangements in other engagements of similar size, scope and complexity.

49 Counsel for the applicants and Catalyst were agreeable to working out an appropriate confidentiality arrangement. Once Catalyst has seen the engagement letter for Mr. Aziz, it will be entitled if so advised to bring whatever come-back motion it thinks appropriate.

50 The Initial Order as signed contains provisions as discussed in this endorsement.

Application granted.

TAB G

2012 ONSC 106
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Timminco Ltd., Re

2012 CarswellOnt 1059, 2012 ONSC 106, 213 A.C.W.S. (3d) 542, 89 C.B.R. (5th) 127

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of
Timminco Limited and Bécancour Silicon Inc. (Applicants)

Morawetz J.

Heard: January 3, 2012
Judgment: January 4, 2012
Docket: None given.

Counsel: A.J. Taylor, M. Konyukhova, K. Esaw for Applicants
S. Weisz for FTI Consulting Canada Inc.
A. Kauffman for Investissement Quebec

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.2 Initial application
XIX.2.b Grant of stay
XIX.2.b.viii Miscellaneous
Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.2 Initial application
XIX.2.h Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Grant of stay — Miscellaneous

Debtor company B was wholly-owned subsidiary of debtor company T — Debtor company T owned 51 per cent of Q partnership and together T and Q were in business of producing silicon — Several directors and officers of debtor company B were also directors and officers of Q partnership — Debtor companies B and T applied for relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") — Application granted — Debtor companies had total claims against them in excess of $89 million — Debtor companies required protection of CCAA to allow them to maintain operations while giving them necessary time to consult with stakeholders regarding future of business operations and corporate structure — Stay of actions against directors of debtor companies also granted — Stay of actions against directors extended to include stay in favour of directors and officers of debtor company who were also directors and officers of Q partnership — Extension of stay to directors and officers of Q partnership was appropriate due to intertwined nature of businesses of debtor companies and Q partnership — Stay would allow directors and officers to focus on restructuring of debtor companies.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Miscellaneous

Administration charge — Directors' and officers' charge — Debtor company B was wholly-owned subsidiary of debtor company T — Debtor company T owned 51 per cent of Q partnership and together T and Q were in business of producing silicon — Debtor companies had total claims against them in excess of $89 million — Debtor companies B and T applied for relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Application granted — Administration charge in maximum amount of $1 million was appropriate given size and complexity of business to be restructured — Administration charge would secure fees and disbursements of counsel to debtor companies, monitor and monitor's counsel — Directors' and officers' charge in amount of $400,000 in favour of directors and officers of debtor companies was appropriate given complexity of business of debtor companies and corresponding potential exposure of directors and officers to personal liability — Directors' and officers' charge would also provide assurances to employees of debtor companies that obligations for accrued wages and termination and severance pay would be satisfied — Directors' and officers' charge would apply only to extent that existing directors' and officers' liability insurance was not adequate.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 6184, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Smoky River Coal Ltd., Re (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 94, 1999 ABCA 179, 71 Alta. L.R. (3d) 1, 175 D.L.R. (4th) 703, 237 A.R. 326, 197 W.A.C. 326, [1999] 11 W.W.R. 734, 1999 CarswellAlta 491 (Alta. C.A.) — followed

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11.02(3) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.03 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8

Generally — referred to

Régimes complémentaires de retraite, Loi sur les, L.R.Q., c. R-15.1

en général — referred to

APPLICATION by debtor companies for relief under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

***Morawetz J.*:**

1 Timminco Limited ("Timminco") and Bécancour Silicon Inc. ("BSI") (collectively, the "Timminco Entities") apply for relief under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (the "CCAA").

2 Timminco produces silicon metal through Québec Silicon Limited Partnership ("QSLP") its 51% owned production partnership with Dow Corning Corporation ("DCC") for resale to customers in the chemical (silicones), aluminum, and electronics/solar industries. Timminco also produces solar-grade silicon through Timminco Solar, an unincorporated division of Timminco's wholly-owned subsidiary BSI ("Timminco Solar"), for customers in the solar photovoltaic industry.

3 The Timminco Entities are facing severe liquidity issues as a result of, among other things, a low profit margin realized on their silicon metal sales due to a high volume long-term supply contract at below market prices, a decrease in the demand and market price for solargrade silicon, failure to recoup their capital expenditures incurred in connection with development of their solar-grade operations, and inability to secure additional funding. The Timminco Entities are also

facing significant pension and environmental remediation legacy costs and financial costs related to large outstanding debts. A significant portion of the legacy costs are as a result of discontinued operations relating to Timminco's former magnesium business.

4 Counsel to the Timminco Entities submits that, as a result, the Timminco Entities are unable to meet various financial covenants set out in their Senior Secured Credit Facility and do not have the liquidity needed to meet their ongoing payment obligations. Counsel submits that, without the protection of the CCAA, a shutdown of operations is inevitable, which would be extremely detrimental to the Timminco Entities' employees, pensioners, suppliers and customers. Counsel further submits that CCAA protection will allow the Timminco entities to maintain operations while giving them the necessary time to consult with their stakeholders regarding the future of their business operations and corporate structure.

5 The facts with respect to this application are set out in the affidavit of Mr. Peter A. M. Kalins, sworn January 2, 2012.

6 Timminco and BSI are corporations established under the laws of Canada and Quebec respectively and, in my view, are "companies" within the definition of the CCAA.

7 Timminco has its head office in the city of Toronto. The board of directors of Timminco authorized this application. Further, pursuant to a unanimous shareholder declaration which removed the directorial powers from the directors of BSI and consolidated the decision making with Timminco through its board of directors, the board of directors of Timminco has also authorized this filing on behalf of BSI. I am satisfied that the Applicants are properly before this court.

8 The affidavit of Mr. Kalins establishes that the Timminco Entities do not have the liquidity necessary to meet their obligations to creditors as they become due and, further, they have failed to pay certain obligations including, among other things, the interest payment due under the secured term loan and the interest payment due under the AMG Note on December 31, 2011.

9 The affidavit also establishes that the Timminco Entities are affiliate debtor companies with total claims against them in excess of $89 million.

10 The required financial statements and cash flow information are contained in the record.

11 The CCAA applies to a "debtor company" or affiliated debtor companies where the total of claims against the debtor or its affiliates exceed $5 million. I am satisfied that the record establishes that the Timminco Entities are insolvent and are "debtor companies" to which the CCAA applies.

12 On an initial application in respect of a debtor company, s. 11.02(3) of the CCAA provides authority for the court to make an order on any terms that it may impose where the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make the order appropriate.

13 Counsel to the Applicants submits that the Timminco Entities require the protection of the CCAA to allow them to maintain operations while giving them the necessary time to consult with their stakeholders regarding the future of their business operations and corporate structure.

14 In this case, in addition to the usual stay provisions affecting creditors of the debtor, counsel submits that, to ensure the ongoing stability of the Timminco Entities' business during the CCAA period, the Timminco Entities require the continued participation of their directors, officers, managers and employees.

15 Under s. 11.03, the court has jurisdiction to grant an order staying any action against a director of the company on any claim against directors that arose before the commencement of CCAA proceedings and that relate to obligations of the company if directors are under any law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of those obligations, until a compromise or arrangement in respect of the company, if one is filed, is sanctioned by the court or refused by the creditors or the court.

16 Counsel submits that there are several directors of BSI that also serve on the board of directors of Quebec Silicon General Partner Inc. ("QSGP") and several common officers (collectively, the "QSGP/BSI Directors").

17 Due to the intertwined nature of the Timminco Entities and QSLP's businesses and in order to allow these directors and officers to focus on the restructuring of the Timminco Entities, the Timminco Entities also seek to extend the stay of proceedings in favour of those directors and officers in their capacity as directors or officers of QSGP.

18 Counsel to the Timminco Entities submits that circumstances exist that make it appropriate to grant a stay in favour of the QSGP/BSI directors. In support of its argument, counsel relies on *Smoky River Coal Ltd., Re* (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 94 (Alta. C.A.) where the court indicated that its jurisdiction includes the power to stay conduct which "could seriously impair the debtor's ability to focus and concentrate its efforts on the business purpose of negotiating the compromise or arrangement".

19 In these circumstances, I am prepared to accept this argument and grant a stay in favour of the QSGP/BSI directors.

20 The Applicants have also requested that the stay of proceedings be extended with respect to the QSLP Agreements. Mr. Kalins' affidavit establishes that BSI's viability is directly related to its relationship with QSLP and that the relationship is governed by the QSLP Agreements. The QSLP Agreements provide for certain events to be deemed to have taken place, for certain modification of rights, and to entitle DCC, QSLP, and/or QSGP to take certain steps for the termination of certain QSLP Agreements in the event BSI becomes insolvent or commences proceedings under the CCAA. Counsel submits that due to the highly intertwined nature of the businesses of BSI and QSLP and BSI's high dependence on QSLP, it is imperative for the Timminco Entities and for the benefit of their creditors that BSI's rights under the QSLP Agreements not be modified as a result of its seeking protection under the CCAA.

21 For the purposes of this initial hearing, I am prepared to accept this argument and extend the stay as requested.

22 The Applicants also request an Administration Charge and a D&O Charge.

23 The requested Administration Charge on the assets, property and undertaking of the Timminco Entities (the "Property") is in the maximum amount of $1 million to secure the fees and disbursements in connection with services rendered by counsel to the Timminco Entities, the Monitor and the Monitor's counsel (the "Administration Charge").

24 The Timminco Entities request that the Administration Charge rank ahead of the existing security interest of Investissement Quebec ("IQ") but behind all other security interests, trusts, liens, charges and encumbrances, claims of secured creditors, statutory or otherwise, including any deemed trust created under the *Ontario Pension Benefits Act* or the *Québec Supplemental Pension Plans Act* (collectively, the "Encumbrances") in favour of any persons that have not been served with notice of this application.

25 IQ has been served and does not object to the requested charge, other than to adjust priorities such that the first-ranking charge should be the Administration Charge to a maximum of $500,000 followed by the D&O Charge to a maximum of $400,000 followed by the Administration Charge to a maximum amount of $500,000. This suggested change is agreeable to the Timminco Entities and has been incorporated into the draft order.

26 Section 11.52 of the CCAA provides statutory jurisdiction to grant such a charge. Under s. 11.52, factors that the court will consider include: the size and complexity of the business being restructured; the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge; whether there is unwarranted duplication of roles; whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable; the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and the views of the monitor. *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re* (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

27 In this case, counsel submits that the Administration Charge is appropriate considering the following factors:

(a) the Timminco Entities operate a business which includes numerous facilities in Ontario and Quebec, several ongoing environmental monitoring and remediation obligations, three defined benefit plans and an intertwined relationship with QSLP;

(b) the beneficiaries of the Administration Charge will provide essential legal and financial advice throughout the Timminco Entities' CCAA proceedings;

(c) there is no anticipated unwarranted duplication of roles;

(d) IQ was advised of the return date of the application and does not object; and

(e) the Administration Charge does not purport to prime any secured party or potential beneficiary of a deemed trust who has not received notice of this application.

28 The proposed monitor has advised that it is supportive of the Administration Charge.

29 I accept these submissions and find that it is appropriate to approve the requested Administration Charge. In doing so, I note that the Timminco Entities have stated that they intend to return to court and seek an order granting super-priority ranking to the Administration Charge ahead of the Encumbrances including, *inter alia*, any deemed trust created under provincial pension legislation on the comeback motion.

30 With respect to the D&O Charge, the Timminco Entities seek a charge over the property in favour of the Timminco Entities' directors and officers in the amount of $400,000 (the "D&O Charge"). The directors of the Timminco Entities have stated that, due to the significant personal exposure associated with the Timminco Entities' aforementioned liabilities, they cannot continue their service with the Timminco Entities unless the Initial Order grants the D&O Charge.

31 The CCAA has codified the granting of directors' and officers' charges on a priority basis in s. 11.51.

32 In *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* (2009), 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 48, Pepall J. applied s. 11.51 noting that the court must be satisfied that the amount of the charge is appropriate in light of obligations and liabilities that may be incurred after commencement of proceedings.

33 Counsel advises that the Timminco Entities maintain directors' and officers' liability insurance ("D&O Insurance") for its directors and officers and the current D&O Insurance provides a total of $15 million in coverage. Counsel advises that it is expected that the D&O Insurance will provide coverage sufficient to protect the directors and officers and the proposed order provides that the D&O Charge shall only apply to the extent that the D&O Insurance is not adequate.

34 The proposed monitor has advised that it is supportive of the D&O Charge.

35 The Timminco Entities have also indicated their intention to return to court and seek an order granting super priority ranking to the D&O Charge ahead of the Encumbrances.

36 In these circumstances, I accept the submission that the requested D&O Charge is reasonable given the complexity of the Timminco Entities business and the corresponding potential exposure of the directors and officers to personal liability. The D&O Charge will also provide assurances to the employees of the Timminco Entities that obligations for accrued wages and termination and severance pay will be satisfied. The D&O Charge is approved.

37 In the result, CCAA protection is granted to the Timminco Entities and the stay of proceedings is extended in favour of the QSGP/BSI directors and with respect to the QSLP Agreements.

38 Further, the Administration Charge and the D&O Charge are granted in the amounts requested.

39 FTI Consulting Canada Inc., having filed its consent to act, is appointed as Monitor.

40 It is specifically noted that the comeback motion has been scheduled for Thursday, January 12, 2012.

41 The Stay Period shall be until February 2, 2012.

42 The Applicants acknowledge that the only party that received notice of this application was IQ. Counsel to the Applicants advised that this step was necessary in order to preserve the operations of the Timminco Entities.

43 For the purposes of the initial application, this matter was treated as being an *ex parte* application. Accordingly, the comeback motion on January 12, 2012 will provide any interested party with the opportunity to make submissions on any aspect of the Initial Order. A total of three hours has been set aside for argument on that date.

Application granted.

TAB H

2009 CarswellOnt 6184
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re

2009 CarswellOnt 6184, [2009] O.J. No. 4286, 181 A.C.W.S. (3d) 853, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, C-36. AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP. AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS LISTED ON SCHEDULE "A"

Pepall J.

Judgment: October 13, 2009
Docket: CV-09-8241-OOCL

Counsel: Lyndon Barnes, Edward Sellers, Jeremy Dacks for Applicants
Alan Merskey for Special Committee of the Board of Directors
David Byers, Maria Konyukhova for Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.
Benjamin Zarnett, Robert Chadwick for Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders
Edmond Lamek for Asper Family
Peter H. Griffin, Peter J. Osborne for Management Directors, Royal Bank of Canada
Hilary Clarke for Bank of Nova Scotia
Steve Weisz for CIT Business Credit Canada Inc.

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.e Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Miscellaneous

Debtor companies experienced financial problems due to deteriorating economic environment in Canada — Debtor companies took steps to improve cash flow and to strengthen their balance sheets — Economic conditions did not improve nor did financial circumstances of debtor companies — They experienced significant tightening of credit from critical suppliers and trade creditors, reduction of advertising commitments, demands for reduced credit terms by newsprint and printing suppliers, and restrictions on or cancellation of credit cards for certain employees — Application was brought for relief pursuant to Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Application granted — Proposed monitor was appointed — Companies qualified as debtor companies under Act — Debtor companies were in default of their obligations — Required statement of projected cash-flow and other financial documents required under s. 11(2) were filed — Stay of proceedings was granted to create stability and allow debtor companies to pursue their restructuring — Partnerships in application carried on operations that were integral and closely interrelated to business of debtor companies — It was just and convenient to grant relief requested with respect to partnerships — Debtor-in-possession financing was approved — Administration charge was granted — Debtor companies' request for authorization to pay pre-filing amounts owed to critical suppliers was granted — Directors' and officers' charge was granted — Key employee retention plans were approved — Extension of time for calling of annual general meeting was granted.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Pepall J.*:

Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re (1995), 1995 CarswellOnt 36, 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187, 2006 ABQB 153, 2006 CarswellAlta 446 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

General Publishing Co., Re (2003), 39 C.B.R. (4th) 216, 2003 CarswellOnt 275 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re (2004), 2004 BCSC 745, 2004 CarswellBC 1249, 2 C.B.R. (5th) 210, 33 B.C.L.R. (4th) 155 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4699, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) — followed

Smurfit-Stone Container Canada Inc., Re (2009), 50 C.B.R. (5th) 71, 2009 CarswellOnt 391 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

Chapter 15 — referred to

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44

Generally — referred to

s. 106(6) — referred to

s. 133(1) — referred to

s. 133(1)(b) — referred to

s. 133(3) — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — considered

s. 2 "debtor company" — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11(2) — referred to

s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.2(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — referred to

s. 11.2(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.4(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — referred to

s. 11.4(3) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 23 — considered

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43

s. 137(2) — considered

Rules considered:

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194

R. 38.09 — referred to

APPLICATION for relief pursuant to *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.*

***Pepall J.*:**

1 Canwest Global Communications Corp. ("Canwest Global"), its principal operating subsidiary, Canwest Media Inc. ("CMI"), and the other applicants listed on Schedule "A" of the Notice of Application apply for relief pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.* [1] The applicants also seek to have the stay of proceedings and other provisions extend to the following partnerships: Canwest Television Limited Partnership ("CTLP"), Fox Sports World Canada Partnership and The National Post Company/La Publication National Post ("The National Post Company"). The businesses operated by the applicants and the aforementioned partnerships include (i) Canwest's free-to-air television broadcast business (ie. the Global Television Network stations); (ii) certain subscription-based specialty television channels that are wholly owned and operated by CTLP; and (iii) the National Post.

2 The Canwest Global enterprise as a whole includes the applicants, the partnerships and Canwest Global's other subsidiaries that are not applicants. The term Canwest will be used to refer to the entire enterprise. The term CMI Entities will be used to refer to the applicants and the three aforementioned partnerships. The following entities are not applicants nor is a stay sought in respect of any of them: the entities in Canwest's newspaper publishing and digital media business in Canada (other than the National Post Company) namely the Canwest Limited Partnership, Canwest Publishing Inc./ Publications Canwest Inc., Canwest Books Inc., and Canwest (Canada) Inc.; the Canadian subscription based specialty television channels acquired from Alliance Atlantis Communications Inc. in August, 2007 which are held jointly with Goldman Sachs Capital Partners and operated by CW Investments Co. and its subsidiaries; and subscription-based specialty television channels which are not wholly owned by CTLP.

3 No one appearing opposed the relief requested.

Backround Facts

4 Canwest is a leading Canadian media company with interests in twelve free-to-air television stations comprising the Global Television Network, subscription-based specialty television channels and newspaper publishing and digital media operations.

5 As of October 1, 2009, Canwest employed the full time equivalent of approximately 7,400 employees around the world. Of that number, the full time equivalent of approximately 1,700 are employed by the CMI Entities, the vast majority of whom work in Canada and 850 of whom work in Ontario.

6 Canwest Global owns 100% of CMI. CMI has direct or indirect ownership interests in all of the other CMI Entities. Ontario is the chief place of business of the CMI Entities.

7 Canwest Global is a public company continued under the *Canada Business Corporations Act*[2]. It has authorized capital consisting of an unlimited number of preference shares, multiple voting shares, subordinate voting shares, and non-voting shares. It is a "constrained-share company" which means that at least 66 2/3% of its voting shares must be beneficially owned by Canadians. The Asper family built the Canwest enterprise and family members hold various classes of shares. In April and May, 2009, corporate decision making was consolidated and streamlined.

8 The CMI Entities generate the majority of their revenue from the sale of advertising (approximately 77% on a consolidated basis). Fuelled by a deteriorating economic environment in Canada and elsewhere, in 2008 and 2009, they experienced a decline in their advertising revenues. This caused problems with cash flow and circumstances were exacerbated by their high fixed operating costs. In response to these conditions, the CMI Entities took steps to improve cash flow and to strengthen their balance sheets. They commenced workforce reductions and cost saving measures, sold certain interests and assets, and engaged in discussions with the CRTC and the Federal government on issues of concern.

9 Economic conditions did not improve nor did the financial circumstances of the CMI Entities. They experienced significant tightening of credit from critical suppliers and trade creditors, a further reduction of advertising commitments, demands for reduced credit terms by newsprint and printing suppliers, and restrictions on or cancellation of credit cards for certain employees.

10 In February, 2009, CMI breached certain of the financial covenants in its secured credit facility. It subsequently received waivers of the borrowing conditions on six occasions. On March 15, 2009, it failed to make an interest payment of US$30.4 million due on 8% senior subordinated notes. CMI entered into negotiations with an ad hoc committee of the 8% senior subordinated noteholders holding approximately 72% of the notes (the "Ad Hoc Committee"). An agreement was reached wherein CMI and its subsidiary CTLP agreed to issue US$105 million in 12% secured notes to members of the Ad Hoc Committee. At the same time, CMI entered into an agreement with CIT Business Credit Canada Inc. ("CIT") in which CIT agreed to provide a senior secured revolving asset based loan facility of up to $75 million. CMI used the funds generated for operations and to repay amounts owing on the senior credit facility with a syndicate of lenders of which the Bank of Nova Scotia was the administrative agent. These funds were also used to settle related swap obligations.

11 Canwest Global reports its financial results on a consolidated basis. As at May 31, 2009, it had total consolidated assets with a net book value of $4.855 billion and total consolidated liabilities of $5.846 billion. The subsidiaries of Canwest Global that are not applicants or partnerships in this proceeding had short and long term debt totalling $2.742 billion as at May 31, 2009 and the CMI Entities had indebtedness of approximately $954 million. For the 9 months ended May 31, 2009, Canwest Global's consolidated revenues decreased by $272 million or 11% compared to the same period in 2008. In addition, operating income before amortization decreased by $253 million or 47%. It reported a consolidated net loss of $1.578 billion compared to $22 million for the same period in 2008. CMI reported that revenues for the Canadian television operations decreased by $8 million or 4% in the third quarter of 2009 and operating profit was $21 million compared to $39 million in the same period in 2008.

12 The board of directors of Canwest Global struck a special committee of the board ("the Special Committee") with a mandate to explore and consider strategic alternatives in order to maximize value. That committee appointed Thomas Strike, who is the President, Corporate Development and Strategy Implementation of Canwest Global, as Recapitalization Officer and retained Hap Stephen, who is the Chairman and CEO of Stonecrest Capital Inc., as a Restructuring Advisor ("CRA").

13 On September 15, 2009, CMI failed to pay US$30.4 million in interest payments due on the 8% senior subordinated notes.

14 On September 22, 2009, the board of directors of Canwest Global authorized the sale of all of the shares of Ten Network Holdings Limited (Australia) ("Ten Holdings") held by its subsidiary, Canwest Mediaworks Ireland Holdings ("CMIH"). Prior to the sale, the CMI Entities had consolidated indebtedness totalling US$939.9 million pursuant to three facilities. CMI had issued 8% unsecured notes in an aggregate principal amount of US$761,054,211. They were guaranteed by all of the CMI Entities except Canwest Global, and 30109, LLC. CMI had also issued 12% secured notes in an aggregate principal amount of US$94 million. They were guaranteed by the CMI Entities. Amongst others, Canwest's subsidiary, CMIH, was a guarantor of both of these facilities. The 12% notes were secured by first ranking charges against all of the property of CMI, CTLP and the guarantors. In addition, pursuant to a credit agreement dated May 22, 2009 and subsequently amended, CMI has a senior secured revolving asset-based loan facility in the maximum amount of $75 million with CIT Business Credit Canada Inc. ("CIT"). Prior to the sale, the debt amounted to $23.4 million not including certain letters of credit. The facility is guaranteed by CTLP, CMIH and others and secured by first ranking charges against all of the property of CMI, CTLP, CMIH and other guarantors. Significant terms of the credit agreement are described in paragraph 37 of the proposed Monitor's report. Upon a CCAA filing by CMI and commencement of proceedings under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, the CIT facility converts into a DIP financing arrangement and increases to a maximum of $100 million.

15 Consents from a majority of the 8% senior subordinated noteholders were necessary to allow the sale of the Ten Holdings shares. A Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement was entered into by CMI, CMIH, certain consenting noteholders and others wherein CMIH was allowed to lend the proceeds of sale to CMI.

16 The sale of CMIH's interest in Ten Holdings was settled on October 1, 2009. Gross proceeds of approximately $634 million were realized. The proceeds were applied to fund general liquidity and operating costs of CMI, pay all amounts owing under the 12% secured notes and all amounts outstanding under the CIT facility except for certain letters of credit in an aggregate face amount of $10.7 million. In addition, a portion of the proceeds was used to reduce the amount outstanding with respect to the 8% senior subordinated notes leaving an outstanding indebtedness thereunder of US$393.25 million.

17 In consideration for the loan provided by CMIH to CMI, CMI issued a secured intercompany note in favour of CMIH in the principal amount of $187.3 million and an unsecured promissory note in the principal amount of $430.6 million. The secured note is subordinated to the CIT facility and is secured by a first ranking charge on the property of CMI and the guarantors. The payment of all amounts owing under the unsecured promissory note are subordinated and postponed in favour of amounts owing under the CIT facility. Canwest Global, CTLP and others have guaranteed the notes. It is contemplated that the debt that is the subject matter of the unsecured note will be compromised.

18 Without the funds advanced under the intercompany notes, the CMI Entities would be unable to meet their liabilities as they come due. The consent of the noteholders to the use of the Ten Holdings proceeds was predicated on the CMI Entities making this application for an Initial Order under the CCAA. Failure to do so and to take certain other steps constitute an event of default under the Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement, the CIT facility and other agreements. The CMI Entities have insufficient funds to satisfy their obligations including those under the intercompany notes and the 8% senior subordinated notes.

19 The stay of proceedings under the CCAA is sought so as to allow the CMI Entities to proceed to develop a plan of arrangement or compromise to implement a consensual "pre-packaged" recapitalization transaction. The CMI Entities and the Ad Hoc Committee of noteholders have agreed on the terms of a going concern recapitalization transaction which is intended to form the basis of the plan. The terms are reflected in a support agreement and term sheet. The recapitalization transaction contemplates amongst other things, a significant reduction of debt and a debt for equity restructuring. The applicants anticipate that a substantial number of the businesses operated by the CMI Entities will continue as going concerns thereby preserving enterprise value for stakeholders and maintaining employment for as many as possible. As mentioned, certain steps designed to implement the recapitalization transaction have already been taken prior to the commencement of these proceedings.

20 CMI has agreed to maintain not more than $2.5 million as cash collateral in a deposit account with the Bank of Nova Scotia to secure cash management obligations owed to BNS. BNS holds first ranking security against those funds and no court ordered charge attaches to the funds in the account.

21 The CMI Entities maintain eleven defined benefit pension plans and four defined contribution pension plans. There is an aggregate solvency deficiency of $13.3 million as at the last valuation date and a wind up deficiency of $32.8 million. There are twelve television collective agreements eleven of which are negotiated with the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada. The Canadian Union of Public Employees negotiated the twelfth television collective agreement. It expires on December 31, 2010. The other collective agreements are in expired status. None of the approximately 250 employees of the National Post Company are unionized. The CMI Entities propose to honour their payroll obligations to their employees, including all pre-filing wages and employee benefits outstanding as at the date of the commencement of the CCAA proceedings and payments in connection with their pension obligations.

Proposed Monitor

22 The applicants propose that FTI Consulting Canada Inc. serve as the Monitor in these proceedings. It is clearly qualified to act and has provided the Court with its consent to act. Neither FTI nor any of its representatives have served in any of the capacities prohibited by section of the amendments to the CCAA.

Proposed Order

23 I have reviewed in some detail the history that preceded this application. It culminated in the presentation of the within application and proposed order. Having reviewed the materials and heard submissions, I was satisfied that the relief requested should be granted.

24 This case involves a consideration of the amendments to the CCAA that were proclaimed in force on September 18, 2009. While these were long awaited, in many instances they reflect practices and principles that have been adopted by insolvency practitioners and developed in the jurisprudence and academic writings on the subject of the CCAA. In no way do the amendments change or detract from the underlying purpose of the CCAA, namely to provide debtor companies with the opportunity to extract themselves from financial difficulties notwithstanding insolvency and to reorganize their affairs for the benefit of stakeholders. In my view, the amendments should be interpreted and applied with that objective in mind.

(a) Threshhold Issues

25 Firstly, the applicants qualify as debtor companies under the CCAA. Their chief place of business is in Ontario. The applicants are affiliated debtor companies with total claims against them exceeding $5 million. The CMI Entities are in default of their obligations. CMI does not have the necessary liquidity to make an interest payment in the amount of US$30.4 million that was due on September 15, 2009 and none of the other CMI Entities who are all guarantors are able to make such a payment either. The assets of the CMI Entities are insufficient to discharge all of the liabilities. The CMI Entities are unable to satisfy their debts as they come due and they are insolvent. They are insolvent both under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*[3] definition and under the more expansive definition of insolvency used in *Stelco Inc., Re*[4]. Absent these CCAA proceedings, the applicants would lack liquidity and would be unable to continue as going concerns. The CMI Entities have acknowledged their insolvency in the affidavit filed in support of the application.

26 Secondly, the required statement of projected cash-flow and other financial documents required under section 11(2) of the CCAA have been filed.

(b) Stay of Proceedings

27 Under section 11 of the CCAA, the Court has broad jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings and to give a debtor company a chance to develop a plan of compromise or arrangement. In my view, given the facts outlined, a stay is necessary to create stability and to allow the CMI Entities to pursue their restructuring.

(b) Partnerships and Foreign Subsidiaries

28 The applicants seek to extend the stay of proceedings and other relief to the aforementioned partnerships. The partnerships are intertwined with the applicants' ongoing operations. They own the National Post daily newspaper and Canadian free-to-air television assets and certain of its specialty television channels and some other television assets. These businesses constitute a significant portion of the overall enterprise value of the CMI Entities. The partnerships are also guarantors of the 8% senior subordinated notes.

29 While the CCAA definition of a company does not include a partnership or limited partnership, courts have repeatedly exercised their inherent jurisdiction to extend the scope of CCAA proceedings to encompass them. See for example *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re*[5]; *Smurfit-Stone Container Canada Inc., Re*[6]; and *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re*[7]. In this case, the partnerships carry on operations that are integral and closely interrelated to the business of the applicants. The operations and obligations of the partnerships are so intertwined with those of the applicants that irreparable harm would ensue if the requested stay were not granted. In my view, it is just and convenient to grant the relief requested with respect to the partnerships.

30 Certain applicants are foreign subsidiaries of CMI. Each is a guarantor under the 8% senior subordinated notes, the CIT credit agreement (and therefore the DIP facility), the intercompany notes and is party to the support agreement and the Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement. If the stay of proceedings was not extended to these entities, creditors could seek to enforce their guarantees. I am persuaded that the foreign subsidiary applicants as that term is defined in the affidavit filed are debtor companies within the meaning of section 2 of the CCAA and that I have jurisdiction and ought to grant the order requested as it relates to them. In this regard, I note that they are insolvent and each holds assets in Ontario in that they each maintain funds on deposit at the Bank of Nova Scotia in Toronto. See in this regard *Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re*[8] and *Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re*[9]

(C) DIP Financing

31 Turning to the DIP financing, the premise underlying approval of DIP financing is that it is a benefit to all stakeholders as it allows the debtors to protect going-concern value while they attempt to devise a plan acceptable to creditors. While in the past, courts relied on inherent jurisdiction to approve the terms of a DIP financing charge, the September 18, 2009 amendments to the CCAA now expressly provide jurisdiction to grant a DIP financing charge. Section 11.2 of the Act states:

> (1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the company's property is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the company an amount approved by the court as being required by the company, having regard to its cash-flow statement. The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made.
>
> (2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.
>
> (3) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over any security or charge arising from a previous order made under subsection (1) only with the consent of the person in whose favour the previous order was made.

(4) In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,

(a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;

(b) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;

(c) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;

(d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;

(e) the nature and value of the company's property;

(f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and

(g) the monitor's report referred to in paragraph 23(1)(b), if any.

32 In light of the language of section 11.2(1), the first issue to consider is whether notice has been given to secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge. Paragraph 57 of the proposed order affords priority to the DIP charge, the administration charge, the Directors' and Officers' charge and the KERP charge with the following exception: "any validly perfected purchase money security interest in favour of a secured creditor or any statutory encumbrance existing on the date of this order in favour of any person which is a "secured creditor" as defined in the CCAA in respect of any of source deductions from wages, employer health tax, workers compensation, GST/QST, PST payables, vacation pay and banked overtime for employees, and amounts under the Wage Earners' Protection Program that are subject to a super priority claim under the BIA". This provision coupled with the notice that was provided satisfied me that secured creditors either were served or are unaffected by the DIP charge. This approach is both consistent with the legislation and practical.

33 Secondly, the Court must determine that the amount of the DIP is appropriate and required having regard to the debtors' cash-flow statement. The DIP charge is for up to $100 million. Prior to entering into the CIT facility, the CMI Entities sought proposals from other third party lenders for a credit facility that would convert to a DIP facility should the CMI Entities be required to file for protection under the CCAA. The CIT facility was the best proposal submitted. In this case, it is contemplated that implementation of the plan will occur no later than April 15, 2010. The total amount of cash on hand is expected to be down to approximately $10 million by late December, 2009 based on the cash flow forecast. The applicants state that this is an insufficient cushion for an enterprise of this magnitude. The cash-flow statements project the need for the liquidity provided by the DIP facility for the recapitalization transaction to be finalized. The facility is to accommodate additional liquidity requirements during the CCAA proceedings. It will enable the CMI Entities to operate as going concerns while pursuing the implementation and completion of a viable plan and will provide creditors with assurances of same. I also note that the proposed facility is simply a conversion of the pre-existing CIT facility and as such, it is expected that there would be no material prejudice to any of the creditors of the CMI Entities that arises from the granting of the DIP charge. I am persuaded that the amount is appropriate and required.

34 Thirdly, the DIP charge must not and does not secure an obligation that existed before the order was made. The only amount outstanding on the CIT facility is $10.7 in outstanding letters of credit. These letters of credit are secured by existing security and it is proposed that that security rank ahead of the DIP charge.

35 Lastly, I must consider amongst others, the enumerated factors in paragraph 11.2(4) of the Act. I have already addressed some of them. The Management Directors of the applicants as that term is used in the materials filed will continue to manage the CMI Entities during the CCAA proceedings. It would appear that management has the confidence of its major creditors. The CMI Entities have appointed a CRA and a Restructuring Officer to negotiate and implement the recapitalization transaction and the aforementioned directors will continue to manage the CMI Entities during the CCAA proceedings. The DIP facility will enhance the prospects of a completed restructuring. CIT has stated

that it will not convert the CIT facility into a DIP facility if the DIP charge is not approved. In its report, the proposed Monitor observes that the ability to borrow funds from a court approved DIP facility secured by the DIP charge is crucial to retain the confidence of the CMI Entities' creditors, employees and suppliers and would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made. The proposed Monitor is supportive of the DIP facility and charge.

36 For all of these reasons, I was prepared to approve the DIP facility and charge.

(d) Administration Charge

37 While an administration charge was customarily granted by courts to secure the fees and disbursements of the professional advisors who guided a debtor company through the CCAA process, as a result of the amendments to the CCAA, there is now statutory authority to grant such a charge. Section 11.52 of the CCAA states:

> (1) On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a debtor company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in respect of the fees and expenses of
>
> (a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;
>
> (b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and
>
> (c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.
>
> (2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

38 I must therefore be convinced that (1) notice has been given to the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; (2) the amount is appropriate; and (3) the charge should extend to all of the proposed beneficiaries.

39 As with the DIP charge, the issue relating to notice to affected secured creditors has been addressed appropriately by the applicants. The amount requested is up to $15 million. The beneficiaries of the charge are: the Monitor and its counsel; counsel to the CMI Entities; the financial advisor to the Special Committee and its counsel; counsel to the Management Directors; the CRA; the financial advisor to the Ad Hoc Committee; and RBC Capital Markets and its counsel. The proposed Monitor supports the aforementioned charge and considers it to be required and reasonable in the circumstances in order to preserve the going concern operations of the CMI Entities. The applicants submit that the above-note professionals who have played a necessary and integral role in the restructuring activities to date are necessary to implement the recapitalization transaction.

40 Estimating quantum is an inexact exercise but I am prepared to accept the amount as being appropriate. There has obviously been extensive negotiation by stakeholders and the restructuring is of considerable magnitude and complexity. I was prepared to accept the submissions relating to the administration charge. I have not included any requirement that all of these professionals be required to have their accounts scrutinized and approved by the Court but they should not preclude this possibility.

(e) Critical Suppliers

41 The next issue to consider is the applicants' request for authorization to pay pre-filing amounts owed to critical suppliers. In recognition that one of the purposes of the CCAA is to permit an insolvent corporation to remain in business, typically courts exercised their inherent jurisdiction to grant such authorization and a charge with respect to

the provision of essential goods and services. In the recent amendments, Parliament codified the practice of permitting the payment of pre-filing amounts to critical suppliers and the provision of a charge. Specifically, section 11.4 provides:

> (1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring a person to be a critical supplier to the company if the court is satisfied that the person is a supplier of goods or services to the company and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation.
>
> (2) If the court declares a person to be a critical supplier, the court may make an order requiring the person to supply any goods or services specified by the court to the company on any terms and conditions that are consistent with the supply relationship or that the court considers appropriate.
>
> (3) If the court makes an order under subsection (2), the court shall, in the order, declare that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge in favour of the person declared to be a critical supplier, in an amount equal to the value of the goods or services supplied under the terms of the order.
>
> (4) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

42 Under these provisions, the Court must be satisfied that there has been notice to creditors likely to be affected by the charge, the person is a supplier of goods or services to the company, and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation. While one might interpret section 11.4 (3) as requiring a charge any time a person is declared to be a critical supplier, in my view, this provision only applies when a court is compelling a person to supply. The charge then provides protection to the unwilling supplier.

43 In this case, no charge is requested and no additional notice is therefore required. Indeed, there is an issue as to whether in the absence of a request for a charge, section 11.4 is even applicable and the Court is left to rely on inherent jurisdiction. The section seems to be primarily directed to the conditions surrounding the granting of a charge to secure critical suppliers. That said, even if it is applicable, I am satisfied that the applicants have met the requirements. The CMI Entities seek authorization to make certain payments to third parties that provide goods and services integral to their business. These include television programming suppliers given the need for continuous and undisturbed flow of programming, newsprint suppliers given the dependency of the National Post on a continuous and uninterrupted supply of newsprint to enable it to publish and on newspaper distributors, and the American Express Corporate Card Program and Central Billed Accounts that are required for CMI Entity employees to perform their job functions. No payment would be made without the consent of the Monitor. I accept that these suppliers are critical in nature. The CMI Entities also seek more general authorization allowing them to pay other suppliers if in the opinion of the CMI Entities, the supplier is critical. Again, no payment would be made without the consent of the Monitor. In addition, again no charge securing any payments is sought. This is not contrary to the language of section 11.4 (1) or to its purpose. The CMI Entities seek the ability to pay other suppliers if in their opinion the supplier is critical to their business and ongoing operations. The order requested is facilitative and practical in nature. The proposed Monitor supports the applicants' request and states that it will work to ensure that payments to suppliers in respect of pre-filing liabilities are minimized. The Monitor is of course an officer of the Court and is always able to seek direction from the Court if necessary. In addition, it will report on any such additional payments when it files its reports for Court approval. In the circumstances outlined, I am prepared to grant the relief requested in this regard.

(f) Directors' and Officers' Charge

44 The applicants also seek a directors' and officers' ("D &O") charge in the amount of $20 million. The proposed charge would rank after the administration charge, the existing CIT security, and the DIP charge. It would rank pari passu with the KERP charge discussed subsequently in this endorsement but postponed in right of payment to the extent of the first $85 million payable under the secured intercompany note.

45 Again, the recent amendments to the CCAA allow for such a charge. Section 11.51 provides that:

> (1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of any director or officer of the company to indemnify the director or officer against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director or officer of the company
>
> (2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.
>
> (3) The court may not make the order if in its opinion the company could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost.
>
> (4) The court shall make an order declaring that the security or charge does not apply in respect of a specific obligation or liability incurred by a director or officer if in its opinion the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in Quebec, the director's or officer's gross or intentional fault.

46 I have already addressed the issue of notice to affected secured creditors. I must also be satisfied with the amount and that the charge is for obligations and liabilities the directors and officers may incur after the commencement of proceedings. It is not to extend to coverage of wilful misconduct or gross negligence and no order should be granted if adequate insurance at a reasonable cost could be obtained.

47 The proposed Monitor reports that the amount of $20 million was estimated taking into consideration the existing D&O insurance and the potential liabilities which may attach including certain employee related and tax related obligations. The amount was negotiated with the DIP lender and the Ad Hoc Committee. The order proposed speaks of indemnification relating to the failure of any of the CMI Entities, after the date of the order, to make certain payments. It also excludes gross negligence and wilful misconduct. The D&O insurance provides for $30 million in coverage and $10 million in excess coverage for a total of $40 million. It will expire in a matter of weeks and Canwest Global has been unable to obtain additional or replacement coverage. I am advised that it also extends to others in the Canwest enterprise and not just to the CMI Entities. The directors and senior management are described as highly experienced, fully functional and qualified. The directors have indicated that they cannot continue in the restructuring effort unless the order includes the requested directors' charge.

48 The purpose of such a charge is to keep the directors and officers in place during the restructuring by providing them with protection against liabilities they could incur during the restructuring: *General Publishing Co., Re* [10] Retaining the current directors and officers of the applicants would avoid destabilization and would assist in the restructuring. The proposed charge would enable the applicants to keep the experienced board of directors supported by experienced senior management. The proposed Monitor believes that the charge is required and is reasonable in the circumstances and also observes that it will not cover all of the directors' and officers' liabilities in the worst case scenario. In all of these circumstances, I approved the request.

(g) Key Employee Retention Plans

49 Approval of a KERP and a KERP charge are matters of discretion. In this case, the CMI Entities have developed KERPs that are designed to facilitate and encourage the continued participation of certain of the CMI Entities' senior executives and other key employees who are required to guide the CMI Entities through a successful restructuring with a view to preserving enterprise value. There are 20 KERP participants all of whom are described by the applicants as being critical to the successful restructuring of the CMI Entities. Details of the KERPs are outlined in the materials and the proposed Monitor's report. A charge of $5.9 million is requested. The three Management Directors are seasoned

executives with extensive experience in the broadcasting and publishing industries. They have played critical roles in the restructuring initiatives taken to date. The applicants state that it is probable that they would consider other employment opportunities if the KERPs were not secured by a KERP charge. The other proposed participants are also described as being crucial to the restructuring and it would be extremely difficult to find replacements for them

50 Significantly in my view, the Monitor who has scrutinized the proposed KERPs and charge is supportive. Furthermore, they have been approved by the Board, the Special Committee, the Human Resources Committee of Canwest Global and the Ad Hoc Committee. The factors enumerated in *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re*[11] have all been met and I am persuaded that the relief in this regard should be granted.

51 The applicants ask that the Confidential Supplement containing unredacted copies of the KERPs that reveal individually identifiable information and compensation information be sealed. Generally speaking, judges are most reluctant to grant sealing orders. An open court and public access are fundamental to our system of justice. Section 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act* provides authority to grant a sealing order and the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*[12] provides guidance on the appropriate legal principles to be applied. Firstly, the Court must be satisfied that the order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk. Secondly, the salutary effects of the order should outweigh its deleterious effects including the effects on the right to free expression which includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

52 In this case, the unredacted KERPs reveal individually identifiable information including compensation information. Protection of sensitive personal and compensation information the disclosure of which could cause harm to the individuals and to the CMI Entities is an important commercial interest that should be protected. The KERP participants have a reasonable expectation that their personal information would be kept confidential. As to the second branch of the test, the aggregate amount of the KERPs has been disclosed and the individual personal information adds nothing. It seems to me that this second branch of the test has been met. The relief requested is granted.

Annual Meeting

53 The CMI Entities seek an order postponing the annual general meeting of shareholders of Canwest Global. Pursuant to section 133 (1)(b) of the CBCA, a corporation is required to call an annual meeting by no later than February 28, 2010, being six months after the end of its preceding financial year which ended on August 31, 2009. Pursuant to section 133 (3), despite subsection (1), the corporation may apply to the court for an order extending the time for calling an annual meeting.

54 CCAA courts have commonly granted extensions of time for the calling of an annual general meeting. In this case, the CMI Entities including Canwest Global are devoting their time to stabilizing business and implementing a plan. Time and resources would be diverted if the time was not extended as requested and the preparation for and the holding of the annual meeting would likely impede the timely and desirable restructuring of the CMI Entities. Under section 106(6) of the CBCA, if directors of a corporation are not elected, the incumbent directors continue. Financial and other information will be available on the proposed Monitor's website. An extension is properly granted.

Other

55 The applicants request authorization to commence Chapter 15 proceedings in the U.S. Continued timely supply of U.S. network and other programming is necessary to preserve going concern value. Commencement of Chapter 15 proceedings to have the CCAA proceedings recognized as "foreign main proceedings" is a prerequisite to the conversion of the CIT facility into the DIP facility. Authorization is granted.

56 Canwest's various corporate and other entities share certain business services. They are seeking to continue to provide and receive inter-company services in the ordinary course during the CCAA proceedings. This is supported by

the proposed Monitor and FTI will monitor and report to the Court on matters pertaining to the provision of inter-company services.

57 Section 23 of the amended CCAA now addresses certain duties and functions of the Monitor including the provision of notice of an Initial Order although the Court may order otherwise. Here the financial threshold for notice to creditors has been increased from $1000 to $5000 so as to reduce the burden and cost of such a process. The proceedings will be widely published in the media and the Initial Order is to be posted on the Monitor's website. Other meritorious adjustments were also made to the notice provisions.

58 This is a "pre-packaged" restructuring and as such, stakeholders have negotiated and agreed on the terms of the requested order. That said, not every stakeholder was before me. For this reason, interested parties are reminded that the order includes the usual come back provision. The return date of any motion to vary, rescind or affect the provisions relating to the CIT credit agreement or the CMI DIP must be no later than November 5, 2009.

59 I have obviously not addressed every provision in the order but have attempted to address some key provisions. In support of the requested relief, the applicants filed a factum and the proposed Monitor filed a report. These were most helpful. A factum is required under Rule 38.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Both a factum and a proposed Monitor's report should customarily be filed with a request for an Initial Order under the CCAA.

Conclusion

60 Weak economic conditions and a high debt load do not a happy couple make but clearly many of the stakeholders have been working hard to produce as desirable an outcome as possible in the circumstances. Hopefully the cooperation will persist.

Application granted.

Footnotes

1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C. 36, as amended

2 R.S.C. 1985, c.C.44.

3 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended.

4 (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); leave to appeal refused 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.).

5 (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

6 [2009] O.J. No. 349 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

7 (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187 (Alta. Q.B.).

8 (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

9 (2004), 33 B.C.L.R. (4th) 155 (B.C. S.C.).

10 (2003), 39 C.B.R. (4th) 216 (Ont. S.C.J.).

11 [2009] O.J. No. 3344 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). That said, given the nature of the relationship between a board of directors and senior management, it may not always be appropriate to give undue consideration to the principle of business judgment.

12 [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.).

End of Document

TAB I

2006 ABQB 743
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re

2006 CarswellAlta 1313, 2006 ABQB 743, [2006] A.W.L.D. 3144, 153 A.C.W.S. (3d) 358, 26 C.B.R. (5th) 77

In the Matter of The Companies Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended

And In the Matter of Calpine Canada Energy Limited, Calpine Canada Power Ltd., Calpine Canada Energy Finance ULC, Calpine Energy Services Canada Ltd., Calpine Canada Resources Company, Calpine Canada Power Services Ltd., Calpine Canada Energy Finance II ULC, Calpine Natural Gas Services Limited, and 3094479 Nova Scotia Company (Applicants)

B.E. Romaine J.

Heard: October 4, 2006
Oral reasons: October 4, 2006
Written reasons: October 10, 2006
Docket: Calgary 0501-17864

Counsel: Jay Carfagnini, Joseph Pasquanello for CCAA Debtors
Larry B. Robinson, Q.C. for CCAA Debtors
Patrick T. McCarthy, Q.C., Josef Kruger for Monitor
Peter Griffin, Monique Jilesen, Usman Sheikh (present by telephone) for U.S. Debtors
David Seligman, Jeffrey Powell (present by telephone) for U.S. Debtors (U.S. Counsel)
Howard Gorman, Randal Van de Mosselaer for ULC1 Noteholders
John Finnigan, Robert Thornton, Rachelle Moncur for ULC2 Ad Hoc Committee of Bondholders
Sean Dunphy, Elizabeth Pillon for ULC2 Trustee
Phillip J. LaFlair for ULC2 Bond Holders

Subject: Insolvency; International

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.5 Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous issues

Debtors obtained protection from their creditors under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") — Debtors obtained order permitting them to market debentures they owned with provision requiring them to identify and process claims purporting to differentiate rights, privileges, and entitlements associated with debentures ("bond differentiation claims") — U.S. debtors in CCAA proceeding brought application to vary order relating to bond differentiation claims process and to compel negotiation of cross-border protocol — Application dismissed; terms of order remained same except with respect to date for U.S. debtors to file bond differentiation claims, which was extended from October 6, 2006 to October 16, 2006 — Amendments proposed by U.S. debtors were not of refinement or clarification but of real change in effect and scope of order — Proposed amendments would narrow meaning of bond differentiation claim and exempt matters within jurisdiction of U.S. court including any defences U.S. debtors might have to claims filed in U.S. proceedings — Clarification of order was not required as suggested by U.S. debtors who were seeking maximum flexibility and unlimited options in U.S. proceedings relating to guarantees of certain debentures — Court had

jurisdiction to make determinations relating to bond differentiation claims and order was for identifying claims so that their validity might be subject of later proceedings — Claims and possible defences in other jurisdiction did not lessen appropriateness of court to administer bond differentiation claims process and adjudicate claims under that process in respect of CCAA debtors including U.S. debtors — Cross-border protocol was premature and unpopular with nearly all other parties in CCAA process.

Table of Authorities

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 1982

Generally — referred to

Chapter 11 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

APPLICATION by debtors to vary order in proceeding under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

B.E. Romaine J.:

Introduction

1 On October 4, 2006, I dismissed an application brought by the U.S. Debtors in this CCAA proceeding to vary previous orders made relating to a Bond Differentiation Claim process and to compel the negotiation of a cross-border protocol. These are my reasons.

Background

2 On December 20, 2005, the Applicants filed for and obtained protection from their creditors under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-36, as amended, (the "CCAA"). In addition to the Applicants, the Initial Order of this Court provided for a stay of proceedings against Calpine Energy Services Canada Partnership ("CESCA"), Calpine Canada Natural Gas Partnership ("CCNG"), and Calpine Canadian Saltend Limited Partnership ("Saltend LP"). The applicants and the additional parties are collectively referred to as the "CCAA Debtors".

3 Pursuant to the Initial Order, Ernst & Young Inc. was appointed Monitor of the CCAA Debtors during these CCAA proceedings.

4 I was advised at the time, and understand, that on the same day, Calpine Corporation and certain of its direct and indirect subsidiaries (the "U.S. Debtors") filed voluntary petitions for relief in the United States Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code of the United States of America.

5 From time to time in these proceedings, reference has been made to the U.S. proceedings. For example, the Claims Bar date in the Canadian proceedings was moved back a few days to August 1, 2006, the same date as the Claims Bar Date in the U.S. proceedings, in part in order to encourage cooperation between the U.S. Debtors and the CCAA Debtors with respect to the filing of claims against the estates of the other parties. The Canadian proceedings and the U.S. proceedings are, however, separate and distinct. Neither the CCAA Debtors nor the U.S. Debtors have sought to have their proceedings recognized in the other jurisdiction.

6 Calpine Canada Resources Company ("CCRC") owns approximately US $360 million principal amount of public debentures issued by Calpine Canada Energy Finance ULC (the "ULC1 Senior Notes"). Saltend LP owns approximately £ 78.6 million and £ 57.6 million principal amount of public debentures issued by Calpine Canada Energy Finance ULC 11 (the "ULC2 Senior Notes").These ULC1 Senior Notes and ULC2 Senior Notes are significant assets of the estates of the CCAA Debtors.

7 The ULC1 Senior Notes and ULC2 Senior Notes are alleged to have been guaranteed by Calpine Corporation. In the U.S. proceedings, the indenture trustees for both ULC1 and ULC2 bondholders have filed proofs of claim based on these guarantees.

8 The CCAA Debtors applied to this Court on July 21, 2006 for authority to market the Notes and to engage advisors with respect to the marketing process. The sale of the Notes would be subject to further approval of this Court. An order to this effect was granted on August 31, 2006. This order includes the following provision:

> . . .all claims filed in advance of the claims bar date of August 1, 2006 (the "Claims Bar Date"), or not subject to the Claims Bar Date, that in any way purport to differentiate the rights, privileges and entitlements associated with the CCRC ULC1 Senior Notes from any other ULC1 Senior Notes are reserved pending further order of this Court, such Order to be obtained on or before October 21, 2006, or such later date as this Court may order.(emphasis added)

9 The issue of what is now referred to as the Bond Differentiation Claims was raised at the hearing on August 31, 2006. The Ad Hoc Committee of Bondholders of Calpine Canada Energy Finance II ULC (the "ULC2 Committee") put forward the wording that was substantially adopted in the Order to address the issue of "whether the [Notes] are subject to any legal or equitable claims or other "clouds" affecting their value such that they would be treated any differently than any other [Notes]." I determined that it was appropriate to attempt to resolve this type of claim in a timely fashion. The parties were directed to develop a process for the litigation of the Bond Differentiation Claims. The August 31, 2006 order has not been appealed.

10 The parties were unable to agree on a litigation process. The ULC2 Committee applied on September 11, 2006 for an order establishing a process and timetable for the resolution of the Bond Differentiation Claims. A number of draft orders were submitted for discussion at the hearing. The resulting Order included the following provisions:

> (a) all claims referred to in Paragraph 6 of the August 31 Order, namely all claims properly filed in advance of the Claims Bar Date, or not subject to the Claims Bar Date, that in any way purport to differentiate the rights, privileges and entitlements associated with the CCRC ULC1 Senior Notes from any other ULC1 Senior Notes, are defined as "Bond Differentiation Claims";
>
> (b) the ULC1 Trustee Claim may include a Bond Differentiation Claim;
>
> (c) in order for any other Proof of Claim filed with the Monitor in accordance with the Claims Process Order to be considered a potential Bond Differentiation Claim, the creditor in respect of such Proof of Claim must identify the Claim as a potential Bond Differentiation Claim on or before October 6, 2006;
>
> (d) if any creditor believes it has a claim that was not subject to the Claims Process Order and that constitutes a potential Bond Differentiation Claim, the creditor must identify the claim as such on or before October 6, 2006; and
>
> (e) all parties with purported Bond Differentiation Claim(s) who wish to appeal the deemed disallowance of such claim(s), must do so by pleading their purported Bond Differentiation Claim(s) on or before October 6, 2006.

Once the Bond Differentiation Claims have been identified, a process would be undertaken that would culminate in a hearing on November 14, 2006 on the issue of Bond Differentiation Claims.

11 The U.S. Debtors appeared by counsel and made submissions at the September 11, 2006 hearing. Counsel for the U.S. Debtors advised me that the U.S. Debtors had filed substantial claims in the claims process mandated by the Court. The U.S. Debtors are thus parties in the claims bar process before this Court and subject to its jurisdiction for the purpose of the resolution of their claims against the CCAA Debtors.

12 The issue of the necessity or advisability of a cross-border protocol involving this Court and the U.S. Court was discussed at the September 11, 2006 hearing, as was the issue of whether or not the Order sought would be contrary to a memorandum of understanding and protocol entered into by the U.S. Debtors and the Canadian Debtors on the issue of inter-company indebtedness. In my brief oral reasons granting the Order, I commented as follows:

> As I indicated on August 31st, 2006, it is appropriate and necessary that any claims that have now been described as bond differentiation claims, that might cloud title to the CCRC ULC1 senior notes and jeopardize the timely realization of that asset of the CCAA debtors, should be resolved in a timely manner, preferably sometime in the order of October 31st, 2006. . . .
>
> The other issue that I will deal with prior to getting into the meat of the process and timelines is Mr. Griffin's submissions on behalf of the Calpine US entities for a more measured approach to the process, by which he means more time to accommodate a further protocol.
>
> I am unable to see how anything in the existing memorandum of understanding and protocol, in wording or in spirit, prevents this Court from dealing with the marketing of this significant asset of the Canadian CCAA Debtors' estate, nor can I see how the determination of the rather narrow issue of whether there are any in rem claims against the Bonds that may preclude the timely marketing of this asset poses any disrespect to the US Bankruptcy Court.
>
> If the US entities intend to pose any claim that may affect the marketing of the bonds, they will have to abide by the process that will be established by my ruling here today.

13 The U.S. Debtors subsequently brought an application heard on its merits on October 4, 2006 for an order extending the dealine by which the U.S. Debtors must identify any potential Bond Differentiation Claims and providing supplemental language to the September 11, 2006 Order to change the definition of Bond Differentiation Claims. The U.S. Debtors also applied for an order directing that, once all the Bond Differentiation Claims have been filed, the CCAA Debtors, the Monitor, the U.S. Debtors and all parties who file Bond Differentiation Claims seek the joint assistance of this Court and the U.S. Court with respect to any cross-border issues arising out of such claims, whether or not a cross-border protocol has been approved. The order sought would also have authorized and directed the CCAA Debtors and the Monitor to negotiate a cross-border protocol with interested stakeholders with respect to any cross-border issues that may arise from any and all claims filed with the Court, including but not limited to any defences the U.S. Debtors may have to any proofs of claim filed in the U.S. Court proceedings.

Analysis

14 While the Notice of Motion filed by the U.S. Debtors purports to provide clarification to the definition of Bond Differential Claims, what the changes proposed by the U.S. Debtors would do is to narrow the meaning of such definition and to exempt from its application "any matters within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Court, including, without limitation, any defences the U.S. Debtors may have to any proof of claim filed in the U.S. Court proceedings." The Notice of Motion asserts that "the Bond Differentiation Claims Order should not have the effect of requiring the U.S. Debtors to adjudicate their defences to the Indenture Trustee Claims in the CCAA Claims process."

15 This give rise to three issues:

> (a) Is this application a collateral attack on this Court's Orders of August 31 and September 11, 2006?
>
> (b) Do these Orders require clarification?
>
> (c) Is this an appropriate time for the negotiation of a cross-border protocol?

(a) Is this application a collateral attack on this Court's Orders of August 31 and September 11, 2006?

16 A number of parties assert that it is, and that the application is a thinly-disguised attempt to vary or appeal the Orders. I must agree with them. I have already noted the effect of the amendments proposed by the U.S. Debtors, which is not one of refinement or clarification but of real change in effect and scope. Most if not all of the issues raised by the U.S. Debtors in this application were raised on September 11, 2006, or, at the least, could have been raised at that time. The motion comes nowhere close to meeting the limited circumstances that would justify a reconsideration of the issue, even taking into account the traditional flexibility of CCAA proceedings and the generally wider latitude afforded by this Court to applications of this kind.

17 Having said this, given the decision I have reached on the question of whether clarification of the Orders is necessary and whether a cross-border protocol is necessary at this point in the proceedings, I do not rest my decision on this more formalistic basis. These are not easy issues, and I understand that the process mandated by my Orders requires affected parties to make what may be difficult strategic choices. If there is a bona fide concern that the process is flawed, I am prepared to reconsider submissions made on that issue.

(b) Do the Orders of August 31 and September 11, 20006 require clarification?

18 Having reviewed the briefs and listened to the submissions of interested parties, I must conclude that the issue is not one of lack of clarity but of the unhappiness of the U.S. Debtors with the possible effect of the Orders on their ability to retain maximum flexibility and unlimited options in the U.S. proceedings when the time comes in those proceedings to deal with claims that relate to the guarantees.

19 The U.S. Debtors submit that the narrow purpose of the Orders was merely to flesh out possible "in rem" claims against the Notes, relying heavily on a portion of my oral comments dealing with whether the proposed order breached the protocol reached between the U.S. Debtors and the CCAA Debtors on inter-corporate claims. This ignores the balance of my comments and the submissions made at the hearing that were focussed on the words that eventually became the definition of Bond Differentiation Claims in the Orders.

20 The U.S. Debtors attempt to recast the discussion by drawing a distinction between "claims" and "defences". They submit that, if they are required to advance defences or objections to the guarantees that *might* fall within the definition of Bond Differentiation Claims under the orders, that would force them to litigate in Canada matters that are properly within the jurisdiction of the U.S. court. They make this broad assertion without specifically identifying what form these defences or objections might take.

21 If a defence to the guarantees may qualify as a Bond Differentiation Claim, it is conceivable that jurisdictional issues may arise. Without knowing the specifics of such defences, it is impossible for this Court to determine at this point of the proceedings whether the issue is within the jurisdiction of this Court, the jurisdiction of the U.S. Court, or whether the issue so overlaps jurisdictions that it would be appropriate to have it dealt with in some sort of cross-border proceeding.

22 The distinction between "claims" and "defences" is unhelpful in the abstract. If Bond Differentiation Claims are limited to affirmative claims only and exclude "defences" that may cloud title to the particular Notes that are proposed to be marketed or to treat them in principle differently from Notes held by parties unrelated to the CCAA Debtors, the potential problem that my Orders were intended to identify and deal with in a slightly accelerated process so that an effective sale of the Notes can occur will not be resolved. I say slightly accelerated, since this issue has been before me since July 21, 2006, with notice to all parties including the U.S. Debtors, and will culminate in a hearing on November 14, 2006. This is not particularly accelerated in terms of normal CCAA time lines.

23 Counsel for the U.S. Debtors says that they are concerned that if the existing definition of Bond Differentiation Claims stands, "any legal theory that might be advanced that would have any implication on whether or not these bonds rank in some *pari passu* basis with other bonds, even if only to be raised by [U.S. Debtors] as a defence in the United States on a guarantee claim, may have to be put forward."

24 It is true that my Orders may require the U.S. Debtors to make some choices that they would prefer to delay or defer. If they have defences to the guarantees that may fall within the definition of Bond Differentiation Claims, they will have to identify them. Once they do, it may be clear that these Bond Differentiation Claims raise issues of jurisdiction. If so, those issues will have to be resolved. I do not intend to pre-judge those question until the issues have been clearly identified before me.

25 Where the proper jurisdiction lies on defences to the guarantees that may fall within the definition of Bond Differentiation Claims is unclear at this time. What is clear, however, is that if there is a possibility that unspecified defences to the guarantees that might taint title to or the character of these particular Notes may later surface in the U.S. proceedings, that consideration will most certainly affect the value of the Notes and render their sale prey to substantial discounting of value.

26 The jurisdiction to make the orders I have made with respect to Bond Differentiation Claims arises from the following facts:

a) the Notes in issue are held by CCRC, a Canadian petitioner before this Court;

b) the Notes in issue were issued by ULC1 - another Canadian petitioner before this Court; and

c) the claims filed by all parties, the U.S. Debtors, ULC 1 or otherwise, relating to such Notes were filed in the Canadian proceedings.

27 This Court must necessarily make determinations regarding the status and enforceability of all outstanding Notes as these principal claims are the main claims outstanding in the estates of the CCAA Debtors and the main asset in their estates.

28 The fact that any such still undefined claim may also constitute a defence by a third party in respect of its obligations in other proceedings in another jurisdiction does not lessen the appropriateness of this Court administering a claims process and adjudicating claims under that process in respect of CCAA Debtors and in respect of their principal assets.

29 When the shadow-boxing is over and Bond Differentiation Claims have been identified, the possibility that some of the claims may be more appropriately dealt with by a cross-border proceeding or solely by the U.S. Court as falling clearly within its jurisdiction can be dealt with in real and not speculative terms. As some parties have implied, it may be enormously complicated and call for a full protocol. It may, in the end not be so complicated. It is important to note that the impugned process is just that, a process to identify Bond Differentiation Claims so that their validity may be the subject of later proceedings.

30 While the CCAA Debtors submit that further clarification regarding the Bond Differentiation Claims process is not required, in an attempt to resolve the issue, they have proposed a clarification of the definition and of the process. That clarification document includes the following statement:

> For greater certainty, any and all claims that purport to differentiate principal obligations (as opposed to guarantee obligations) owing in respect of CCRC ULC1 Senior Notes from principal obligations (as opposed to guarantee obligations) owing in respect of any other ULC1 Senior Notes are [Bond Differentiation Claims] that must be filed and resolved in Canada in accordance with the BDC Order and the BDC Process established thereby.
>
> In other words, any claims that, if successful, would have the effect of requiring ULC1 (a CCAA debtor) to treat the obligations owing by it to CCRC (also a CCAA debtor), under or in respect of the CCRC ULC1 Senior Notes differently from how ULC1 treats or is to treat the obligations owing by it in respect of any other ULC1 Senior Notes are [Bond Differentiation Claims] which are properly before the CCAA Court.

31 Apparently independently, the ULCII Indenture Trustee in its brief provided its interpretation of the definition of Bond Differentiation Claims as follows:

> Should the U.S. Debtors require any clarification or confirmation in respect of the September 11 Order, it is to confirm the Court's expectations and requirements that all *assertions* (be they claims, defences or counterclaims or otherwise), that the principal claim associated with the CCRC ULC I Bonds is different from the principal claim associated with all other ULCI Bonds, represents a Bond Differentiation Claim which shall be determined in accordance with the September 11 Order.

32 While I do not find it necessary to amend my previous Orders, I do not find anything in the above interpretations of the definition of Bond Differentiation Claims and what was intended by the institution of the process of identifying such claims to be inconsistent with these Orders. I make this comment to reduce the possibility of misinterpretation of the August 31 and September 11, 2006 Orders in an effort to focus the process.

33 I must also comment on the issue of the automatic stay under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. As U.S. counsel to the U.S. Debtors has repeatedly advised the parties and this Court, it is his opinion that a requirement to litigate any defences to the guarantees in Canada would be a violation of the automatic stay imposed under U.S. bankruptcy law when a party files for bankruptcy. Unfortunately, his lack of specificity with respect to the nature of these defences fails to provide context to his opinion, and I note that the U.S. Debtors have not sought companion or ancillary orders in Canada with respect to the proceedings they instituted, and the stay they obtained, in the United States.

34 Canadian counsel to the U.S. Debtors attempted to clarify the opinion expressed on the U.S. stay. I gather him to be suggesting that, if this Court does anything that may limit the options available to the U.S. Debtors in defending on the question of the guarantees in the U.S. proceedings, that would be a violation of the stay. I would have to hear further evidence on this broad interpretation of the automatic stay before I would be prepared to accept this opinion. Surely, the U.S. stay does not insulate the U.S. Debtors who have filed claims in Canada from having those claims dealt with in the Canadian proceedings.

35 Having said this, this Court will of course extend to the U.S. court respect and the full benefits of comity. If and when real questions of jurisdiction surface in these proceedings, they will be dealt with directly and thoroughly.

c) Is this an appropriate time for the negotiation of a cross-border protocol?

36 As I have indicated in my previous comments, the time may come when it is clear that there are issues of overlapping jurisdiction that would make a form of cross-border protocol appropriate. The issue is whether that time has arrived. Currently, I have nothing before me but speculation and conjecture as to the nature of the Bond Differentiation Claims that may be identified for resolution by the parties, and parties who are not anxious to lay their cards on the table. In that regard, nothing substantial has been added to the debate since I decided on September 11, 2006 that a cross-border protocol was premature. It still is.

37 I certainly have no objection to the principles that underlie the Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communications in Cross-Border Cases, which are currently the subject of review by the Corporate and Commercial Advisory Committee of this Court with a view to formal adoption. As counsel for the Monitor has pointed out, the first court-to-court communication between Canada and the United States on a CCAA/US insolvency matter involved the Court of this province, as did one of the first formal protocols to be endorsed. It would not be surprising if this case necessitated some form of protocol at some point in time, or at least some form of communication between the Courts.

38 What a protocol should not be is a method to delay or obfuscate proceedings, or to provide an alternate method of appeal or the re-hearing of a ruling of the court of one jurisdiction in the court of another. It is these types of cross-border manipulations that protocols and court-to-court communications are designed to prevent.

39 The form of protocol suggested by the U.S. Debtors has proved to be unpopular with nearly all other parties in this CCAA process. This supports the proposition that a protocol cannot be drafted in a vacuum, and must address the particular circumstances of the case at hand. This case is different from cases where there is to be a global restructuring of all of the applicants, wherever they are situate. As pointed out by counsel for the CCAA Debtors, while there are some common issues among the CCAA Debtors and the U.S. Debtors, they are adverse in interest in others given their respective status as creditors (even major creditors in the case of the CCAA Debtors in the U.S. claims process) in each others' estates. If and when a protocol is necessary, it is unlikely to be one pulled off the shelf from a less-complicated cross-border situation. The negotiation of a cross-border protocol should be a matter of discussion, negotiation and cooperation among interested parties before a form of protocol is presented to the Courts for review and approval. The CCAA Debrors have advised me that they are prepared to commence good faith discussions with the U.S. Debtors, and I assume other stakeholders, to determine the need for a court-to-court protocol and the terms that may be appropriate.

40 This should be a continuing discussion as the Bond Differentiation Claims process unfolds and other issues arise. There is currently no need for this Court to step in and direct the negotiation.

41 For the reasons given, I dismissed the application brought by the U.S. Debtors, except as follows.

42 On September 29, 2006, the CCAA Debtors and the Monitor reached an agreement with the U.S. Debtors to reschedule the hearing before the U.S. Bankruptcy Court to October 12, 2006. I understand that the CCAA Debtors have agreed that they would be amenable to the U.S. Debtors obtaining an Order of this Court extending, for the U.S. Debtors only, the date by which the U.S. Debtors are required to file any Bond Differentiation Claims from October 6, 2006 to a time which has now been identified as October 16, 2006. All other terms of and dates set forth in the September 11, 2006 Order remain the same.

Applications for Extension by the Ad Hoc ULC1 Committee and the ULC1 Indenture Trustee

43 As I indicated on October 4, 2006, I have granted to the Ad Hoc ULC1 Committee and the ULC1 Indenture Trustee an extension of time of two business days after the release of my reasons for decision to identify their Bond Differentiation Claims. This gives them an opportunity to review these reasons before they make decisions on the identification of their claims.

44 Counsel for the Ad Hoc ULC1 Committee during the hearing raised the question of whether a failure to raise an argument with respect to the Notes would preclude him from raising it for future purposes. He asked for assurances that "all that would be resolved in the Bond Differentiation Claim would be square within what is included in the Bond Differentiation Claim and the subsequent dispute Note."

45 I confirm that the Orders are meant to address only claims that may fall within the definition of Bond Differentiation Claims, and not to preclude claims involving the Notes that do not fall within that definition from being raised in later proceedings. A decision on whether or not a particular claim may fall within the definition of Bond Differentiation Claim is for a party affected by these proceedings to decide, and I recognize that such determination may not be easy to make or without implications for later strategies. The parties have, however, been involved in this process for 10 months on both side of the border.

46 It is timely under the CCAA process to facilitate the sale of the Notes by minimizing market uncertainty about the legal rights of the Applicants as holders of the Bonds.

Order accordingly.

End of Document

TAB J

2012 ONSC 3974
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Northstar Aerospace Inc., Re

2012 CarswellOnt 8605, 2012 ONSC 3974, 219 A.C.W.S. (3d) 24

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Northstar Aerospace, Inc., Northstar Aerospace (Canada) Inc., 2007775 Ontario Inc. and 3024308 Nova Scotia Company, Applicants

Morawetz J.

Heard: June 14, 2012
Judgment: June 14, 2012
Docket: CV-12-9761-00CL

Counsel: A.J. Taylor, D. Murdoch, for Northstar
Craig Hill, for Monitor, Ernst & Young Inc.
Clifton Prophet, for Boeing Capital Loan Corporation
Steven Weisz, Chris Burr, for Fifth Third Bank as DIP Agent and Agent, for Existing Lenders
Paul Guy, for Former Directors and Officers of Northstar
Grant Moffat, for FTI Consulting Inc., Chief Restructuring Officer

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure; Corporate and Commercial; International

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court
XIX.3.b.iii Creditor approval

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — Creditor approval

CCAA entities sought relief under Companies Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") — CCAA entities were unable to meet financial and other covenants with secured creditors and did not have liquidity needed t meet ongoing payment obligations — Without protection of CCAA, shutdown was inevitable — CCAA entities were debtor companies to which CCAA applied — Circumstances existed making order granting protection under CCAA appropriate — Appointment of FTI as CRO was appropriate — It was appropriate to approve CRO agreement nunc pro tunc — It was appropriate to grant administration charge, critical suppliers' charge, and directors' charge — It was appropriate to authorize DIP facility and to grant DIP lenders' charge — It was appropriate to approve cross-border guarantee and cross-border protocol — Court approved proposed approval process of giving notice to creditors and shareholders of motion to seek approval of Boeing release.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2006), 2006 ABQB 743, 2006 CarswellAlta 1313, 26 C.B.R. (5th) 77 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 50 C.B.R. (5th) 77, 2009 CarswellOnt 146 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 1982

Chapter 11 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

***Morawetz J.*:**

1 Northstar Aerospace, Inc. ("Northstar Inc."), Northstar Aerospace (Canada) Inc. ("Northstar Canada"), 2007775 Ontario Inc. ("2007775") and 3024308 Nova Scotia Company (3024308"), together with Northstar Inc., Northstar Canada and 2007775, (the "CCAA Entities") seek relief under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA").

2 Certain of Northstar Canada's direct and indirect U.S. subsidiaries (the "Chapter 11 Entities") are expected to file voluntary petitions ("Chapter 11 Proceedings"), pursuant to Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the "U.S. Bankruptcy Code") in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Delaware (the "U.S. Court") concurrently with the CCAA applications. The CCAA Entities and the Chapter 11 Entities are sometimes collectively referred to as "Northstar".

3 Northstar manufactures components and assemblies for military and commercial aircraft. Northstar is facing severe liquidity issues as a result of, among other things: low to negative profit margins on significant customer contracts; decreases in defence spending and a resulting stretch out of deliveries of backlog orders and decline in new business orders placed; and the inability to secure additional funding.

4 The record establishes that the CCAA Entities are unable to meet various financial and other covenants with their secured lenders and do not have the liquidity needed to meet their ongoing payment obligations.

5 I accept that, without the protection of the CCAA, a shutdown of operations is inevitable, which would be extremely detrimental to the employees, customers, suppliers and creditors of Northstar.

6 I accept the submission of counsel that CCAA protection will allow the CCAA Entities to maintain operations, while giving them the necessary time to complete the remaining steps in a marketing process for the sale of their business and assets and provide a going concern outcome for the CCAA Entities' stakeholders.

7 The facts with respect to the application are fully set out in the affidavit of Mr. Craig A. Yuen, sworn June 11, 2012 in support of this filing. They are also summarized in the comprehensive factum filed by counsel and, therefore, are not repeated in this endorsement.

8 Northstar Inc., Northstar Canada and 2007775 are all corporations established under the laws of Ontario and 3024308 is a corporation established under the laws of Nova Scotia. The CCAA Entities are, therefore, "companies" within the definition of the CCAA.

9 I am satisfied that the record establishes that the CCAA Entities do not have the liquidity necessary to meet their obligations to creditors as they come due and have failed to pay certain obligations as they came due. The total claims against the CCAA Entities are in excess of $147 million. Therefore, the CCAA Entities are "debtor companies" to which the CCAA applies.

10 I am also satisfied that the CCAA Entities require the protection of the CCAA, including a stay of proceedings, to allow them to maintain operations while giving them the necessary time to complete the sales process and maximize recovery for the CCAA Entities' stakeholders. In my view, circumstances exist that make an order granting protection under the CCAA appropriate.

11 As set out in the affidavit of Mr. Yuen, the directors of Northstar Inc., Northstar Canada and 2007775 intend to resign effective on the granting of the Initial Order. Counsel to the Applicants advised that, in order to ensure ongoing corporate governance, the CCAA Entities entered into an engagement letter with FTI Consulting Canada Inc. ("FTI Consulting") dated June 6, 2012 (the "CRO Agreement") and therefore seek an order appointing FTI Consulting as the CRO and approving the terms of the CRO Agreement *nunc pro tunc*.

12 I am satisfied that the appointment of FTI Consulting as CRO is appropriate in the circumstances and it is also appropriate that they be afforded the protections outlined in the draft Initial Order. In the circumstances, I have been persuaded that it is appropriate to approve the CRO Agreement *nunc pro tunc*.

13 The CCAA Entities also seek an Administration Charge to secure the fees and disbursements of counsel to the CCAA Entities, the Monitor, the Monitor's counsel, the CRO, the CRO's counsel and independent counsel to Northstar Inc.'s board of directors (the "Administration Charge"). The legal basis for the appointment is set out at paragraphs 72-78 of the factum, which statements I accept.

14 I have been persuaded that it is appropriate to grant the Administration Charge for the reasons set out in the factum.

15 The CCAA Entities also seek a Critical Supplier Charge. The basis for creating such a charge is set out at paragraphs 79-85 of the factum.

16 With the assistance of the CRO, the CCAA Entities have identified a number of suppliers which they consider to be critical to the ongoing operations of their business. A complete listing of the suppliers for the CCAA Entities considered critical (the "Critical Suppliers") is attached as Schedule "A" to the proposed Initial Order.

17 I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the Critical Suppliers' Charge on the terms set out in the draft order. I am also mindful of the priority issue raised at paragraph 85 of the factum.

18 The CCAA Entities also seek a Directors' Charge in the amount of $1,750,000. The basis for the Directors' Charge is set out at paragraphs 86-92 of the factum.

19 I accept these submissions and have concluded that the granting of the Directors' Charge is appropriate in the circumstances.

20 The CCAA Entities also seek approval of a DIP Facility up to a principal amount of $3 million and a DIP Lenders' Charge. The terms of the Charge are summarized in the factum commencing at paragraph 94 and the basis for the granting of the Charge is set out at paragraphs 94-98.

21 I am satisfied that, for reasons set out in the factum, it is appropriate to authorize the DIP Facility and to grant the DIP Lenders' Charge.

22 The Chapter 11 Entities are also seeking approval of DIP Financing from the DIP Lenders and from an affiliate of Boeing. The provision of the U.S. $7,500,000 financing from Boeing to the Chapter 11 Entities (the "U.S. Boeing DIP Agreement") is a condition to the continued availability of the DIP Facility. The U.S. Boeing DIP Agreement requires a guarantee by the CCAA Entities of the obligations of the Chapter 11 Entities (the "Boeing Guarantee") and a priority charge as part of the DIP Lenders' Charge. This issue is fully set out in the factum at paragraphs 99-102. I have been persuaded, by the submissions, that it is appropriate to approve the Cross-Border Guarantee.

23 The Applicants also seek approval of a Cross-Border Protocol, which they submit will facilitate communication and cooperation between the U.S. Court and the Canadian court in respect of the issues arising in the Sales Process, the DIP Facility and any other issues which may arise at a later date. The basis for approving the Cross-Border Protocol is set out at paragraphs 103-108 of the factum.

24 Cross-border protocols have been approved and implemented by courts across Canada in CCAA proceedings where parallel U.S. proceedings have been commenced under Chapter 11. In particular, cross-border protocols have been adopted where "it is clear that there are issues of overlapping jurisdiction that would make a form of cross-border protocol appropriate". See *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re*, 2006 ABQB 743 (Alta. Q.B.) and *Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (2009), 50 C.B.R. (5th) 77 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

25 I am satisfied that it is appropriate to approve the Cross-Border Protocol.

26 Finally, the CCAA Entities request approval of a Notice Process for approval of the Boeing Release. This issue is covered at paragraphs 109-112 of the factum. I am satisfied that it is appropriate in these circumstances for the court to approve the proposed process for giving notice to creditors and shareholders of the motion to seek approval of the Boeing Release.

27 In the result, the relief requested by the CCAA Entities is granted and the Initial Order has been signed in the form presented.

End of Document

TAB K

2009 CarswellOnt 3657
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Eddie Bauer of Canada Inc., Re

2009 CarswellOnt 3657, [2009] O.J. No. 2647, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 47, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 33

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C., c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF EDDIE BAUER OF CANADA, INC. AND EDDIE BAUER CUSTOMER SERVICES INC. (Applicants)

Morawetz J.

Heard: June 17, 2009
Judgment: June 24, 2009
Docket: 09-8240-CL

Counsel: L.J. Latham, F.L. Myers, C.G. Armstrong for Applicants
A. Kauffman for Rainier Holdings LLP
A. Cobb for Bank of America
M.P. Gottlieb for RSM Richter Inc.

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court
XIX.3.b.iv Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous issues

US debtors filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of Bankruptcy Code — Applicant Canadian corporation and applicant Ontario corporation were wholly owned subsidiaries of US debtor — Applicants had liabilities in excess of $5 million and had declared themselves to be insolvent — Applicants applied for Initial order under s. 11 of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") — Initial order was granted — Applicants could not carry on business independently from US debtors — Principle indebtedness of each applicant was inter-company loan that arose between each applicant and US debtors — Applicants qualified as debtor corporations within meaning of CCAA — Applicants had obligations in excess of qualifying limit and had acknowledged that they were insolvent — Application had not been opposed by any party appearing — It was appropriate that applicants be granted protection under CCAA — Applicants were fully integrated into operations of US debtors — Applicants had not filed under Chapter 11 — Cross-Border Insolvency Protocol was approved.

Table of Authorities

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
Chapter 11 — referred to
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 11 — referred to

s. 11(2) — referred to

APPLICATION for initial order under s. 11 of *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

***Morawetz J.*:**

1 On June 17, 2009, I granted an Initial Order under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") which provided CCAA protection to Eddie Bauer of Canada, Inc. ("EB Canada") and Eddie Bauer Customer Services Inc. ("EBCS" and, with EB Canada, the "Applicants"), with brief reasons to follow. These are the reasons.

2 The application was not opposed.

3 Having reviewed the Affidavit of Marvin Toland, the Chief Financial Officer of Eddie Bauer Holdings Inc. ("EB Holdings") and a Vice President of EB Canada and EBCS (the "Toland Affidavit") as well as the Report of RSM Richter Inc. ("RSM"), the proposed Monitor of the Applicants (the "RSM Report"), I am satisfied that the Applicants qualify as proper applicants under the CCAA.

4 EB Holdings and Eddie Bauer Inc. ("EB Inc.") (collectively, the "US Debtors") have filed voluntary petitions (the "Chapter 11 Proceedings") for relief under Chapter 11 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.

5 The U.S. Debtors and the Applicants are collectively referred to as the "Eddie Bauer Group".

6 EB Canada is a Canadian corporation and EBCS is an Ontario corporation.

7 EB Canada is a wholly-owned subsidiary of EB Inc. which, in turn, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of EB Holdings.

8 EB Canada is located in Vaughan, Ontario and is the main operating company in Canada, focussing on operating the business of Eddie Bauer's 36 retail stores and its one warehouse store in Canada.

9 EBCS is located in Saint John, New Brunswick. EBCS is also a wholly-owned subsidiary of EB Inc., and is therefore an affiliate of EB Canada. EBCS operates a call centre.

10 The Applicants have liabilities in excess of $5 million and have declared themselves to be insolvent.

11 I am satisfied that, based on a reading of the Toland Affidavit and the RSM Report, that the Applicants cannot carry one business independently from the US Debtors.

12 The Toland Affidavit establishes that the Applicants are fully integrated into the US and except for some Canadian-specific functions, all of the "head office" functions are based out of Eddie Bauer's head office in Bellvue, Washington.

13 The principal indebtedness of each Applicant is the inter-company loan that arises between each Applicant and the US Debtors.

14 The Toland Affidavit also establishes that the Applicants depend on financing from EB Inc. to carry on business.

15 The Toland Affidavit also establishes that the primary purpose of the CCAA Proceedings and the Chapter 11 Proceedings (collectively, the "Restructuring Proceedings") is to allow the Eddie Bauer Group the opportunity to maximize the value of its business and assts in a unified, court-supervised sales process.

16 The US Debtors have, subject to necessary Chapter 11 approvals, obtained DIP Financing.

17 RSM understands that the Applicants do not have any secured creditors (with the possible exception of equipment lessors, if any), nor are the Applicants a borrower or guarantor under the US Debtors' Senior Secured Revolving Credit Facility.

18 The Applicants are funded by the US Debtors on an unsecured basis and the obligation is tracked in the inter-company account.

19 The proposed DIP Facility contemplates the US Debtors to advance up to US $7.5 million to the Applicants and US Debtors be granted a charge over the assets of the Applicants limited to the actual amount of inter-company advances.

20 The DIP Facility is predicated on the US Debtors carrying out a Sale Process, which will include the marketing of the businesses and assets of the US Debtors and the Applicants. The Sales Process will be subject to approval by this Court and the US Court. I am satisfied that the proposed DIP Facility is appropriate in the circumstances as is the creation of the Inter-company Charge as described in the Toland Affidavit and the RSM Report.

21 The proposed form of order is based on the Model Order. It provides for other charges as described in the Toland Affidavit and the RSM Report. These charges are the Administrative Charge and the Directors' Charge. I am satisfied that these charges are reasonable in the circumstances.

22 The proposed order also provides that the Applicants shall be entitled but not required to pay amounts owing for goods and services actually supplied to the Applicants prior to the date of the Order. The RSM Report comments on this point. The Eddie Bauer Group is of the view that operations could be disrupted and its vendor relationships adversely impacted if it does not have the ability to pay pre-filing obligations to certain vendors and it further believes that the value of its business will be maximized if it can pay its pre-filing creditors. RSM has reviewed this issue and is supportive of this provision as the Eddie Bauer Group believes it is a necessary provision and the DIP Lenders are supportive of the Restructuring Proceedings. The relief requested in these proceedings is consistent with the relief sought in the Chapter 11 Proceedings. This provision is unusual but, in the circumstances of this case, appears to be reasonable.

23 As previously noted, I am satisfied that the Applicants qualify as debtor corporations within the meaning of the CCAA. They have obligations in excess of the qualifying limit and have acknowledged they are insolvent. The jurisdiction of the court to receive the CCAA application has been established.

24 The Applicants seek an Initial Order under Section 11 of the CCAA. The Statement of Projected Cash Flow and other financial documents required under Section 11(2) have been filed. RSM Richter has consented to act as Monitor. The application was not opposed by any party appearing.

25 I am satisfied that it is appropriate that the Applicants be granted protection under the CCAA and an order shall issue to that effect.

26 The Applicants are fully integrated into the operations of the US Debtors. The Applicants have not filed under Chapter 11. The Applicants do, however, recognized that it is important to coordinate the activities of the Eddie Bauer Group in the two proceedings and, to this end, the Applicants have proposed the adoption of a Cross-Border Insolvency Protocol (the "Protocol") which incorporates by reference the Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communication in Cross-Border Cases (the "Guidelines").

27 Mr. Toland stated that he believes the Protocol is needed to ensure that: (i) both the CCAA and Chapter 11 Proceedings are coordinated to avoid inconsistent, conflicting or duplicative rulings by the Courts; (ii) all parties of interest are provided with sufficient notice of key issues in both proceedings; (iii) the substantive rights of all parties in interest are protected; and (iv) the jurisdictional integrity of the Court is preserved.

28 I accept the views of Mr. Toland. It seems to me that all parties would be best served if the Protocol is implemented. Accordingly, I approve the Protocol, in substantially the form included in the Application Record. It is recognized,

however, that the implementation of the Protocol cannot take effect until such time as the Protocol has also been approved by the US Bankruptcy Court.

29 An order shall issue to give effect to the foregoing.

30 I appreciate the efforts of the parties involved in this process. The detail contained in the Toland Affidavit and the RSM Report was of great assistance to the Court.

Application granted.

TAB L

Court File No. CV-18-603054-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

THE HONOURABLE	)	THURSDAY, THE 25TH
	)	
JUSTICE DUNPHY	)	DAY OF OCTOBER, 2018

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF ARALEZ PHARMACEUTICALS INC. AND ARALEZ PHARMACEUTICALS CANADA INC.

Applicants

ORDER

(Re Cross-Border Protocol)

THIS MOTION, made by Aralez Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Aralez Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc. (together the "**Applicants**"), pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "**CCAA**") for, among other things, an order approving a cross-border insolvency protocol (the "**Cross-Border Protocol**") was heard this day at 361 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the affidavit of Adrian Adams sworn October 19, 2018 and the Exhibits attached thereto, and the report dated October 23, 2018 by Richter Advisory Group Inc., in its capacity as Court-appointed Monitor (the "**Monitor**"), and on hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicants and the Monitor, no one appearing for any other person on the service list, although duly served as appears from the affidavit of service of Nicholas Avis sworn October 23, 2018 and filed:

SERVICE

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service of the Notice of Motion and the Motion Record is hereby abridged and validated so that this Motion is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.

CROSS-BORDER PROTOCOL

2. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Cross-Border Protocol in the form attached as Schedule "A" hereto is hereby approved and shall become effective upon its approval by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, and the parties to these proceedings and any other Person shall be governed by and shall comply with the Cross-Border Protocol.

GENERAL

3. **THIS COURT HEREBY REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada or in the United States, to give effect to this Order and to assist the Applicants, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Applicants and to the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order, to grant representative status to the Monitor in any foreign proceeding, or to assist the Applicants and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order.

ENTERED AT / INSCRIT À TORONTO
ON / BOOK NO:
LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO:

OCT 25 2018

PER / PAR:

SCHEDULE "A"

CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY PROTOCOL

1. This cross-border insolvency protocol (the "Protocol") shall govern the conduct of all parties in interest in the Insolvency Proceedings (as such term is defined herein).

2. The Guidelines for Communication and Cooperation Between Courts in Cross-Border Insolvency Matters (the "Guidelines"), annexed hereto as "Schedule A" hereto, shall be incorporated by reference and form part of this Protocol. To the extent there is any discrepancy between the Protocol and the Guidelines, this Protocol shall prevail.

A. Background

3. On August 10, 2018 (the "Filing Date"), Aralez Pharmaceuticals US Inc. and certain of its affiliates (collectively, the "U.S. Debtors")[1] commenced cases (collectively, the "U.S. Proceedings") under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York and Aralez Pharmaceuticals Inc., the U.S. Debtors' ultimate parent company, and Aralez Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc. (together with Aralez Pharmaceuticals Inc., the "Canadian Debtors," and with the U.S. Debtors, the "Debtors"), the U.S. Debtors' affiliate, also commenced a reorganization proceeding in Canada (the "Canadian Proceedings" and together with the U.S. Proceedings, the "Insolvency Proceedings") by filing an application under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "CCAA") with the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the "Canadian Court" and together with the U.S. Court, the "Courts" and each individually, a "Court").

4. On the Filing Date, the Canadian Debtors sought an initial order from the Canadian Court (as may be amended from time to time, the "CCAA Order") which, *inter alia*, (a) granted the Canadian Debtors relief under the CCAA; (b) appointed Richter Advisory Group Inc. as monitor of the Canadian Debtors, with the rights, powers, duties and limitations upon liabilities set forth in the CCAA Order; and (c) granted a stay of proceedings in respect of the Canadian Debtors.

5. The U.S. Debtors continue to operate and maintain their businesses as debtors in possession pursuant to sections 1107 and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Office of the United States Trustee (the "U.S. Trustee") appointed an official committee of unsecured creditors (the "U.S. Creditors' Committee") in the U.S. Proceedings on August 27, 2018.

B. Purpose and Goals

6. While the U.S. Proceedings and the Canadian Proceedings are full and separate proceedings pending in the U.S. and Canada, the implementation of basic administrative procedures is both necessary and desirable to coordinate certain activities in the Insolvency

[1] The U.S. Debtors in the chapter 11 cases and the last four digits of each Debtor's federal taxpayer identification number are as follows: Aralez Pharmaceuticals Holdings Limited (5824); Aralez Pharmaceuticals Management Inc. (7166); POZEN Inc. (7552); Aralez Pharmaceuticals Trading DAC (1627); Aralez Pharmaceuticals US Inc. (6948); Aralez Pharmaceuticals R&D Inc. (9731); Halton Laboratories LLC (9342). For the purposes of these chapter 11 cases, the U.S. Debtors' mailing address is: Aralez Pharmaceuticals, c/o Prime Clerk, P.O. Box 329003, Brooklyn, NY 11232.

Proceedings, protect the rights of parties thereto and ensure the maintenance of the Court's independent jurisdiction and comity. Accordingly, this Protocol has been developed to promote the following mutually desirable goals and objectives in the Insolvency Proceedings:

(a) harmonize and coordinate activities in the Insolvency Proceedings before the Courts;

(b) promote the orderly and efficient administration of the Insolvency Proceedings to, among other things, maximize the efficiency of the Insolvency Proceedings, reduce the costs associated therewith and avoid duplication of effort;

(c) honor the independence and integrity of the Courts and other courts and tribunals of the U.S. and Canada, respectively;

(d) promote international cooperation and respect for comity among the Courts, the Debtors, the U.S. Creditors' Committee, the U.S. Representatives (defined below), the Canadian Representatives (defined below) (together with the U.S. Representatives, the "Estate Representatives"), the U.S. Trustee and other creditors and interested parties in the Insolvency Proceedings;

(e) facilitate the fair, open and efficient administration of the Insolvency Proceedings for the benefit of all of the creditors and interested parties of the Debtors, wherever located; and

(f) implement a framework of general principles to address basic administrative issues arising out of the cross-border and international nature of the Insolvency Proceedings.

C. Comity and Independence of the Courts

7. The approval and implementation of this Protocol shall not divest or diminish the U.S. Court's and the Canadian Court's independent jurisdiction over the subject matter of the U.S. Proceedings and the Canadian Proceedings, respectively. By approving and implementing this Protocol, neither the U.S. Court, the Canadian Court, the Debtors nor any creditors or interested parties shall be deemed to have approved or engaged in any infringement on the sovereignty of the U.S. or Canada.

8. The U.S. Court shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction and power over the conduct of the U.S. Proceedings and the hearing and determination of matters arising in the U.S. Proceedings. The Canadian Court shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction and power over the conduct of the Canadian Proceedings and the hearing and determination of matters arising in the Canadian Proceedings.

9. In accordance with the principles of comity and independence established in the two preceding paragraphs, nothing contained herein shall be construed to:

(a) increase, decrease or otherwise modify the independence, sovereignty or jurisdiction of the U.S. Court, the Canadian Court or any other court or tribunal in the U.S. or Canada, including the ability of any such court or tribunal to provide appropriate relief under applicable law on an *ex parte* or "limited notice" basis;

(b) require the U.S. Court to take any action that is inconsistent with its obligations under the laws of the U.S.;

(c) require the Canadian Court to take any action that is inconsistent with its obligations under the laws of Canada;

(d) require the Debtors, the Monitor, the U.S. Creditors' Committee, the Estate Representatives or the U.S. Trustee to take any action or refrain from taking any action that would result in a breach of any duty imposed on them by any applicable law;

(e) authorize any action that requires the specific approval of one or both of the Courts under the Bankruptcy Code or the CCAA after appropriate notice and a hearing (except to the extent that such action is specifically described in this Protocol); or

(f) preclude the Debtors, the Monitor, the U.S. Creditors' Committee, the Estate Representatives, the U.S. Trustee, or any creditor or other interested party from asserting such party's substantive rights under the applicable laws of the U.S., Canada or any other relevant jurisdiction including, without limitation, the rights of interested parties or affected persons to appeal from the decisions taken by one or both of the Courts.

10. Subject to the terms hereof, the Debtors, the U.S. Creditors' Committee, the Estate Representatives and their respective employees, members, agents and professionals shall respect and comply with the independent, non-delegable duties imposed upon them by the Bankruptcy Code, the CCAA, the CCAA Order and other applicable laws and orders of the Courts, as applicable.

D. Cooperation

11. To assist in the efficient administration of the Insolvency Proceedings, the Debtors and the Estate Representatives shall where appropriate:

(a) reasonably cooperate with each other in connection with actions taken in both the U.S. Court and the Canadian Court; and

(b) take any other reasonable steps to coordinate the administration of the U.S. Proceedings and the Canadian Proceedings for the benefit of the Debtors' respective estates and stakeholders, including, without limitation, developing in consultation with the U.S. Creditors' Committee any cross-border claims protocol to be approved by the Canadian and U.S. Courts.

12. To harmonize and coordinate the administration of the Insolvency Proceedings, the U.S. Court and the Canadian Court each may coordinate activities with and defer to the judgment of the other Court, where appropriate and feasible. In furtherance of the foregoing:

(a) The U.S. Court and the Canadian Court may communicate with one another, with or without counsel present, with respect to any procedural or substantive matter relating to the Insolvency Proceedings;

(b) Where the issue of the proper jurisdiction or Court to determine an issue is raised by an interested party in either of the Insolvency Proceedings with respect to a motion or an application filed in either Court, the Court before which such motion or application was initially filed may contact the other Court to determine an appropriate process by which the issue of jurisdiction will be determined. Such process shall be subject to submissions by the Debtors, the Estate Representatives, the U.S. Creditors' Committee, the Monitor, the U.S. Trustee and any interested party before any determination on the issue of jurisdiction is made by either Court; and

(c) The Courts may, but are not obligated to, coordinate activities in the Insolvency Proceedings such that the subject matter of any particular action, suit, request, application, contested matter or other proceeding is determined in a single Court.

13. The U.S. Court and the Canadian Court may conduct joint hearings with respect to any matter relating to the conduct, administration, determination or disposition of any aspect of the U.S. Proceedings and the Canadian Proceedings, if both Courts consider such joint hearings to be necessary or advisable and, in particular, to facilitate or coordinate with the proper and efficient conduct of the U.S. Proceedings and the Canadian Proceedings. With respect to any such hearing, unless otherwise ordered, the following procedures will be followed:

(a) a telephone or video link shall be established so that both the U.S. Court and the Canadian Court shall be able to simultaneously hear the proceedings in the other Court;

(b) notices, submissions or applications by any party that are or become the subject of a joint hearing of the Courts (collectively, "Pleadings") shall be made or filed initially only to the Court in which such party is appearing and seeking relief. Promptly after the scheduling of any joint hearing, the party submitting such Pleadings to one Court shall file courtesy copies with the other Court. In any event, Pleadings seeking relief from both Courts shall be filed with both Courts.

(c) any party intending to rely on any written evidentiary materials in support of a submission to the U.S. Court or the Canadian Court in connection with any joint hearing shall file such materials, which shall be identical insofar as possible and shall be consistent with the procedure and

evidentiary rules and requirements of each Court, in advance of the time of such hearing or the submissions of such application;

(d) If a party has not previously appeared in or attorned or does not wish to attorn to the jurisdiction of either court, it shall be entitled to file such materials without, by the act of filing, being deemed to have attorned to the jurisdiction of the Court in which such material is filed, so long as it does not request in its materials or submissions any affirmative relief from the Court to which it does not wish to attorn;

(e) the Judge of the U.S. Court and the Justice of the Canadian Court who will hear any such application shall be entitled to communicate with each other in advance of the hearing on the application, with or without counsel being present, to establish guidelines for the orderly submission of pleadings, papers and other materials and the rendering of decisions by the U.S. Court and the Canadian Court, and to address any related procedural, administrative or preliminary matters; and

(f) the Judge of the U.S. Court and the Justice of the Canadian Court, having heard any such application, shall be entitled to communicate with each other after the hearing on such application, without counsel present, for the purpose of determining whether consistent rulings can be made by both Courts, and coordinating the terms upon which such rulings shall be made, as well as to address any other procedural or non-substantive matter relating to such applications.

14. Notwithstanding the terms of the preceding paragraph, the Protocol recognizes that the U.S. Court and the Canadian Court are independent courts. Accordingly, although the Courts will seek to cooperate and coordinate with each other in good faith, each of the Courts shall be entitled at all times to exercise its independent jurisdiction and authority with respect to:

(a) the conduct of the parties appearing in matters presented to such Court; and

(b) matters presented to such Court, including without limitation, the right to determine if matters are properly before such Court.

15. In the interest of cooperation and coordination of these proceedings, each Court shall recognize and consider all privileges applicable to communications between counsel and parties, including those contemplated by the common interest doctrine or like privileges, which would be applicable in each respective Court. Such privileges in connection with communications shall be applicable in both Courts with respect to all parties to these proceedings having any requisite common interest.

16. Where one Court has jurisdiction over a matter which requires the application of the law of the jurisdiction of the other Court in order to determine an issue before it, the Court with jurisdiction over such matter may, among other things, hear expert evidence or seek the

advice and direction of the other Court in respect of the foreign law to be applied, subject to paragraph 38 herein.

E. Retention and Compensation of Estate Representatives and Professionals

17. The Monitor, its officers, directors, employees, counsel, agents, and any other professionals related therefor, wherever located (collectively, the "Monitor Parties") and any other estate representatives in the Canadian Proceedings (collectively with the Monitor Parties, the "Canadian Representatives") shall all be subject to the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the Canadian Court with respect to all matters, including:

(a) the Canadian Representatives' appointment and tenure in office;

(b) the retention and compensation of the Canadian Representatives;

(c) the Canadian Representatives' liability, if any, to any person or entity, including the Canadian Debtors and any third parties, in connection with the Insolvency Proceedings; and

(d) the hearing and determination of any matters relating to the Canadian Representatives arising in the Canadian Proceedings under the CCAA or other applicable Canadian law.

18. Additionally, the Canadian Representatives:

(a) shall be compensated for their services solely in accordance with the CCAA and other applicable Canadian law or orders of the Canadian Court; and

(b) shall not be required to seek approval of their compensation in the U.S. Court.

19. The Monitor Parties shall be entitled to the same protections and immunities in the U.S. as those granted to them under the CCAA and the CCAA Order. In particular, except as otherwise provided in any subsequent order entered in the Canadian Proceedings, the Monitor Parties shall incur no liability or obligations as a result of the appointment of the Monitor, the carrying out of its duties or the provisions of the CCAA and the CCAA Order by the Monitor Parties, except any such liability arising from actions of the Monitor Parties constituting gross negligence or willful misconduct.

20. Any estate representative appointed in the U.S. Proceedings, including without limitation, the U.S. Creditors' Committee and any examiner or trustee appointed pursuant to section 1104 of the Bankruptcy Code (collectively, the "U.S. Representatives"), shall be subject to the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S. Court with respect to all matters, including:

(a) the U.S. Representatives' tenure in office;

(b) the U.S. Representatives' retention and compensation;

(c) the U.S. Representatives' liability, if any, to any person or entity, including the U.S. Debtors and any third parties, in connection with the Insolvency Proceedings; and

(d) the hearing and determination of any other matters relating to the U.S. Representatives arising in the U.S. Proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code or other applicable laws of the U.S.

21. Nothing in this Protocol creates any fiduciary duty, duty of care or other duty owed by the U.S. Representatives to the stakeholders in the Canadian Proceedings or by the Canadian Representatives to the stakeholders in the U.S. Proceedings that they would not otherwise have in the absence of this Protocol.

22. The U.S. Representatives shall not be required to seek approval of their retention in the Canadian Court. Additionally, the U.S. Representatives:

(a) shall be compensated for their services solely in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code and other applicable laws of the United States or orders of the U.S. Court; and

(b) shall not be required to seek approval of their compensation in the Canadian Court.

23. Any professionals retained by or with the approval of the Canadian Debtors for activities performed in Canada or in connection with the Canadian Proceeding, including, in each case, counsel, financial advisors, accountants, consultants and experts (collectively, the "Canadian Professionals") shall be subject to the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the Canadian Court. Accordingly, the Canadian Professionals: (a) shall be subject to the procedures and standards for retention and compensation applicable in the Canadian Court under the CCAA, the CCAA Order any other applicable Canadian law or orders of the Canadian Court; and (b) shall not be required to seek approval of their retention or compensation in the U.S. Court. The Debtors will include the identity and the amount of payments with respect to the Canadian Professionals in the Debtors' monthly operating reports.

24. Any professionals retained by or with approval of the Debtors for activities performed in the U.S. or in connection with the U.S. Proceedings, including, in each case, counsel, financial advisors, accountants, consultants and experts (collectively, the "U.S. Professionals") shall be subject to the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S. Court. Accordingly, the U.S. Professionals: (a) shall be subject to the procedures and standards for retention and compensation applicable in the U.S. Court under the Bankruptcy Code and any other applicable laws of the U.S. or orders of the U.S. Court; and (b) shall not be required to seek approval of their retention of compensation in the Canadian Court.

25. Any professionals retained by the U.S. Creditors' Committee, including, in each case, counsel and financial advisors (collectively, the "Committee Professionals") shall be subject to the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S. Court. Accordingly, the Committee Professionals: (a) shall be subject to the procedures and standards for retention and compensation applicable in the U.S. Court under the Bankruptcy Code and any other applicable laws of the

U.S. or orders of the U.S. Court; and (b) shall not be required to seek approval of their retention of compensation in the Canadian Court.

F. Rights to Appear and Be Heard

26. Each of the Debtors, their creditors and other interested parties in the Insolvency Proceedings, including the Canadian Representatives and the U.S. Representatives, shall have the right and standing to:

(a) appear and be heard in either the U.S. Court or the Canadian Court in the Insolvency Proceedings to the same extent as a creditor and other interested party domiciled in the forum country, but solely to the extent such party is a creditor or other interested party in the subject forum, subject to any local rules or regulations generally applicable to all parties appearing in the forum; and

(b) subject to 26(a) above, file notices of appearance or other papers with the Clerk of the U.S. Court or the Canadian Court in the Insolvency Proceedings; provided, however, that any appearance or filing may subject a creditor or interested party to the jurisdiction of the Court in which the appearance or filing occurs; provided further, that appearance by the U.S. Creditors' Committee in the Canadian Proceedings shall not form a basis for personal jurisdiction in Canada over the members of the U.S. Committee or vice versa. Notwithstanding the foregoing, and in accordance with the policies set forth above:

(i) the Canadian Court shall have jurisdiction over the U.S. Representatives and the U.S. Trustee solely with respect to the particular matters as to which the U.S. Representatives or the U.S. Trustee appear before the Canadian Court; and

(ii) the U.S. Court shall have jurisdiction over the Canadian Representatives solely with respect to the particular matters as to which the Canadian Representatives appear before the U.S. Court.

27. Solely with respect to consensual due diligence the U.S. Creditors' Committee will execute confidentiality agreements in the form to be agreed to by the Canadian Debtors and the U.S. Creditors' Committee.

G. Notice

28. Notice of any motion, application or other pleading or paper filed in one or both of the Insolvency Proceedings relating to matters addressed by this Protocol and notice of any related hearings or other proceedings shall be given by appropriate means (including, where circumstances warrant, by courier or electronic forms of communication) to the following:

(a) all creditors and other interested parties in accordance with the practice of the jurisdiction where the papers are filed or the proceedings are to occur; and

(b) to the extent not otherwise entitled to receive notice under subpart (a) of this paragraph, to:

(i) Counsel to the U.S. Debtors, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, 787 Seventh Avenue, New York, New York, U.S., 10019, (Attn: Paul V. Shalhoub, Esq., Robin Spigel, Esq. and Debra C. McElligott, Esq.);

(ii) Counsel to the Canadian Debtors, Stikeman Elliott LLP, 5300 Commerce Court West, 199 Bay Street, Toronto, Ontario, M5L 1B9, Canada, (Attn: Ashley John Taylor, Maria Konyukhova and Kathryn Esaw);

(iii) Counsel to Deerfield Partners, L.P., Deerfield Private Design Fund III, L.P., Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, 525 Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois 60661 (Attn: Peter A. Siddiqui, Esq.), and Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, 575 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10022 (Attn: Steven J. Reisman, Esq.);

(iv) the Monitor, Richter Advisory Group, 3320 Bay Wellington Tower, 181 Bay Street, Toronto, Ontario M5J 2T3 (Attn: Paul Van Eyk), and its counsel, Torys LLP, 3000 TD South Tower, 79 Wellington Street West, Toronto, Ontario M5K 1N2 (Attn: David Bish);

(v) counsel to any statutory committee or any other official appointed in the U.S. Proceedings or the Canadian Proceedings;

(vi) the Office of the United States Trustee for Region 2, 201 Varick Street, Suite 1006, New York, New York, 10014 (Attn: Andrea B. Schwartz, Esq.);

(vii) and such other parties as may be designated by either Court from time to time.

29. Notice in accordance with this paragraph may be designated by either of the Courts from time to time. Notice in accordance with this paragraph shall be given by the party otherwise responsible for effecting notice in the jurisdiction where the underlying papers are filed or the proceedings are to occur. In addition to the foregoing, upon request, the U.S. Debtors or the Canadian Debtors shall provide the U.S. Court or the Canadian Court, as the case may be, with copies of any orders, decisions, opinions or similar papers issued by the other Court in the Insolvency Proceedings.

30. When any cross-border issues or matters addressed by this Protocol are to be addressed before a Court, notices shall be provided in the manner and to the parties referred to in paragraph 28 above.

H. Recognition of Stays of Proceedings

31. The Canadian Court hereby recognizes the validity of the stay of proceedings and actions against or respecting the U.S. Debtors and their property under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code (the "U.S. Stay"). In implementing the terms of this paragraph, the Canadian Court may consult with the U.S. Court regarding the interpretation, extent, scope and applicability of the U.S. Stay, and any orders of this U.S. Court modifying or granting relief from the U.S. Stay.

32. The U.S. Court hereby recognizes the validity of the stay of proceedings and actions against or respecting the Canadian Debtors, its property and the current and former directors and officers of the Canadian Debtors under the CCAA and the Initial Order (the "Canadian Stay"). In implementing the terms of this paragraph, the U.S. Court may consult with the Canadian Court regarding the interpretation, extent, scope and applicability of the Canadian Stay, and any orders of the Canadian Court modifying or granting relief from the Canadian Stay.

33. Nothing contained herein shall affect or limit the Debtors or other parties' rights to assert the applicability or non-applicability of the U.S. Stay or the Canadian Stay to any particular proceeding, property, asset, activity or other matter, wherever pending or located. Subject to the terms hereof: (a) any motion with respect to the application of the stay of proceedings issued by the Canadian Court in the CCAA Proceeding shall be heard and determined by the Canadian Court and (b) any motion with respect to the application of the stay under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code shall be heard and determined by the U.S. Court.

I. Effectiveness; Modification

34. This Protocol shall become effective only upon its approval by both the U.S. Court and the Canadian Court.

35. This Protocol may not be supplemented, modified, terminated or replaced in any manner except by the U.S. Court and the Canadian Court after notice and a hearing. Notice of any legal proceeding to supplement, modify, terminate or replace this Protocol shall be given in accordance with the notice provision contained in this Protocol.

J. Procedure for Resolving Disputes Under the Protocol

36. Disputes relating to the terms, intent or application of this Protocol may be addressed by interested parties to either the U.S. Court, the Canadian Court or both Courts upon notice as set forth in paragraph 28 above. In rendering a determination in any such dispute, the Court to which the issue is addressed:

(a) shall consult with the other Court; and

(b) may, in its sole discretion, either:

(i) render a binding decision after such consultation;

(ii) defer to the determination of the other Court by transferring the matter, in whole or in part, to the other Court; or

(iii) seek a joint hearing of both Courts.

37. Notwithstanding the foregoing, each Court in making a determination shall have regard to the independence, comity or inherent jurisdiction of the other Court established under existing law.

38. In implementing the terms of the Protocol, the U.S. Court and the Canadian Court may, in their sole, respective discretion, provide advice or guidance to each other with respect to legal issues in accordance with the following procedures:

(a) The U.S. Court or the Canadian Court, as applicable, may determine that such advice or guidance is appropriate under the circumstances;

(b) The Court issuing such advice or guidance shall provide it to the non-issuing Court in writing;

(c) Copies of such written advice or guidance shall be served by the applicable Court in accordance with paragraph 28 hereof; and

(d) The Courts may jointly decide to invite the Debtors, the Estate Representatives, the U.S. Trustee, the Monitor and any other affected or interested party to make submissions to the appropriate Court in response to or in connection with any written advice or guidance received from the other Court.

39. For clarity, the provisions of paragraph 38 shall not be construed to restrict the ability of the U.S. Court or the Canadian Court to confer, as provided above, whenever they deem it appropriate to do so.

K. Preservation of Rights

40. Except as specifically provided herein, neither the terms of this Protocol nor any actions taken under the terms of this Protocol shall (a) prejudice or affect the powers, rights, claims and defenses of the Debtors and their estates, the Estate Representatives, the U.S. Trustee, the Monitor or any of the Debtors' creditors under applicable law, including the Bankruptcy Code, the CCAA and the Orders of the Courts or (b) preclude or prejudice the rights of any person to assert or pursue such person's substantive rights against any other person under the applicable laws of the United States or Canada.

41. The question of the degree of standing of the U.S. Creditors' Committee in the Canadian Court remains an open issue. This protocol is without prejudice to the question one way or the other.

SCHEDULE A

GUIDELINES FOR COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN COURTS IN CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY MATTERS[2]

INTRODUCTION

A The overarching objective of these Guidelines is to improve in the interests of all stakeholders the efficiency and effectiveness of cross-border proceedings relating to insolvency or adjustment of debt opened in more than one jurisdiction ("Parallel Proceedings") by enhancing coordination and cooperation among courts under whose supervision such proceedings are being conducted. These Guidelines represent best practice for dealing with Parallel Proceedings.

B In all Parallel Proceedings, these Guidelines should be considered at the earliest practicable opportunity.

C In particular, these Guidelines aim to promote:

(i) the efficient and timely coordination and administration of Parallel Proceedings;

(ii) the administration of Parallel Proceedings with a view to ensuring relevant stakeholders' interests are respected;

(iii) the identification, preservation, and maximization of the value of the debtor's assets, including the debtor's business;

(iv) the management of the debtor's estate in ways that are proportionate to the amount of money involved, the nature of the case, the complexity of the issues, the number of creditors, and the number of jurisdictions involved in Parallel Proceedings;

(v) the sharing of information in order to reduce costs; and

(vi) the avoidance or minimization of litigation, costs, and inconvenience to the parties[3] in Parallel Proceedings.

D These Guidelines should be implemented in each jurisdiction in such manner as the jurisdiction deems fit.[4]

E These Guidelines are not intended to be exhaustive and in each case consideration ought to be given to the special requirements in that case.

F Courts should consider in all cases involving Parallel Proceedings whether and how to implement these Guidelines. Courts should encourage and where necessary direct, if they have the power to do so, the parties to make the necessary applications to the court to

---

[2] These Guidelines are distilled in large part from the ALI/ABA/III Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communications in Cross-Border Cases.

[3] The term "parties" when used in these Guidelines shall be interpreted broadly.

[4] Possible means for the implementation of these Guidelines include practice directions and commercial guides.

facilitate such implementation by a protocol or order derived from these Guidelines, and encourage them to act so as to promote the objectives and aims of these Guidelines wherever possible.

ADOPTION AND INTERPRETATION

Guideline 1: In furtherance of paragraph F above, the courts should encourage administrators in Parallel Proceedings to cooperate in all aspects of the case, including the necessity of notifying the courts at the earliest practicable opportunity of issues present and potential that may (a) affect those proceedings; and (b) benefit from communication and coordination between the courts. For the purpose of these Guidelines, "administrator" includes a liquidator, trustee, judicial manager, administrator in administration proceedings, debtor-in-possession in a reorganization or scheme of arrangement, or any fiduciary of the estate or person appointed by the court.

Guideline 2: Where a court intends to apply these Guidelines (whether in whole or in part and with or without modification) in particular Parallel Proceedings, it will need to do so by a protocol or an order,[5] following an application by the parties or pursuant to a direction of the court if the court has the power to do so.

Guideline 3: Such protocol or order should promote the efficient and timely administration of Parallel Proceedings. It should address the coordination of requests for court approvals of related decisions and actions when required and communication with creditors and other parties. To the extent possible, it should also provide for timesaving procedures to avoid unnecessary and costly court hearings and other proceedings.

Guideline 4: These Guidelines when implemented are not intended to:

(i) interfere with or derogate from the jurisdiction or the exercise of jurisdiction by a court in any proceedings including its authority or supervision over an administrator in those proceedings;

(ii) interfere with or derogate from the rules or ethical principles by which an administrator is bound according to any applicable law and professional rules;

(iii) prevent a court from refusing to take an action that would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the jurisdiction or which would not sufficiently protect the interests of the creditors and other interested entities, including the debtor; or

(iv) confer or change jurisdiction, alter substantive rights, interfere with any function or duty arising out of any applicable law, or encroach upon any applicable law.

[5] In the normal case, the parties will agree on a protocol derived from these Guidelines and obtain the approval of each court in which the protocol is to apply. Pending such approval, or in Parallel Proceedings where there is no protocol, administrators and other parties are expected to comply with these Guidelines.

Guideline 5: For the avoidance of doubt, a protocol or order under these Guidelines is procedural in nature. It should not constitute a limitation on or waiver by the court of any powers, responsibilities, or authority or a substantive determination of any matter in controversy before the court or before the other court or a waiver by any of the parties of any of their substantive rights and claims, except to the extent specifically provided in such protocol or order as permitted by applicable law.

Guideline 6: In the interpretation of these Guidelines or any protocol or order approved under these Guidelines, due regard shall be given to their international origin and to the need to promote good faith and uniformity in their application.

COMMUNICATION BETWEEN COURTS[6]

Guideline 7: A court may receive communications from a foreign court and may respond directly to them. Such communications may occur for the purpose of the orderly making of submissions and rendering of decisions by the courts, and to coordinate and resolve any procedural, administrative or preliminary matters relating to any joint hearing where Annex A is applicable. Such communications may take place through the following methods or such other method as may be agreed by the two courts in a specific case:

(i) Sending or transmitting copies of formal orders, judgments, opinions, reasons for decision, endorsements, transcripts of proceedings or other documents directly to the other court and providing advance notice to counsel for affected parties in such manner as the court considers appropriate.

(ii) Directing counsel to transmit or deliver copies of documents, pleadings, affidavits, briefs or other documents that are filed or to be filed with the court to the other court, or other appropriate person, in such fashion as may be appropriate and providing advance notice to counsel for affected parties in such manner as the court considers appropriate.

(iii) Participating in two-way communications with the other court, including by telephone, video conference call, or other electronic means, in which case Guideline 8 should be considered.

Guideline 8: In the event of communications between courts, other than on procedural matters, unless otherwise directed by any court involved in the communications whether on an *ex parte* basis or otherwise, or permitted by a protocol or order, the following shall apply:

(i) In the normal case, parties may be present.

(ii) If the parties are entitled to be present, advance notice of the communications shall be given to all parties in accordance with the rules of procedure applicable in each of the courts to be involved in the communications, and the communications between the courts shall be

[6] Communications between administrators are also expected under and to be consistent with these Guidelines.

recorded and may be transcribed. A written transcript may be prepared from a recording of the communications that, with the approval of each court involved in the communications, may be treated as the official transcript of the communications.

(iii) Copies of any recording of the communications, of any transcript of the communications prepared pursuant to any direction of any court involved in the communications, and of any official transcript prepared from a recording may be filed as part of the record in the proceedings and made available to the parties and subject to such directions as to confidentiality as any court may consider appropriate.

(iv) The time and place for communications between the courts shall be as directed by the courts. Personnel other than judges in each court may communicate with each other to establish appropriate arrangements for the communications without the presence of the parties.

Guideline 9: A court may direct that notice of its proceedings be given to parties in proceedings in another jurisdiction. All notices, applications, motions, and other materials served for purposes of the proceedings before the court may be ordered to be provided to such other parties by making such materials available electronically in a publicly accessible system or by facsimile transmission, certified or registered mail or delivery by courier, or in such other manner as may be directed by the court in accordance with the procedures applicable in the court.

APPEARANCE IN COURT

Guideline 10: A court may authorize a party, or an appropriate person, to appear before and be heard by a foreign court, subject to approval of the foreign court to such appearance.

Guideline 11: If permitted by its law and otherwise appropriate, a court may authorize a party to a foreign proceeding, or an appropriate person, to appear and be heard on a specific matter by it without thereby becoming subject to its jurisdiction for any purpose other than the specific matter on which the party is appearing.

CONSEQUENTIAL PROVISIONS

Guideline 12: A court shall, except on proper objection on valid grounds and then only to the extent of such objection, recognize and accept as authentic the provisions of statutes, statutory or administrative regulations, and rules of court of general application applicable to the proceedings in other jurisdictions without further proof. For the avoidance of doubt, such recognition and acceptance does not constitute recognition or acceptance of their legal effect or implications.

Guideline 13: A court shall, except upon proper objection on valid grounds and then only to the extent of such objection, accept that orders made in the proceedings in other jurisdictions were duly and properly made or entered on their respective dates and accept that such orders require no further proof for purposes of the proceedings before it, subject to its law and all such proper reservations as in the opinion of the court are appropriate regarding proceedings by way of appeal or review that are actually pending in respect of any such orders. Notice of any

amendments, modifications, extensions, or appellate decisions with respect to such orders shall be made to the other court(s) involved in Parallel Proceedings, as soon as it is practicable to do so.

Guideline 14: A protocol or order made by a court under these Guidelines is subject to such amendments, modifications, and extensions as may be considered appropriate by the court consistent with these Guidelines, and to reflect the changes and developments from time to time in any Parallel Proceedings. Notice of such amendments, modifications, or extensions shall be made to the other court(s) involved in Parallel Proceedings, as soon as it is practicable to do so.

ANNEX A (JOINT HEARINGS)

Annex A to these Guidelines relates to guidelines on the conduct of joint hearings. Annex A shall be applicable to, and shall form a part of these Guidelines, with respect to courts that may signify their assent to Annex A from time to time. Parties are encouraged to address the matters set out in Annex A in a protocol or order.

ANNEX A: JOINT HEARINGS

A court may conduct a joint hearing with another court. In connection with any such joint hearing, the following shall apply, or where relevant, be considered for inclusion in a protocol or order:

(i) The implementation of this Annex shall not divest nor diminish any court's respective independent jurisdiction over the subject matter of proceedings. By implementing this Annex, neither a court nor any party shall be deemed to have approved or engaged in any infringement on the sovereignty of the other jurisdiction.

(ii) Each court shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction and power over the conduct of its own proceedings and the hearing and determination of matters arising in its proceedings.

(iii) Each court should be able simultaneously to hear the proceedings in the other court. Consideration should be given as to how to provide the best audio-visual access possible.

(iv) Consideration should be given to coordination of the process and format for submissions and evidence filed or to be filed in each court.

(v) A court may make an order permitting foreign counsel or any party in another jurisdiction to appear and be heard by it. If such an order is made, consideration needs to be given as to whether foreign counsel or any party would be submitting to the jurisdiction of the relevant court and/or its professional regulations.

(vi) A court should be entitled to communicate with the other court in advance of a joint hearing, with or without counsel being present, to establish the procedures for the orderly making of submissions and rendering of decisions by the courts, and to coordinate and resolve any procedural, administrative or preliminary matters relating to the joint hearing.

(vii) A court, subsequent to the joint hearing, should be entitled to communicate with the other court, with or without counsel present, for the purpose of determining outstanding issues. Consideration should be given as to whether the issues include procedural and/or substantive matters. Consideration should also be given as to whether some or all of such communications should be recorded and preserved.

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF ARALEZ PHARMACEUTICALS INC. AND ARALEZ PHARMACEUTICALS CANADA INC.

Court File No: CV-18-603054-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
Proceeding commenced at Toronto

ORDER
(RE CROSS-BORDER PROTOCOL)

STIKEMAN ELLIOTT LLP
Barristers & Solicitors
5300 Commerce Court West
199 Bay Street
Toronto, Canada M5L 1B9

Ashley Taylor LSO#: 39932E
Tel: (416) 869-5236
Email: ataylor@stikeman.com

Maria Konyukhova LSO#: 52880V
Tel: (416) 869-5230
Email: mkonyukhova@stikeman.com
Fax: (416) 947-0866

Kathryn Esaw LSO#: 58264F
Tel: (416) 869-6820
Email: kesaw@stikeman.com

Lawyers for the Applicants

TAB M

2015 ONSC 1487
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Target Canada Co., Re

2015 CarswellOnt 3261, 2015 ONSC 1487, 23 C.B.R. (6th) 314, 252 A.C.W.S. (3d) 9

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Target Canada Co., Target Canada Health Co., Target Canada Mobile GP Co., Target Canada Pharmacy (BC) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (SK) Corp., and Target Canada Property LLC.

G.B. Morawetz R.S.J.

Heard: March 5, 2015
Judgment: March 5, 2015
Docket: CV-15-10832-00CL

Counsel: Jeremy Dacks, Tracy Sandler, Shawn Irving for Applicants, Target Canada Co., Target Canada Health Co., Target Canada Mobile GP Co., Target Canada Pharmacy (BC) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (SK) Corp., and Target Canada Property LLC
Jay Swartz for Target Corporation
D.J. Miller for Oxford Properties Group Inc.
Jeff Carhart for Hamilton Beach Corp. et al.
Alan Mark, Melaney Wagner for Monitor, Alvarez & Marsal Inc.
Leonard Loewith for Solutions 2 Go et al.
Aubrey Kauffman for Ivanhoe Cambridge Inc.
Ruzbeh Hosseini for Amskor Corporation
Sean Zweig for RioCan Management Inc. and Kingsett Capital Inc.
Lou Brzezinski, Alexandra Teoderescu for Thyssenkrupp Elevator (Canada) Limited, Advitek, Universal Studios Canada Inc., Nintendo of Canada, Ltd., and Bentall Kennedy (Canada) LP Group
Melvyn L. Solmon for ISSI Inc.

Subject: Insolvency; Property

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court
XIX.3.b.iv Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — Miscellaneous

Retail chain store encountered financial difficulties and proceedings were engaged under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Chain entered into agreement under which it was to surrender its interest in eleven leases to landlord entities in consideration for purchase price and certain other benefits — To enter into agreement, leases were withdrawn from auction and sale process — Sublessors, who were creditors, would require payment for breaking leases — Certain parties brought motion to approve sale — Motion granted — No indication debtor acted improvidently — Debtor,

financial advisor and monitor felt lease transaction was in best interests of debtors and their stakeholders and that consideration received was reasonable, and this view was entitled to deference by court — Process for achieving sale was fair and reasonable — Actual price under agreement was commercially sensitive, and was ordered sealed.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *G.B. Morawetz R.S.J.*:

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re (2010), 68 C.B.R. (5th) 233, 2010 CarswellOnt 3509, 2010 ONSC 2870 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, 2002 CSC 41 (S.C.C.) — followed

White Birch Paper Holding Co., Re (2010), 2010 CarswellQue 10954, 2010 QCCS 4915, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 49 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

White Birch Paper Holding Co., Re (2010), 72 C.B.R. (5th) 74, 2010 CarswellQue 11534, 2010 QCCA 1950 (C.A. Que.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

s. 36 — considered

s. 36(3) — considered

MOTION to approve sale agreement in proceedings under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

***G.B. Morawetz R.S.J.*:**

1 On February 11, 2015, Target Canada Co. ("TCC") received Court approval to conduct a real estate sales process (the "Real Property Portfolio Sales Process") to seek qualified purchasers for TCC's leases and other real property, to be conducted by the Target Canada Entities in consultation with their financial advisor, Lazard Fréres & Co., LLC (the "Financial Advisor") and their real estate advisor, Northwest Atlantic (Canada) Co. (the "Broker"), with the supervision and oversight of the Monitor.

2 The Applicants bring this motion to approve a lease transaction agreement (the "Lease Transaction Agreement") that has been negotiated in response to an unsolicited bid by certain landlords (Oxford Properties Corporation ("Oxford") and Ivanhoe Cambridge Inc. ("IC") and certain others, together the "Landlord Entities").

3 Under the Lease Transaction Agreement, TCC will surrender its interest in eleven leases (the "Eleven Leases") to the Landlord Entities in consideration for the purchase price and certain other benefits.

4 The Target Entities decided, after considering the likely benefits and risks associated with the unsolicited offer by the Landlord Entities, to exercise their right under the terms of the Real Property Portfolio Sales Process to withdraw the applicable leases from the bidding and auction phases of the process. The Target Canada Entities contend that the decision to exercise this right was made based on the informed business judgment of the Target Canada Entities with advice from the Financial Advisor and the Broker, in consultation and with the approval of the Monitor.

5 The Applicants submit that the process by which the decision was made to pursue a potential transaction with the Landlord Entities, and withdraw the Eleven Leases from the bidding and auction phases of the Real Property Portfolio Sales Process, was fair and reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances. Further, they submit that the process

by which the benefits of the Lease Transaction Agreement were evaluated, and the Lease Transaction Agreement was negotiated, was reasonable in the circumstances.

6 The Applicants contend that the purchase price being offered by the Landlord Entities is in the high-range of value for the Eleven Leases. As such, the Applicants contend that the price is reasonable, taking into account the market value of the assets. Moreover, the Applicants submit that the estate of the Target Canada Entities will benefit not only from the value represented by the purchase price, but from the release of claims. That includes the potentially material claims that the Landlord Entities may otherwise have been entitled to assert against the estate of the Target Canada Entities, if some or all of the Eleven Leases had been purchased by a third party or disclaimed by the Target Canada Entities.

7 The Target Canada Entities submit that it is in their best interests and that of their stakeholders to enter into the Lease Transaction Agreement. They also rely on the Monitor's approval of and consent to the Target Canada Entities entering into the Lease Transaction Agreement.

8 The Target Canada Entities are of the view that the Lease Transaction Agreement secures premium pricing for the Eleven Leases in a manner that is both certain and efficient, while allowing the Target Canada Entities to continue the Inventory Liquidation Process for the benefit of all stakeholders and to honour their commitments to the pharmacy franchisees.

9 The terms of the Lease Transaction Agreement are set out in the affidavit of Mark J. Wong, sworn February 27, 2015, and are also summarized in the Third Report of the Monitor. The Lease Transaction Agreement is also summarized in the factum submitted by the Applicants.

10 If approved, the closing of the Lease Transaction Agreement is scheduled for March 6, 2015.

11 One aspect of the Lease Transaction Agreement requires specific mention. Almost all of TCC's retail store leases were subleased to TCC Propco. The Premises were then subleased back to TCC. The Applicants contend that these arrangements were reflected in certain agreements between the parties (the "TCC Propco Agreements"). Mr. Wong states in his affidavit that it is a condition of the Lease Transaction Agreement that TCC terminate any subleases prior to closing. TCC will also wind-down other arrangements with TCC Propco.

12 The Applicants contend that the TCC Propco Agreements have been terminated in accordance with their terms and an early termination payment is now owing as a result of this wind-down by TCC to TCC Propco, which, they contend, will be addressed within a claims process to be approved in due course by the Court. The claim of TCC Propco is not insignificant. This intercompany claim is expected to be in the range of $1.9 billion.

13 The relief requested by the Target Canada Entities was not opposed.

14 Section 36 of the CCAA sets out the applicable legal test for obtaining court approval where a debtor company seeks to sell assets outside the ordinary course of business during a CCAA proceeding.

15 In deciding whether to grant authorization, pursuant to section 36(3), the Court is to consider, among other things:

(a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;

(b) whether the Monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;

(c) whether the Monitor filed with the Court a report stating that in its opinion, the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;

(d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;

(e) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and

(f) whether the consideration to be received for the asset is reasonable and fair, taking into account its market value.

16 The factors listed in section 36(3) are not intended to be exhaustive, nor are they intended to be a formulaic check list that must be followed in every sale transaction under the CCAA (see: *White Birch Paper Holding Co., Re*, 2010 QCCS 4915 (C.S. Que.); leave to appeal refused 2010 QCCA 1950 (C.A. Que.).

17 The factors overlap, to a certain degree, with the *Soundair* factors that were applied in approving sale transactions under pre-amendment CCAA case law (see: *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 2870 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), citing *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.*, [1991] O.J. No. 1137 (Ont. C.A.) ("Soundair")).

18 I am satisfied, having reviewed the record and hearing submissions, that — taking into account the factors listed in s. 36(3) of the CCAA — the Lease Transaction Agreement should be approved. In arriving at this conclusion, I have taken the following into account: in the absence of any indication that the Target Canada Entities have acted improvidently, the informed business judgment of the Target Canada Entities (as supported by the advice of the Financial Advisor and the consent of the Monitor) that the Lease Transaction Agreement is in the best interests of the Target Canada Entities and their stakeholders is entitled to deference by this Court.

19 I am also satisfied that the process for achieving the Sale Transaction was fair and reasonable in the circumstances. It is also noted that the Monitor concurs with the assessment of the Target Canada Entities.

20 The Target Canada Entities, the Monitor and the Financial Advisor are all of the view that the consideration to be received by TCC is reasonable, taking into account the market value of the Eleven Leases.

21 I am also satisfied that the Transaction is in the best interest of the stakeholders.

22 The Applicants also submit that all of the other statutory requirements for obtaining relief under section 36 of the CCAA have been satisfied. Having reviewed the factum and, in particular, paragraphs 46 and 47, I accept this submission of the Applicants.

23 As referenced above, the relief requested by the Applicants was not opposed. However, it is necessary to consider this non-opposition in the context of the TCC Propco Agreements. The Applicants contend that the TCC Propco Agreements have been terminated in accordance with their terms, and that the early termination payment now owing as a result of this wind-down by TCC to TCC Propco will be addressed within a claims process to be approved in due course as part of the CCAA proceedings.

24 The Monitor's consent to the entering into of the Termination Agreement, and the filing of the Third Report, do not constitute approval by the Monitor as to the validity, ranking or quantum of the intercompany claim. Further, when the intercompany claims are submitted in the claims process to be approved the Court, the Monitor will prepare a report thereon and make it available to the Court and all creditors. The creditors will have an opportunity to seek any remedy or relief with respect to the intercompany claim in the claims process.

25 In my view, it is necessary to stress the importance of the role of the Monitor in any assessment of the intercompany claim. It is appropriate for the Monitor to take an active and independent role in the review process, such that all creditors are satisfied with respect to the transparency of the process.

26 Finally, it is noted that the actual consideration is not disclosed in the public record.

27 The Applicants are of the view that the specific information relating to the consideration to be paid by the Landlord Entities and the valuation analysis of the Eleven Leases is sensitive commercial information, the disclosure of which could be harmful to stakeholders.

28 The Applicants have requested that Confidential Appendices "A" and "B" be sealed. Confidential Appendix "A" contains an unredacted version of the Lease Transaction Agreement. The Applicants request that this document be sealed until the closing of the transaction. The Applicants request that the transaction and valuation analysis as contained in Appendix "B" be sealed pending further order.

29 No party objected to the sealing requests.

30 Having considered the principles set out in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.), I am satisfied that it is appropriate, in the circumstances, to grant the sealing relief as requested by the Applicants.

31 In the result, the motion is granted. The approval and vesting order in respect of the Lease Transaction Agreement has been signed.

Motion granted.

TAB N

Court File No. CV-17-11674-00CL

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

COMMERCIAL LIST

THE HONOURABLE REGIONAL	)	FRIDAY, THE 27TH DAY
	)	
SENIOR JUSTICE MORAWETZ	)	OF JANUARY, 2017

HUK 10 LIMITED

Applicant

- and -

HMV CANADA INC.

Respondent

APPLICATION UNDER section 243(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended, and section 101 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, as amended

APPROVAL ORDER – AGENCY AGREEMENT

THIS MOTION made by HUK 10 LIMITED for an Order, inter alia, (i) approving the transaction contemplated under the agency agreement entered into between a contractual joint venture composed of Gordon Brothers Canada ULC and Merchant Retail Solutions ULC (together, the "**Agent**"), as agent, HMV Canada Inc. (the "**Debtor**" or the "**Merchant**"), and Richter Advisory Group Inc., solely in its capacity as Court-appointed receiver of the Company (in such capacity, "**Richter**"), provided Richter is so appointed by this Court, dated January 26, 2017 (the "**Agency Agreement**"), and for certain related relief, and (ii) the granting of the Agent's Charge (as defined below) was heard this day at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the affidavit of Chris Emmott sworn January 24, 2017, and the Exhibits thereto, the pre-filing report of Richter to be filed by Richter in its capacity as proposed Receiver (the "**Pre-Appointment Report**"), and on hearing the submissions of counsel for HUK 10, counsel for Richter, counsel for the Debtor, counsel for ~~the Agent~~ Primaris REIT, counsel for THE Cadillac Fairview Corporation Limited, counsel for 20 Vic Management Inc., Morguard Investments and Ivanhoe Cambridge II Inc., and those other parties listed on the counsel slip, no one appearing for any other person although duly served as appears from the affidavit of service of Donna McEvoy sworn January 25, 2017,

SERVICE AND DEFINITIONS

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service of the Notice of Application, the Application Record and the Pre-Appointment Report is hereby abridged and that this Application is properly returnable today and that service, including form, manner and time that such service was actually effected on all parties, is hereby validated, and where such service was not effected such service is hereby dispensed with.

2. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any capitalized term used and not defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed thereto in the Appointment Order in these proceedings dated January 27, 2016 (the "**Appointment Order**") and the Agency Agreement, including the schedules thereto, as applicable.

APPROVAL OF AGENCY AGREEMENT

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Agency Agreement, and the Sale Guidelines attached hereto as Schedule "A" (the "**Sale Guidelines**"), and the transactions contemplated therein and thereunder are hereby approved, authorized and ratified and that the execution of the Agency Agreement by each of the Debtor and Richter is hereby approved, authorized and ratified with such minor amendments to which the Debtor, Richter and the Agent may agree in writing. Subject to the provisions of this Order, the Debtor and Richter are hereby authorized and directed to comply with and perform the provisions of the Agency Agreement and take any and all actions as may be necessary or desirable to implement the Agency Agreement and each of the transactions contemplated therein. Without limiting the foregoing, the Debtor and Richter are authorized to execute, comply with and perform any other agreement, contract, deed or any other

document, or take any other action, which could be required or be useful to give full and complete effect to the Agency Agreement.

4. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that subject to the terms of the Agency Agreement, the Agent is authorized to conduct the Sale in accordance with this Order, the Agency Agreement and Sale Guidelines and to advertise and promote the Sale within the Closing Stores in accordance with the Sale Guidelines. If there is a conflict between this Order, the Agency Agreement and the Sale Guidelines, the order of priority of documents to resolve such conflict is as follows: (i) this Order, (ii) the Sale Guidelines, and (iii) the Agency Agreement.

5. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, the Agent, in its capacity as agent, is authorized to market and sell the Merchandise, Merchant Consignment Goods, any Additional Merchandise and Owned FF&E in accordance with the Sale Guidelines, free and clear of all liens, claims, encumbrances, security interests, mortgages, charges, trusts, deemed trusts, executions, levies, financial, monetary or other claims, whether or not such claims have attached or been perfected, registered or filed and whether secured, unsecured, quantified or unquantified, contingent or otherwise, whensoever and howsoever arising, and whether such claims arose or came into existence on or prior to the date this Order or came into existence following the date of this Order (in each case, whether contractual, statutory, arising by operation of law, in equity or otherwise) (all of the foregoing, collectively, "**Claims**"), including, without limitation, the Administration Charge and the Director's Charge, and any other charges hereafter granted by this Court in these proceedings, and all Claims, charges, security interests or liens evidenced by registration pursuant to the *Personal Property Security Act* (Ontario) or any other personal or removable property registration system (all such Claims, charges, security interests and liens collectively referred to herein as "**Encumbrances**"), which Encumbrances, subject to this Order and the Appointment Order, will attach instead to the Guaranteed Amount and other amounts received by Richter pursuant to the Agency Agreement, in the same order and priority as they existed against the sold assets on the Sale Commencement Date.

6. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that subject to the terms of this Order, the Appointment Order the Sale Guidelines and the Agency Agreement, the Agent shall have the right to enter and use the Closing Stores and all related store services and all facilities and all furniture, trade fixtures

and equipment, including the FF&E, located at the Closing Stores, and other assets of the Merchant as designated under the Agency Agreement, for the purpose of conducting the Sale and for such purposes, the Agent shall be entitled to the benefit of the Merchant's and Richter's stay of proceedings provided for under the Appointment Order, provided that any such stay of proceedings shall not be lifted or suspended without the written consent of the Agent or leave of this Court.

7. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that until the applicable Vacate Date for each Closing Store (which shall in no event be later than April 30, 2017), the Agent shall have access to the Closing Stores in accordance with the applicable leases and the Sale Guidelines on the basis that the Agent is an agent of the Merchant and Richter, as applicable, and the Merchant and Richter, as applicable, have granted the right of access to the Closing Stores to the Agent. To the extent that the terms of the applicable leases are in conflict with any term of this Order or the Sale Guidelines, the terms of this Order and the Sale Guidelines shall govern.

8. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that nothing in this Order shall amend or vary, or be deemed to amend or vary the terms of the leases for the Merchant's leased locations. Nothing contained in this Order or the Sale Guidelines shall be construed to create or impose upon the Merchant, Richter or the Agent any additional restrictions not contained in the applicable lease or other occupancy agreement.

9. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that except as provided for in paragraph 4 hereof in respect of the advertising and promotion of the Sale within the Closing Stores, subject to, and in accordance with this Order, the Agency Agreement and the Sale Guidelines, the Agent, as agent for the Merchant, is authorized to advertise and promote the Sale, without further consent of any Person other than the Merchant and Richter as provided under the Agency Agreement or a Landlord as provided under the Sale Guidelines.

10. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that until the Sale Termination Date, the Agent shall have the right to use, without interference by any intellectual property licensor the Merchant's trademarks and logos, as well as all licenses and rights granted to the Merchant to use the trade names, trademarks and logos of third parties, relating to and used in connection with the operation of the

Closing Stores solely for the purpose of advertising and conducting the Sale in accordance with the terms of the Agency Agreement, the Sale Guidelines, and this Order.

11. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that upon delivery of a Receiver's certificate to the Agent substantially in the form attached as Schedule "B" hereto (the "**Receiver's Certificate**") and subject to payment in full by the Agent to Richter of the unpaid portion, if any, of the Guaranteed Amount, Net FF&E Proceeds, any Merchant Sharing Recovery Amount, and all other amounts due to the Merchant and Richter under the Agency Agreement, all of the Merchant's right, title and interest in and to any Remaining Merchandise shall vest absolutely in the Agent, free and clear of and from any and all Claims, including without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the Encumbrances, and, for greater certainty, this Court orders that all of the Encumbrances affecting or relating to the Remaining Merchandise shall be expunged and discharged as against the Remaining Merchandise upon the delivery of the Receiver's Certificate to the Agent; provided however that nothing herein shall discharge the obligations of the Agent pursuant to the Agency Agreement, or the rights or claims of the Merchant or Richter in respect thereof, including without limitation, the obligations of the Agent to account for and remit the proceeds of sale of the Remaining Merchandise to the Merchant's Designated Deposit Accounts. The Agent shall comply with the Agency Agreement and the Sale Guidelines regarding the removal and/or sale of any FF&E.

12. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DIRECTS** Richter to file with the Court a copy of the Receiver's Certificate, forthwith after delivery thereof.

AGENT LIABILITY

13. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Agent shall act as an agent to the Merchant and Richter, as applicable, and that it shall not be liable for any claims against the Merchant other than as expressly provided in the Agency Agreement (including the Agent's indemnity obligations thereunder) or the Sale Guidelines. More specifically:

(a) the Agent shall not be deemed to be an owner or in possession, care, control or management of the Closing Stores, of the assets located therein or associated therewith or of the Merchant's employees (including the

Retained Employees) located at the Closing Stores or any other property of the Merchant;

(b) the Agent shall not be deemed to be an employer, or a joint or successor employer or a related or common employer or payor within the meaning of any legislation governing employment or labour standards or pension benefits or health and safety or other statute, regulation or rule of law or equity for any purpose whatsoever, and shall not incur any successorship liabilities whatsoever; and

(c) The Merchant shall bear all responsibility for any liability whatsoever (including without limitation losses, costs, damages, fines, or awards) relating to claims of customers, employees and any other persons arising from events occurring at the Closing Stores and at the Distribution Centers during and after the term of the Agency Agreement, or otherwise in connection with the Sale, except in accordance with the Agency Agreement.

14. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that to the extent the Landlords (or any of them) have claims against the Merchant arising solely out of the conduct of the Agent in conducting the Sale for which the Merchant has claims against the Agent under the Agency Agreement, the Merchant shall be deemed to assign free and clear such claims to the applicable Landlord (the "**Assigned Landlord Rights**").

AGENT AN UNAFFECTED CREDITOR

15. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Agency Agreement shall not be repudiated, resiliated or disclaimed by Richter, Merchant or any trustee in bankruptcy of Merchant. The claims of the Agent pursuant to the Agency Agreement and under the Agent's Charge shall be treated as unaffected and shall not be compromised or arranged pursuant to any plan of arrangement or compromise filed by or in respect of the Merchant under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)* ("**CCAA**") or any proposal filed by or in respect of the Merchant under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Canada) (the "**BIA**").

16. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Merchant and Richter are hereby authorized and directed, in accordance with the Agency Agreement, to remit and pay all amounts that become due to the Agent thereunder.

17. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that Richter shall hold the Escrow Amount (as defined in the Agency Agreement) in escrow, in a separate trust account, pending completion of the Final Reconciliation (as such term is defined in the Agency Agreement) in accordance with the terms of the Agency Agreement, which Escrow Amount shall be released in accordance with the agreed Final Reconciliation or, in the absence of agreement between the Agent and Richter, upon further Order of the Court made on notice to Richter and the Agent.

18. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that no Encumbrances shall attach to any amounts remitted or payable or to be credited or reimbursed to, or retained by, the Agent pursuant to the Agency Agreement, including, without limitation, the Proceeds thereunder or any amounts to be reimbursed by the Merchant or Richter to the Agent pursuant to the Agency Agreement, and Merchant or Richter will pay such amounts to the Agent within five (5) Business Days after the Agent's written request for such reimbursement, and at all times the Agent will retain such amounts, free and clear of all Encumbrances, notwithstanding any enforcement or other process or Claims, all in accordance with the Agency Agreement.

19. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that if the Merchant (a) fails to comply with any of its obligations under the Agency Agreement, this Order or the Sale Guidelines and, if curable, such failure is not cured within two business days of delivery of notice thereof by the Agent to the Merchant and Richter; or (b) the Merchant is prevented, by the making of an assignment in bankruptcy, the issuance of a bankruptcy order, by legislation or order of any court, or otherwise, from complying with any of its obligations under the Agency Agreement, this Order or the Sale Guidelines; then Richter shall and shall be deemed to have assumed the obligations of the Merchant under the Agency Agreement, this Order and the Sale Guidelines and be bound by the terms thereof, and shall take all steps necessary, including by exercise of all applicable Permissive Powers, to carry out and perform the obligations of the Merchant under the Agency Agreement, this Order and the Sale Guidelines.

DESIGNATED DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS

20. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that no Person, including BMO, shall take any action, including any collection or enforcement steps, with respect to amounts deposited into the Designated Deposit Accounts or the Post-Receivership Accounts, or the Sales Tax Account pursuant to the Agency Agreement, including any setoff, collection or enforcement steps, in relation to any Proceeds or FF&E Proceeds, that are payable to the Agent or in relation to which the Agent has a right of reimbursement or payment under the Agency Agreement.

21. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that amounts deposited in the Designated Deposit Accounts pursuant to the Agency Agreement including Proceeds and FF&E Proceeds shall be and be deemed to be held in trust for the Merchant and the Agent, as the case may be, and, for clarity, no Person shall have any claim, ownership interest or other entitlement in or against such amounts, including, without limitation, by reason of any claims, disputes, rights of offset, set-off, or claims for contribution or indemnity that it may have against or relating to the Merchant or Richter.

AGENT'S CHARGE AND SECURITY INTEREST

22. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that subject to the receipt by Richter of the Initial Guaranty Payment, the Agent be and is hereby granted a charge (the "**Agent's Charge**") on all of the Merchandise, Proceeds, the FF&E Proceeds and the Agent's share of the proceeds from the sale of Merchant Consignment Goods as security for all of the obligations of the Merchant and Richter to the Agent under the Agency Agreement, including, without limitation, all amounts owing or payable to the Agent from time to time under or in connection with the Agency Agreement, which charge shall rank in priority to all Encumbrances.

PRIORITY OF CHARGES

23. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the priorities of the Agent's Charge, the Administration Charge and the Directors' Charge, as among them, shall be as set out in the Appointment Order.

24. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that neither the Merchant nor Richter shall grant or suffer to exist any Encumbrances over any Merchandise, Proceeds, FF&E Proceeds and the Agent's share

of the proceeds from the sale of Merchant Consignment Goods that rank in priority to, or *pari passu* with the Agent's Charge.

25. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Agent's Charge shall constitute a mortgage, hypothec, security interest, assignment by way of security and charge over the Merchandise, Proceeds, FF&E Proceeds and the Agent's share of the proceeds from the sale of Merchant Consignment Goods and, if any, shall rank in priority to all other Encumbrances of or in favour of any Person.

26. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that notwithstanding (a) the pendency of these proceedings; (b) any application for a bankruptcy order now or hereafter issued pursuant to the BIA, in respect of the Merchant, or any bankruptcy order made pursuant to any such applications; (c) any assignment in bankruptcy made in respect of the Merchant; (d) the provisions of any federal or provincial statute; or (e) any negative covenants, prohibitions or other similar provisions with respect to borrowings, incurring debt or the creation of encumbrances, contained in any existing loan documents, lease, mortgage, security agreement, debenture, sublease, offer to lease or other document or agreement which binds the Merchant:

(a) the Agency Agreement and the transactions and actions provided for and contemplated therein, including without limitation, the payment of amounts due to the Agent thereunder and any transfer of Remaining Merchandise,

(b) the Agent's Charge, and

(c) Assigned Landlord Rights,

shall be binding on any trustee in bankruptcy that may be appointed in respect to the Merchant and shall not be void or voidable by any Person, including any creditor of the Merchant, nor shall they, or any of them, constitute or be deemed to be a preference, fraudulent conveyance, transfer at undervalue or other challengeable reviewable transaction, under the BIA or any applicable law, nor shall they constitute oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct under any applicable law.

BULK SALES ACT AND OTHER LEGISLATION

27. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the transactions contemplated under the Agency Agreement and any transfer of Remaining Merchandise shall be exempt from the application of *Bulk Sales Act* (Ontario) and any other equivalent federal or provincial legislation.

28. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, without limiting the provisions of the Appointment Order, the Merchant and Richter are authorized and permitted to transfer to the Agent personal information in each's custody and control, and Agent is permitted to use and disclose such personal information subject to and in accordance with the terms of the Agency Agreement.

GENERAL

29. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that Richter may from time to time apply to this Court for advice and directions in the discharge of its powers and duties hereunder.

30. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that this Order shall have full force and effect in all provinces and territories in Canada.

31. **THIS COURT HEREBY REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada, the United Kingdom or in the United States to give effect to this Order and to assist Richter, the Merchant and their agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Receiver, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order or to assist Richter and its agents in carrying out the terms of this Order.

32. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that Richter be at liberty and is hereby authorized and empowered to apply to any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body, wherever located, for the recognition of this Order and for assistance in carrying out the terms of this Order, and that Richter is authorized and empowered to act as a representative in respect of the within proceedings for the purpose of having these proceedings recognized in a jurisdiction outside Canada.

33. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any interested party may apply to this Court to vary or amend this Order on not less than seven (7) days' notice to Richter, the Merchant, and Agent and to any other party likely to be affected by the order sought or upon such other notice, if any, as this Court may order.

34. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that Confidential Appendices "1" and "2" to the Receiver's Pre-Appointment Report be sealed pending further Order of this Court.

ENTERED AT / INSCRIT À TORONTO
ON / BOOK NO:
LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO:

JAN 27 2017

PER / PAR:

SCHEDULE A
SALE GUIDELINES

The following procedures shall apply to the Sale to be conducted at the Closing Stores of HMV Canada Inc. (the "**Merchant**"). All terms not herein defined shall have the meaning set forth in the Agency Agreement, dated as of January 25, 2017, between Gordon Brothers Canada ULC and Merchant Retail Solutions ULC (together, the "**Agent**") the Merchant, and Richter Advisory Group Inc. solely in its capacity as Court-appointed receiver of the Company (in such capacity, "**Richter**") provided so appointed by the Court.

1. Except as otherwise expressly set out herein, and subject to: (i) the Approval Order or any further Order of the Court; (ii) any subsequent written agreement between the Merchant or Richter and the applicable landlord(s) (individually, a "**Landlord**" and, collectively, the "**Landlords**") and approved by the Agent; or (iii) as otherwise set forth herein, the Sale shall be conducted in accordance with the terms of the applicable leases/or other occupancy agreements to which the affected landlords are privy for each of the affected Closing Stores (individually, a "**Lease**" and, collectively, the "**Leases**"). However, nothing contained herein shall be construed to create or impose upon the Merchant or Richter or the Agent any additional restrictions not contained in the applicable Lease or other occupancy agreement.

2. The Sale shall be conducted so that each of the Closing Stores remain open during their normal hours of operation provided for in the respective Leases for the Closing Stores until the respective Vacate Date of each Closing Store. The Sale at the Closing Stores shall end by no later than April 30, 2017. Any Rent payable under the respective Leases shall be paid as provided in the Appointment Order.

3. The Sale shall be conducted in accordance with applicable federal, provincial and municipal laws and regulations, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

4. All display and hanging signs used by the Agent in connection with the Sale shall be professionally produced and all hanging signs shall be hung in a professional manner. The Agent may advertise the Sale at the Closing Stores as a "store closing", "everything on sale", "everything must go", or similar theme sale at the Closing Stores (provided however that no signs shall advertise the Sale as a "bankruptcy", a "going out of business" sale or a "liquidation" sale it being understood that the French equivalent of "clearance" is "liquidation" and is permitted to be used). Forthwith upon request from a Landlord, the Landlord's counsel, the Merchant or Richter, the Agent shall provide the proposed signage packages along with the proposed dimensions and number of signs (as approved by the Merchant pursuant to the Agency Agreement) by e-mail or facsimile to the applicable Landlords or to their counsel of record and the applicable Landlord shall notify the Agent and the Company of any requirement for such signage to otherwise comply with the terms of the Lease and/or the Sale Guidelines and where the provisions of the Lease conflicts with these Sale Guidelines, these Sale Guidelines shall govern. The Agent shall not use neon or day-glow or handwritten signage (unless otherwise contained in the sign package, including "you pay" or "topper" signs). In addition, the Agent shall be permitted to utilize exterior banners/signs at stand alone or strip mall Closing Stores or enclosed mall Closing Stores with a separate entrance from the exterior of the enclosed mall; provided, however, that where such banners are not permitted by the applicable Lease or the

Landlord requests in writing that the banner are not to be used, no banner shall be used absent further Order of the Court, which may be sought on an expedited basis on notice to the Landlord. Any banners used shall be located or hung so as to make clear that the Sale is being conducted only at the affected Closing Store and shall not be wider than the premises occupied by the affected Closing Store. All exterior banners shall be professionally hung and to the extent that there is any damage to the facade of the premises of a Closing Store as a result of the hanging or removal of the exterior banner, such damage shall be professionally repaired at the expense of the Agent. If a Landlord is concerned with "store closing" signs being placed in the front window of a Closing Store or with the number or size of the signs in the front window, the Agent and the Landlord will discuss the Landlord's concerns and work to resolve the dispute.

5. The Agent shall be permitted to utilize sign walkers and street signage; provided, however, such sign walkers and street signage shall not be located on the shopping centre or mall premises.

6. Conspicuous signs shall be posted in the cash register areas of each Closing Store to the effect that all sales are "final".

7. The Agent shall not distribute handbills, leaflets or other written materials to customers outside of any of the Closing Stores on any Landlord's property, unless permitted by the applicable Lease or, if distribution is customary in the shopping centre in which the Closing Store is located. Otherwise, the Agent may solicit customers in the Closing Stores themselves. The Agent shall not use any giant balloons, flashing lights or amplified sound to advertise the Sale or solicit customers, except as permitted under the applicable Lease, or agreed to by the Landlord.

8. At the conclusion of the Sale in each Closing Store, the Agent shall arrange that the premises for each Closing Store are in "broom-swept" and clean condition, and shall arrange that the Closing Stores are in the same condition as on the commencement of the Sale, ordinary wear and tear excepted, subject to the Agent's right to abandon FF&E in accordance with sections 7.2 15(a) of the Agency Agreement. No property of any Landlord of a Closing Store shall be removed or sold during the Sale. No permanent fixtures (other than the FF&E for clarity) may be removed without the Landlord's written consent unless otherwise provided by the applicable Lease. Subject to the foregoing, the Agent shall vacate the Closing Stores in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Agency Agreement. Any fixtures or personal property left in a Closed Store after it has been vacated by the Agent or in respect of which the applicable Lease has been repudiated by Richter shall be deemed abandoned, with the applicable Landlord having the right to dispose of the same as the Landlord chooses, without any liability whatsoever on the part of the Landlord.

9. Subject to the terms of paragraph 8 above, the Agent may sell Owned FF&E located in the Closing Stores during the Sale. The Merchant and the Agent may advertise the sale of Owned FF&E consistent with these guidelines on the understanding that any Landlord may require that such signs be placed in discreet locations within the Closing Stores acceptable to the Landlord, acting reasonably. Additionally, the purchasers of any Owned FF&E sold during the Sale shall only be permitted to remove the Owned FF&E either through the back shipping areas designated by the Landlord or through other areas after regular store business hours or through the front

door of the Store during Store business hours if the Owned FF&E can fit in a shopping bag, with Landlord's supervision as required by the Landlord. The Agent shall repair any damage to the Closing Stores resulting from the removal of any FF&E by the Agent or by third party purchasers of Owned FF&E from the Agent.

10. The Agent shall not make any alterations to interior or exterior Closing Store lighting, except as authorized pursuant to the applicable Lease. The hanging of exterior banners or other signage, where permitted in accordance with the terms of these guidelines, shall not constitute an alteration to a Closing Store.

11. The Agent hereby provides notice to the Landlords of the Agent's intention to sell and remove FF&E from the Closing Stores. The Agent will arrange with each Landlord represented by counsel on the service list or directed by the Landlord and with any other Landlord that so requests, a walk through with the Agent to identify the FF&E subject to the sale. The relevant Landlord shall be entitled to have a representative present in the Closing Store to observe such removal. If the Landlord disputes the Agent's entitlement to sell or remove any FF&E under the provisions of the Lease, such FF&E shall remain on the premises and shall be dealt with as agreed to between the Merchant, Richter, the Agent and such Landlord, or by further Order of the Court upon a motion by Richter on at least two (2) days' notice to such Landlord. If the Merchant or Richter has repudiated the Lease governing such Closing Store in accordance with the Appointment Order, it shall not be required to pay rent under such Lease pending resolution of any such dispute (other than rent payable for the notice period provided for in the Appointment Order), and the repudiation of the Lease shall be without prejudice to Richter's or the Merchant's or the Agent's claim to the FF&E in dispute.

12. If a notice of repudiation is delivered pursuant to the Appointment Order to a Landlord while the Sale is ongoing and the Closing Store in question has not yet been vacated, then: (a) during the notice period prior to the effective time of the repudiation, the landlord may show the affected leased premises to prospective tenants during normal business hours, on giving the Merchant, Richter and the Agent 24 hours' prior written notice; and (b) at the effective time of the repudiation, the relevant Landlord shall be entitled to take possession of any such Closing Store without waiver of or prejudice to any claims or rights such landlord may have against the Merchant in respect of such Lease or Closing Store, provided that nothing herein shall relieve such Landlord of its obligation to mitigate any damages claimed in connection therewith. Absent the Agent's consent, neither the Merchant nor Richter shall seek to repudiate any Lease of a Closing Store prior to the earlier of (i) the applicable Vacate Date for such Closing Store and (ii) April 30, 2017.

13. The Agent and its agents and representatives shall have the same access rights to the Closing Stores as the Merchant and Richter under the terms of the applicable Lease, and the Landlords shall have the rights of access to the Closing Stores during the Sale provided for in the applicable Lease (subject, for greater certainty, to any applicable stay of proceedings).

14. The Agent, the Merchant and, where appropriate, Richter, shall not conduct any auctions of Merchandise or FF&E at any of the Closing Stores.

CDN $500,000 at cost

15. The Agent shall be entitled to include in the Sale the Additional Merchandise, to the extent permitted under the Agency Agreement; provided that: (i) the Additional Merchandise will not exceed $6.5 million at cost in the aggregate; (ii) the Additional Merchandise will be distributed among the Closing Stores such that no Closing Store will receive more than ~~15%~~ of the Additional Merchandise; and (iii) the Additional Merchandise is of like kind and category and no lessor quality to the Merchandise, and consistent with any restriction on usage of the Closing Stores set out in the applicable Leases.

16. The Agent shall designate a party to be contacted by the Landlords should a dispute arise concerning the conduct of the Sale. The initial contact person for Agent shall be Dylan Chochla at Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP who may be reached by phone at 416.868.3425 or email at dchochla@fasken.com. If the parties are unable to resolve the dispute between themselves, the Landlord or Richter shall have the right to schedule a "status hearing" before the Court on no less than two (2) days written notice to the other party or parties, during which time the Agent shall cease all activity in dispute other than activity expressly permitted herein, pending the determination of the matter by the Court; provided, however, that if a banner has been hung in accordance with these Sale Guidelines and is thereafter the subject of a dispute, the Agent shall not be required to take any such banner down pending determination of the dispute.

17. Nothing herein is, or shall be deemed to be a consent by any Landlord to the sale, assignment or transfer of any Lease, or to grant to the Landlord any greater rights than already exist under the terms of any applicable Lease.

18. These Sale Guidelines may be amended by written agreement between the Merchant, Richter, the Agent and any applicable Landlord (provided that such amended Sale Guidelines shall not affect or bind any other Landlord not privy thereto without further Order of the Court approving the amended Sale Guidelines).

SCHEDULE B

FORM OF RECEIVER'S CERTIFICATE

Court File No. CV-17-11674-00CL

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

COMMERCIAL LIST

HUK 10 LIMITED

Applicant

- and -

HMV CANADA INC.

Respondent

APPLICATION UNDER section 243(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended, and section 101 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, as amended

RECEIVER'S CERTIFICATE

RECITALS

All undefined terms in this Receiver's Certificate have the meanings ascribed to them in the Agency Agreement entered into between a contractual joint venture composed of Gordon Brothers Canada ULC and Merchant Retail Solutions ULC (together, the "**Agent**"), as agent, and HMV Canada Inc. (the "**Merchant**"), and Richter Advisory Group Inc., solely in its capacity as Court-appointed receiver of the Company (in such capacity, "**Richter**") on January <*>, 2017, a copy of which is attached as Appendix <*> to the Pre-Appointment Report of Richter dated January <*>, 2017.

Pursuant to an Order of the Court dated January 27, 2017, the Court ordered that all of the Remaining Merchandise vest absolutely in the Agent, free and clear of and from any and all claims and encumbrances, upon the delivery by Richter to the Agent of a certificate certifying that (i) the Sale has ended, and (ii) the Guaranteed Amount, the Expenses, Net FF&E Proceeds, any Merchant Sharing Recovery Amount, and all other amounts due to the Merchant and Richter under the Agency Agreement have been paid in full to the Merchant.

RICHTER ADVISORY GROUP INC., in its capacity as Court-appointed Receiver in the BIA receivership proceedings of the Merchant certifies that it has been informed by the Agent and the Merchant that:

i. The Sale has ended.

ii. The Guaranteed Amount, Net FF&E Proceeds, any Merchant Sharing Recovery Amount, and all other amounts due to the Merchant and Richter under the Agency Agreement have been paid in full.

iii. The Remaining Merchandise includes the Merchandise listed on Appendix "A" hereto.

DATED as of this ____ day of _____, 2017.

RICHTER ADVISORY GROUP INC., in its capacity as Court-appointed Receiver of HMV Canada Inc. and not in its personal capacity

_____

_____

APPENDIX "A"

LIST OF REMAINING MERCHANDISE

Court File No. CV-17- 11674-00CL

HUK 10 LIMITED	- and -	HMV CANADA INC.
Applicant		Respondent

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED AT TORONTO

ORDER
(APPROVING AGENCY AGREEMENT)

WEIRFOULDS LLP
Barristers & Solicitors
TD Bank Tower
66 Wellington Street West
Toronto, Ontario M5K 1B7

EDMOND F.B. LAMEK – LSUC NO. 33338U
Tel: 41-947-5042
Fax: 416-365-1876
Email: elamek@weirfoulds.com

DANNY NUNES– LSUC NO. 53802D
Tel: 416-619-6293
Fax: 416-365-1876
Email: dnunes@weirfoulds.com

Lawyers for the Applicant,
HUK 10 Limited

AGENCY AGREEMENT

This Agency Agreement (the "**Agreement**") is made as of January 26, 2017, by and between a contractual joint venture composed of Gordon Brothers Canada ULC and Merchant Retail Solutions ULC (together, the "**Agent**"), as agent, and HMV Canada Inc. (the "**Company**" or the "**Merchant**"), and Richter Advisory Group, Inc., solely in its capacity as Court-appointed receiver of the Company (in such capacity, "**Richter**"), provided so appointed by the Court (as hereinafter defined).

RECITALS

WHEREAS HUK 10 Limited ("**HUK10**"), as a secured creditor of the Company, intends to apply to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the "**Court**") for **(i)** an order (the "**Appointment Order**") pursuant to section 243 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act,* RSC 1985, c B-3, as amended ("**BIA**"), and section 101 of *Courts of Justice Act*, RSO 1990, c C.43, as amended ("**CJA**") seeking, among other things, the appointment of Richter as receiver, without security, of the Company so that the Sale (as defined below) may commence on or about February 4, 2017, and **(ii)** the Approval Order (as hereinafter defined);

AND WHEREAS the Appointment Order will provide that the Company benefits from a stay of proceedings against the Company's business and property, as well as other protections in the proceedings under the BIA (the "**Receivership Proceedings**") in favour of both the Company and Richter;

AND WHEREAS on the date hereof, the Merchant operates 102 retail stores across Canada in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Prince Edward Island;

AND WHEREAS as part of the Receivership Proceedings, the Merchant wishes to engage the Agent as its exclusive agent for the limited purposes of (a) selling, by conducting a "store closing," "sale on everything," "everything must go," or other mutually agreed similarly themed sale (the "**Sale**"), all of the Merchandise (as hereinafter defined) from all of Merchant's retail store locations identified in **Exhibit 1A** annexed hereto (collectively, the "**Closing Stores**" and each a "**Closing Store**") and Merchant's distribution centres identified in **Exhibit 1B** annexed hereto (collectively, the "**Distribution Centres**"); and (b) subject to Section 15 hereof, disposing of the Merchant's owned furniture, trade fixtures and equipment (collectively, "**Owned FF&E**") located at the Closing Stores, Distribution Centres, and Merchant's corporate office, subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein;

AND WHEREAS the Agent is willing to serve as the Merchant's exclusive agent to conduct the Sale in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement and subject to the issuance of the Approval Order including the Sale Guidelines, both in form and substance satisfactory to the Agent, the Approval Order and the Sale Guidelines;

AND WHEREAS, if Richter exercises any of the powers given to it in the Appointment Order or any other Order of the Court that relates to the conduct of the Sale, the Agent is willing to serve as Richter's exclusive agent, to the extent necessary, to conduct the Sale in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement and, subject to the issuance of the Approval

Order including the Sale Guidelines, both in form and substance satisfactory to the Agent, the Approval Order and the Sale Guidelines;

AND WHEREAS each of the Agent, the Merchant and Richter agrees and acknowledges that the entering into of this Agreement by the Merchant and Richter is subject to the approval of the Court and that should the Appointment Order and the Approval Order (as hereinafter defined) not be issued by the Court, this Agreement shall have no force or effect.

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements set forth herein, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the Agent, the Merchant and Richter hereby agree as follows:

Section 1. Cash Management

1.1 Each of the parties hereto hereby acknowledges and agrees that, upon the issuance of the Appointment Order, Richter has been appointed by the Court pursuant to the terms of the Appointment Order to, among other things, monitor and administer the Merchant's cash and cash management systems. Any and all references herein relating to payments to be made by the Merchant under this Agreement or the receipt of any payments and/or deposits to be paid to the Merchant by the Agent or to which payment(s) the Merchant is entitled shall be made to or effected at the direction of and shall be under the control and supervision of Richter at all times, including, but not limited to, the payments described in Sections 3 and 4 below.

1.2 Richter shall take such reasonable steps, subject to compliance with its Court ordered duties and statutory obligations, as are necessary to facilitate the Merchant's need to fulfill its obligations under this Agreement and to allow the Merchant to carry on business in the ordinary course, as modified by and subject to the Appointment Order, the Approval Order, the Sale Guidelines, and this Agreement. The parties shall cooperate to effect the purpose, spirit, and the terms of this Agreement.

Section 2. Appointment of Agent

2.1 Appointment of Agent to Conduct Sale. Subject to approval of the Court, Merchant hereby appoints Agent, and Agent hereby agrees to serve, as Merchant's exclusive agent for the limited purpose of conducting the Sale in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement and upon issuance, the Approval Order and the Sale Guidelines. Neither Merchant, nor Richter, nor Agent shall be obligated to perform this Agreement and this Agreement shall not be effective unless, by 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) on February 2, 2017 or such later date as the parties may agree (the "**Outside Date**"), Merchant has obtained the Approval Order and the Approval Order shall not have been stayed, varied, or vacated nor shall an application to restrain or prohibit the completion of the Sale be pending.

2.2 Appointment of Agent to Administer Proceeds. Subject to approval by the Court, if Richter exercises any of the powers given to it in the Appointment Order or any other Order of the Court that relates to the conduct of the Sale, Richter hereby appoints Agent, and Agent hereby agrees to serve, as Richter's exclusive agent, to the extent necessary, to conduct the Sale in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement.

2.3 No Other Agreements. Except for incurring Expenses in connection with the Sale and as otherwise specifically provided in this Agreement, Agent shall have no authority to enter into any contract, agreement, or other arrangement or take any other action, by or on behalf of Merchant or Richter, that would have the effect of creating any obligation or liability, present or contingent, on behalf of or for the account of Merchant or Richter without Merchant's and Richter's prior written consent.

2.4 Additional Merchandise. [redacted] additional inventory of like nature, quality, and appropriate mix to include in the Sale ("**Additional Merchandise**") [redacted] provided that: (i) the Additional Merchandise will not exceed $[redacted] at cost in the aggregate, and (ii) the Additional Merchandise will be distributed among the Closing Stores such that no Closing Store will receive more than [redacted] of the Additional Merchandise. Additional Merchandise may be sold in accordance with and subject to the Sale Guidelines.

Section 3. Approval Order

3.1 Approval Order. Concurrent to the motion seeking the Appointment Order, HUK10 will bring a motion to obtain an order of the Court, in substantially the form attached hereto as **Exhibit 3.1** (the "**Approval Order**") authorizing the Merchant and Richter to enter into this Agreement and the Agent and Merchant to conduct the Sale in accordance with the terms hereof by no later than the Outside Date. The Approval Order shall be in form and substance satisfactory to the Merchant, Richter, and the Agent, acting reasonably, and shall provide, among other things, that:

(a) the terms of this Agreement, including the Sale Guidelines, and each of the transactions contemplated hereby, including the Sale, are approved;

(b) Merchant, Agent, and Richter shall be authorized to take any and all actions as may be necessary or desirable to implement this Agreement, administer and keep safe the Proceeds, and each of the transactions contemplated hereby;

(c) Agent shall be entitled to sell all Merchandise and, subject to Section 15, the Owned FF&E, free and clear of all security interests (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), hypothecs, mortgages, trusts or deemed trusts (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), liens, executions, levies, charges, or other financial or monetary claims, reservation of ownership or right of a third party of any nature or kind whatsoever including, without limitation, the charges and encumbrances in favour of HUK10, or any other lender, and the charges granted by the Court (collectively, "**Encumbrances**"), which Encumbrances will attach instead to the Guaranteed Amount and other amounts paid or to be paid to the Merchant under this Agreement in the same order and priority as they existed on the Sale Commencement Date;

(d) no Encumbrances shall attach to any amounts payable by Merchant to, or retained by Agent under this Agreement, or to any amounts that must be reimbursed by Merchant to Agent in the event that Agent over-funds any amounts due to Merchant, and Merchant will pay such amounts to Agent, and Agent will be entitled to receive and will retain such amounts, free and clear of any and all Encumbrances, notwithstanding any enforcement;

(e) Agent shall have the right to use the Closing Stores and all related store services, all furniture, trade fixtures and equipment, including the Owned FF&E (collectively, the "**FF&E**"), and other assets of Merchant as designated hereunder for the purpose of conducting the Sale, free of any interference from any entity or person, subject to the terms of this Agreement, the Appointment Order, the Approval Order and the Sale Guidelines approved by the Court;

(f) subject to compliance by Merchant and Agent with this Agreement, the Appointment Order, the Approval Order and the Sale Guidelines, all utilities, landlords, creditors, any successor or assignee of Merchant under any and all leases relating to the Closing Stores or Distribution Centres and all persons acting for or on their behalf shall not interfere with or otherwise impede the conduct of the Sale, or institute any action in any court or before any administrative body which in any way directly or indirectly interferes with or obstructs or impedes the conduct of the Sale;

(g) Agent, as agent for Merchant, is authorized to conduct, advertise, use A-frames and sign-walkers, post signs, and otherwise promote the Sale without further consent of any person in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the Approval Order, and the Sale Guidelines;

(h) a valid and perfected security interest and charge (the "**Agent's Charge**") is granted in favour of the Agent in all of the Merchandise, the Additional Merchandise, the Proceeds, the FF&E Proceeds and the Agent's share of the proceeds from the sale of Merchant Consignment Goods, (collectively, the "**Charged Property**") as security for all of the obligations of Merchant and Richter to Agent under this Agreement, including all amounts that are or may become owing or payable by Merchant to Agent under or in connection with this Agreement (the "**Merchant's Obligations**"). Upon issuance of the Approval Order and payment of the Initial Guaranteed Payment, the Agent's Charge shall be deemed properly perfected. For greater certainty, the Agent's Charge shall not extend to any property of Merchant other than the Charged Property. The Agent's Charge shall:

(i) be limited to the amount of the Merchant's Obligations;

(ii) from the time of payment of the Initial Guaranty Payment to Merchant pursuant to this Agreement, rank in first priority senior to all Encumbrances save except to the extent of any unpaid portion of the Guaranteed Amount, the Merchant's Share Recovery Amount, Net FF&E

Proceeds, and Merchant's share of the proceeds from the sale of Merchant Consignment Goods due to Merchant hereunder (the "**Unpaid Merchant's Entitlements**");

(iii) be valid and enforceable as against all of the Charged Property against all persons, including, without limitation, any trustee in bankruptcy, receiver, receiver and manager or interim receiver of Merchant including Richter for all purposes.

(i) Notwithstanding (i) the bankruptcy of Merchant; (ii) the provisions of any federal or provincial statutes; or (iii) any negative covenants, prohibitions or other similar provisions with respect to borrowings, incurring debt or the creation of Encumbrances contained in any existing loan document, lease, sublease or offer to lease or other agreement which binds Merchant or Richter or any agent of Merchant; and notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any such agreement, the entering into of this Agreement and any other ancillary or related documents or agreements and any steps or actions taken in relation hereto, including the vesting of any Remaining Merchandise at the Sale Termination Date in Agent's possession free of any Encumbrances pursuant to Section 4.2 hereof, and the granting of the Agent's Charge and all steps taken and registrations made in any jurisdiction in the sole discretion of Agent, do not and will not constitute fraudulent preferences, fraudulent conveyances, transfer at undervalue, conduct that is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interest of any person, settlements or other challengeable, voidable or reviewable transactions under any applicable law and shall be binding on any receiver and any trustee in bankruptcy that may be appointed in respect of Merchant and shall not be void or voidable by creditors of Merchant;

(j) the amounts deposited in Merchant's accounts in connection with this Agreement shall be held in trust in favour of the Merchant and Agent, and shall be distributed as set out in this Agreement; and

(k) the transaction contemplated in this Agreement is exempt from the *Bulk Sales Act* (Ontario).

Section 4. Guaranteed Amount and Other Payments.

4.1 Payments to Merchant and Agent.

(a) Concurrent with the execution of this Agreement, the Agent has delivered a deposit, payable to the order of Richter Advisory Group Inc. in its capacity as Court-appointed receiver of the Merchant, in trust, by certified cheque, bank draft, or wire transfer to the account specified by Richter, in the amount equal to [redacted] percent ([redacted]) of the Guaranteed Amount (as defined below) (the "**Deposit**"), to be held in a non-interest bearing account with a Canadian bank and otherwise to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. If this Agreement is terminated by the Merchant as a result of the Agent's default, the

Deposit shall be paid to the Merchant, without interest, as liquidated damages and not as a penalty. If this Agreement is terminated for any other reason, including if the Approval Order is not obtained by the Outside Date, the Deposit shall be promptly repaid by the Merchant or Richter to the Agent, without interest.

(b) As a guaranty of Agent's performance hereunder in respect of the Sale of the Merchandise, Agent guarantees that Merchant shall receive an amount equal to [redacted] percent ([redacted]%) (the "**Guaranty Percentage**") of the aggregate Cost Value of the Merchandise included in the Sale (the "**Guaranteed Amount**"). The Guaranteed Amount will be calculated based upon the aggregate Cost Value of the Merchandise as determined by (i) the aggregate Cost Value of the Merchandise subject to Gross Rings (as calculated below); and (ii) any other adjustments to Cost Value as expressly contemplated by this Agreement. As required and from time to time, any reference to "Guaranteed Amount" shall mean the amount as calculated and modified from time to time in accordance with this Section. As to other adjustments, their calculation and nature is reflected in Section 6 hereof.

(c) Merchandise received at the Closing Stores after the 10th day following the Sale Commencement Date, but prior to the Receipt Deadline shall be included in the Sale as Merchandise and valued independently at the Cost Value and Retail Price of each good multiplied by the inverse of the prevailing Sale discount for each such good at the time of receipt at the Closing Store. For greater clarity, by way of example, if Merchandise is received on the fifteenth (15th) day after the Sale Commencement Date and the prevailing discount on that date is equal to [redacted]%, the Cost Value and Retail Price of the Merchandise will be multiplied by [redacted]%.

(d) To the extent that Proceeds exceed the sum of (i) the Guaranteed Amount, (ii) the Expenses and (iii) [redacted] percent ([redacted]%) of the sum of the aggregate Cost Value of the Merchandise sold within the Sale (the "**Agent's Fee**") (collectively, the "**Sharing Threshold**"), then all remaining Proceeds of such Sale shall be shared [redacted] percent [redacted] to Merchant (the "**Merchant's Sharing Recovery Amount**") and [redacted] percent [redacted] to Agent (the "**Agent's Sharing Recovery Amount**"). To the extent that Merchant is entitled to receive any Merchant's Sharing Recovery Amount from the Proceeds, Agent shall pay the Merchant's Sharing Recovery Amount in accordance with Section 4.3(d) hereof.

(e) Agent shall also be entitled to receive a commission on the FF&E Proceeds, if any, as provided for in Section 15 hereof.

(f) Agent shall pay to Merchant the Guaranteed Amount, the Merchant's Sharing Recovery Amount, if any, the Net FF&E Proceeds in the manner and at the times specified in Section 4.3 below.

(g) Subject to Section 4.3(e) below, if and to the extent that Agent or Merchant over-funds any amounts due to the other hereunder, then Merchant or Agent, as applicable, agrees to promptly reimburse (by no later than the next weekly

reconciliation contemplated by Section 4.6) such over-payment amounts to Agent or Merchant, as applicable, to the extent such amount is not disputed by the other. If such over-payment amount is disputed by Merchant or Agent, then Merchant or Agent, as applicable, shall reimburse such over-payment amount to the other, if any, no later than five (5) days following the date on which such dispute is resolved pursuant to this Agreement.

(h) Subject to Section 4.3 below, to ensure accurate sales audit functions, as well as accurate calculations of the Merchant's Sharing Recovery Amount, Agent shall be required to utilize Merchant's existing point-of-sale system for recording all sales of Merchandise in the Closing Stores.

(i) The Guaranty Percentage has been established based upon the assumption that aggregate Cost Value of the Merchandise included in the Sale is not less than [redacted] dollars [redacted] (the "**Merchandise Threshold**") and is not more than [redacted] dollars ($[redacted]) (the "**Merchandise Ceiling**"). To the extent that the aggregate Cost Value of the Merchandise included in the Sale is less than the Merchandise Threshold, or higher than the Merchandise Ceiling, the Guarantee Percentage shall be adjusted, on a *pro rata* basis, in accordance with **Exhibit 4.1(i)** hereto, as and where applicable.

(j) The Guaranty Percentage has also been established based upon the assumption that the aggregate Cost Value-to-Retail Price relationship of the Merchandise (aggregate Cost Value divided by aggregate Retail Price) (the "**Cost Factor**") shall not be greater than [redacted] percent [redacted] (the "**Cost Factor Threshold**"). If the Cost Factor is greater than the Cost Factor Threshold, the Guaranty Percentage shall be adjusted downward in accordance with **Exhibit 4.1(j)** attached hereto. For the purposes of this Agreement, "**Retail Price**" means the lower of (i) lowest ticketed, marked, shelf, hang-tag, stickered, hard-marked, multi-unit purchase discount, or "buy one get one" type price, (ii) current retail or aged price as reflected in the Cost Files, or (iii) other file price reflected in Merchant's books and records for such item of Merchandise; provided, however, that the Retail Price shall not be adjusted for Excluded Price Adjustments. For purposes of calculating Retail Price, if an item of Merchandise of the same SKU has more than one ticketed price, marked price, shelf price, hang-tag price, stickered price, or other hard-marked price, or if multiple items of the same SKU have different ticketed prices, marked prices, shelf prices, hang-tag prices, stickered prices, or other hard-marked price, the lowest ticketed, marked, shelf, hang-tag, stickered, or other hard-marked price on any such item shall prevail for such item or for all such items within the same SKU, as the case may be, that are located within the same location (as the case may be, the "**Lowest Location Price**"), unless it is reasonably determined by Merchant and Agent that the applicable Lowest Location Price was mismarked or such item was priced because it was damaged or marked as "as is," in which case the higher price shall control; provided, however, in determining the Lowest Location Price with respect to any item of Merchandise at a Store, the Lowest Location Price shall be determined based upon the lowest ticketed, marked, shelf, hang-tag, stickered,

hard-marked, multi-unit purchase discounts, "buy one get one" type discounts or PLU price for such item on a per Store basis. No adjustment to Retail Price shall be made with respect to different ticketed price, marked price, shelf, hang-tag, stickered, hard-marked, multi-unit purchase discounts, "buy one get one" type discounts or PLU prices for items located in different Closing Stores. For purposes of this Agreement, the Cost Factor shall be calculated by dividing the aggregate Cost Value of the Merchandise by the aggregate Retail Price of the Merchandise.

(k) The adjustments to the Guaranty Percentage contemplated by **Exhibit 4.1(i)** and **Exhibit 4.1(j)** shall be independent and cumulative.

(l) On the Sale Commencement Date, or as soon as practically possible, Agent and Merchant shall confirm the amount of cash in the registers at the Closing Stores as of the Sale Commencement Date ("**Cash in Registers**"). An actual count of such cash shall be conducted by Agent and Merchant at the start of the Sale Commencement Date prior to any transactions. The Cash in Registers shall be made available for use by Agent during the Sale and the Agent shall pay the Merchant an amount equal to the Cash in Registers on the Final Reconciliation.

4.2 Remaining Merchandise. Provided that no Event of Default has occurred and continues to exist on the part of Agent, and after all payments are made to Merchant as required hereunder, all Merchandise remaining, if any, at the Sale Termination Date (the "**Remaining Merchandise**") shall become the property of Agent free and clear of all Encumbrances, provided, however, that all proceeds received by Agent from the disposition shall nevertheless constitute Proceeds for the purposes of this Agreement. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Agent shall use commercially reasonable efforts and act in good faith to dispose of all of the Merchandise during the Sale Term.

4.3 Time of Payments.

(a) Payment of Guaranteed Amount. On or before the next Business Day following the date the Approval Order is issued by the Court (the "**Payment Date**"), Agent shall pay to an account designated by Merchant and approved by Richter an amount equal to [redacted] percent [redacted] of the estimated Guaranteed Amount (the "**Initial Guaranty Payment**") calculated based upon the estimated Cost Value of the Merchandise in the Closing Stores and the Distribution Centres on the Sale Commencement Date (based upon Merchant's books and records maintained in the ordinary course as of the date immediately preceding the Payment Date), less the Deposit (which Deposit shall be credited against the Initial Guaranty Payment on the Payment Date). Such payment shall be made to Merchant by wire transfer to an account designated by Merchant and approved by Richter. From the funds paid on account of the Initial Guaranty Payment, an amount equal to [redacted] percent [redacted] of the estimated Guaranteed Amount (the "**Escrow Amount**") shall be held by Richter, in escrow, in a separate trust account, pending completion of the Final Reconciliation provided for in Section 4.6(b) below, which Escrow Amount shall be released in accordance with the

agreed Final Reconciliation or, in the absence of agreement between the Agent and Richter, upon further Order of the Court made on notice to Richter and the Agent.

(b) Payment of Balance of Guaranteed Amount. The balance of the Guaranteed Amount, if any, shall be paid by Agent to Merchant by wire transfer to the account designated by Merchant and approved by Richter upon completion of the Final Reconciliation provided for in Section 4.6(b) below. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if and when [redacted] percent ([redacted]) of the estimated Cost Value of the Merchandise has been rung through using Gross Rings (the "**Funding Threshold**"), Agent will then, beginning with the next subsequent weekly reconciliation under Section 4.6(a), remit to Merchant an amount equal to [redacted] percent [redacted] of the Cost Value of Merchandise sold during in that week in excess of the Funding Threshold. For the purposes of this Agreement, "**Business Day**" means any day excluding a Saturday, Sunday or statutory holiday in the Province of Ontario.

(c) Payments in respect of Merchant's Sharing Recovery Amount and Net FF&E Proceeds. Agent shall pay to Merchant, following approval by Richter, all amounts on account of the Merchant's Sharing Recovery Amount, if any, as part of the Final Reconciliation pursuant to Section 4.6(b), and the Agent shall pay to Merchant, following approval by Richter, all amounts owed to the Merchant on account of the Net FF&E Proceeds, if any, as part of the weekly reconciliation conducted pursuant to Section 4.6(a).

(d) Payments to Agent. Subject to payment of the Guaranteed Amount, Expenses, Merchant's Sharing Recovery Amount, if any, and all other amounts payable to Merchant from Proceeds hereunder, Agent shall retain from Proceeds, as its compensation for services rendered to Merchant hereunder, the Agent's Fee, plus Agent's Sharing Recovery Amount, if any. Agent shall also be entitled to receive the FF&E Commission. Agent shall be entitled to receive, and retain from the Proceeds, any applicable sales, excise, consumption or use, or similar taxes or any other government charges (other than taxes on income), including GST and QST, ("**Sales Taxes**") payable by Merchant on any compensation or fees for services received by Agent under this Agreement, including the Agent's Fee, the Agent's Sharing Recovery Amount and the FF&E Commission. Such Sales Taxes shall be payable by the Merchant to the Agent in addition to the compensation received by the Agent. "**GST**" means any goods and services or harmonized sales tax imposed under Part IX of the *Excise Tax Act* (Canada). "**QST**" means any Quebec sales tax imposed under Title I of an *Act respecting the Quebec Sales Tax* (Quebec).

(e) Over-Funding by Agent. In the event that Agent funds or pays all or any portion of the Merchant's obligations under this Agreement, and such funding or payment cannot be recovered by the Agent under Section 4.3(g) as an offset or otherwise, and as a result of such funding or payment, the Merchant received more value than the Merchant would have otherwise received under this Agreement had Agent not funded or paid such obligations, Merchant, subject to the approval of

Richter, (or Richter, if applicable) shall pay all such funded or paid amounts to Agent within five (5) Business Days of Agent's request. If and to the extent Agent over-funds any amounts in respect of the Guaranteed Amount hereunder, and such over-funding cannot be recovered by the Agent from Merchant under Section 4.3(g) as an offset or otherwise, then Merchant, subject to the approval of Richter, (and Richter, if applicable) agree to reimburse any undisputed portion of such overfunded amount in respect of the Guaranteed Amount to Agent within five (5) Business Days of written demand thereof by Agent. In the event Agent and Merchant cannot agree within five (5) Business Days of Agent's request as to the amount to be reimbursed or the party from whom such reimbursement is required to be made, Agent shall be entitled to file a motion with the Court seeking payment of the undisputed portion of the reimbursable amount hereunder, and Merchant (or Richter if applicable) agree that they shall be bound by the final determination of the Court as to such matter.

(f) Timing of Wire Transfer Payments. All amounts required to be paid by Agent or Merchant under any provision of this Agreement shall be made by wire transfer of immediately available funds which shall be wired by Agent or Merchant, as applicable, subject to approval by Richter, no later than 2:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) on the date that such payment is due; provided, however, that all of the information necessary to complete the wire transfer has been received by Agent or Merchant, as applicable, by 11:00 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the date that such payment is due. In the event that the date on which any such payment is due is not a Business Day, then such payment shall be made by wire transfer on the next Business Day.

(g) Set-Off. Merchant agrees that if at any time during the Sale Term, Agent holds any amounts due to Merchant hereunder, notwithstanding the provisions of any Order of the Court, Agent, may in its discretion, offset such amounts being held by Agent against any undisputed amounts due and owing by, or required to be paid by Merchant under this Agreement. Merchant may, in its discretion, offset any amounts held by Merchant against any undisputed amounts due and owing by, or required to be paid by Agent under this Agreement. Any such setoffs shall be reconciled and accounted for as part of the weekly reconciliation.

4.4 [Reserved].

4.5 Gross Rings. For the period from the Sale Commencement Date until the Vacate Date for each Closing Store (the "**Gross Rings Period**"), Merchant and Agent shall jointly keep (a) a strict count of all gross cash register receipts less applicable Sales Taxes but excluding any prevailing discounts ("**Gross Rings**") and (b) cash reports of sales at the Closing Stores. Register receipts shall show for each item sold the actual Cost Value and Retail Price for such item and the markdown or discount, if any, specifically granted by Agent in connection with such Sale. Agent shall pay that portion of the Guaranteed Amount calculated on the Gross Rings basis, to account for shrinkage, on the basis of [redacted]% of the aggregate Cost Value of the Merchandise sold during the Gross Rings Period. All such records and reports shall be made available to Merchant and Agent and Richter during regular business hours upon reasonable

notice. Any Merchandise included in the Sale using the Gross Rings shall be included in Merchandise.

4.6 Reconciliation.

(a) Weekly Reconciliation. On each Thursday during the Sale Term, commencing on the second Thursday after the Sale Commencement Date, Merchant, Agent, and Richter shall cooperate to jointly prepare a reconciliation of the weekly Proceeds of the Sale, Expenses and Net FF&E Proceeds and any other Sale related items that either party may reasonably request, in each case for the prior week or partial week (i.e. Sunday through Saturday), all pursuant to procedures agreed upon by Merchant, Agent, and Richter.

(b) Final Reconciliation. Within thirty (30) days after the Sale Termination Date, Merchant and Agent shall jointly prepare a final reconciliation of the Sale for review and approval by Richter, including, without limitation, a summary of Proceeds, Expenses, Net FF&E Proceeds, Sales Taxes and any other accounting required hereunder (the "**Final Reconciliation**"). Within five (5) days of completion of the Final Reconciliation and Richter's review and approval of the Final Reconciliation, Agent shall pay to Merchant, or Merchant or Richter shall pay to Agent, as the case may be, any and all undisputed amounts due to the other pursuant to the Final Reconciliation. Merchant, Richter or Agent, as the case may be, shall hold any disputed amounts in trust pending resolution of the dispute by agreement of the parties or as determined in the manner set out in Section 4.6(c) below. During the Sale Term, and until all of Merchant's, Richter's and Agent's obligations under this Agreement have been indefeasibly satisfied in full, Merchant, Agent, and Richter shall have reasonable access to Merchant's and Agent's records with respect to the Merchandise, Proceeds, Net FF&E Proceeds, Sales Taxes, and Expenses to review and audit such records relating to the Sale.

(c) Dispute Resolution. In the event that there is any dispute with respect to the Final Reconciliation or the determination of the aggregate Cost Value of the Merchandise or with respect to any other matters arising from or related to this Agreement, such dispute shall be promptly (and in no event later than the third Business Day following the request by either Merchant, Agent, or Richter) submitted to the Court for resolution.

4.7 Control of Proceeds. All Proceeds shall be controlled by Agent in the manner provided for below.

(a) Agent may (but shall not be required to) establish its own accounts (including without limitation credit card accounts and systems), dedicated solely for the deposit of the Proceeds and the disbursement of amounts payable to Agent hereunder (the "**Agency Accounts**"), and Merchant shall promptly, upon Agent's reasonable request, execute and deliver all necessary documents to open and maintain the Agency Accounts; provided, however, Agent shall have the right, in its sole and absolute discretion, to continue to use Merchant's Designated Deposit

Accounts (as defined below) as the Agency Accounts in which case Merchant's Designated Deposit Accounts shall be deemed to be Agency Accounts. Subject to Agent's compliance with all representations, warranties and covenants herein, Agent shall exercise sole signatory authority and control with respect to the Agency Accounts. The Agency Accounts shall be dedicated solely to the deposit of Proceeds and other amounts contemplated by this Agreement and the distribution of amounts payable hereunder; provided that, in the event (a) Agent elects to continue to use Merchant's Designated Deposit Accounts (defined below) as the Agency Accounts, and (b) such accounts have amounts deposited therein by Merchant that do not constitute proceeds and/or other amounts contemplated by this Agreement, then Merchant and Agent shall cooperate with each other to establish and implement appropriate steps and procedures to accomplish a daily reconciliation, and remittance to Merchant and Agent, as their interests may appear, of any Proceeds (including credit card Proceeds), and other amounts contemplated by this Agreement. Upon request, Agent shall deliver to Merchant and/or Richter copies of all bank statements and other information relating to such accounts. Neither the Merchant nor Richter shall be responsible for, and Agent shall pay as an Expense hereunder, all bank fees and charges, including wire transfer charges, related to the Sale and the Agency Accounts, whether received during or after the Sale Term. Upon Agent's notice to Merchant and Richter of Agent's designation of the Agency Accounts (other than Merchant's Designated Deposit Accounts), all Proceeds of the Sale (including credit card Proceeds) shall be deposited into the Agency Accounts, subject to the review and approval by Richter. For clarity, Richter shall not be responsible for any Expense, fees, or costs hereunder and all Expense, fees, and costs hereunder shall be born by Merchant and Agent, as applicable.

(b) Agent shall have the right to use Merchant's credit card facilities, including Merchant's credit card terminals and processor(s), credit card processor coding, Merchant's identification number(s) and existing bank accounts for credit card transactions relating solely to the Sale. In the event that Agent elects to use Merchant 's credit card facilities, Merchant shall process credit card transactions on behalf of Agent and for Agent's account, applying customary practices and procedures. Without limiting the foregoing, Merchant shall cooperate with Agent to download data from all credit card terminals each day during the Sale Tern to effect settlement with Merchant's credit card processor(s), and shall take such other actions necessary to process credit card transactions on behalf of Agent under Merchant's identification number(s). At Agent's request, Merchant shall cooperate with Agent to establish Merchant's identification numbers under Agent's name to enable Agent to process all such credit card Proceeds for Agent's account. Neither Merchant nor Richter shall be responsible for, and Agent shall pay as an Expense hereunder, all credit card fees, charges, and chargebacks related to the Sale, whether received during or after the Sale Term. Agent shall not be responsible for, as an Expense or otherwise, any credit card fees, charges, or chargebacks that do not relate to the Sale, whether received prior to, during or after the Sale Term.

(c) Unless and until Agent establishes its own Agency Accounts (other than Merchant's Designated Deposit Accounts), all Proceeds and other amounts contemplated by this Agreement (including credit card Proceeds), shall be collected by Merchant and deposited on a daily basis into depository accounts designated by, and owned and in the name of, Merchant for the Closing Stores, which accounts shall be designated solely for the deposit of Proceeds and other amounts contemplated by this Agreement (including credit card Proceeds), and the disbursement of amounts payable to or by Agent hereunder (the "**Designated Deposit Accounts**"). Merchant hereby grants to Agent a first priority Charge solely upon such amounts that constitute Proceeds (or other amounts contemplated hereunder) deposited in each Designated Deposit Account from and after the Sale Commencement Date. If, notwithstanding the provisions of this section, Merchant or Richter receives or otherwise has dominion over or control of any Proceeds or other amounts due to Agent, Merchant or Richter shall be deemed to hold such Proceeds and other amounts due to Agent "in trust" for Agent and shall not commingle Proceeds or other amounts due to Agent with any of Merchant's other funds or deposit such Proceeds or other amounts in any account except a Designated Deposit Account or as otherwise instructed by Agent.

(d) On each business day, Merchant shall promptly pay to Agent by wire funds transfer all funds in the Designated Deposit Accounts (including, without limitation, Proceeds, Proceeds from credit card sales, and all other amounts) deposited into the Designated Deposit Accounts for the prior day(s) without any offset or netting of Expenses or other amounts that may be due to Merchant. Agent shall have ten (10) calendar days after the date of each such payment by Merchant to notify Merchant and Richter of any shortfall in such payment, in which case, Merchant or Richter shall promptly pay to Agent funds in the amount of such shortfall.

(e) From Gross Sale Proceeds, Merchant shall establish a holdback in an amount equal to the Sales Taxes applicable to such Gross Sale Proceeds (the "**Sales Tax Holdback**") and shall deposit such holdback into a segregated account designated by Merchant and Agent solely for the purpose thereof (the "**Sales Tax Account**"). Sales Taxes are to be remitted from the Sales Tax Holdback in the Sales Tax Account by Merchant pursuant to Section 9.3 hereof, as part of the weekly reconciliation conducted by the Parties pursuant to Section 4.6(a) hereof. Subject to the terms of this Agreement, if the Sales Tax Holdback exceeds the Sales Taxes that should have been charged and collected on the Sale, any surplus funds are to be released to the Agent from the Sales Tax Holdback.

Section 5. Payment of Expenses

5.1 Expenses. Agent shall be unconditionally responsible for the payment of all Expenses out of Proceeds (or from Agent's own accounts if and to the extent there are insufficient Proceeds) incurred in conducting the Sale during the Sale Term and such Expenses shall not reduce the Guaranteed Amount. As used herein, "**Expenses**" shall mean all Closing Store level operating

expenses of the Sale that arise or are incurred during the Sale Term (and in the case of the Expenses set forth in Sections 5.1(f), 5.1(q), 5.1(r), and 5.1(t) below, such expenses also include expenses incurred prior to or in connection with the Sale and are not confined to Closing Store level operating expenses of the Sale and in connection with Section 5.1(v) are not confined to Closing Store level operating expenses of the Sale) limited to the following (without duplication):

(a) occupancy expenses for the Closing Stores on a per location, per category, and *per diem* basis through the Vacate Date (as defined in Section 6.2 hereof) in an amount up to the respective per diem totals by Closing Store set forth on **Exhibit 5.1(a)** hereto (the "**Occupancy Expenses**");

(b) remittances by Agent to Merchant of an amount equal to the Base Payroll for all Retained Employees used in conducting the Sale for actual days/hours worked during the Sale Term;

(c) remittances by Agent to Merchant of any actual amounts paid by Merchant for benefits that accrue solely during and are referable to the Sale Term for Retained Employees used in the Sale (including, but not limited to, Canadian pension plan and Quebec pension plan payments, employment insurance premiums, employer health tax, health services fund payments, workers' compensation benefits and health care and insurance benefits, vacation pay accruing during the Sale Term (but not in arrears) and statutory holiday pay) but excluding Excluded Benefits, in an amount not to exceed [redacted] percent [redacted] of the Base Payroll for each Retained Employee in the Closing Stores (the "**Benefits Cap**");

(d) remittances by Agent to Merchant of any amounts payable by Merchant under an Agent approved employee incentive plan to eligible Retained Employees in an amount not to exceed [redacted] percent [redacted] of the Base Payroll for each Retained Employee in the Closing Stores; as provided in Section 10.4 below;

(e) all costs associated with Agent's on-site supervision of the Sale by Agent's employees or independent contractors and associated reasonable corporate travel costs (based on economy fares and reasonable hotels), third party payroll costs, and reasonable and customary deferred compensation;

(f) all costs of signage and banners (interior and exterior) and in-store signs which are produced for the Sale, in compliance with the Sale Guidelines;

(g) out-of-pocket promotional costs incurred by Agent pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, including, without limitation, use of Agent's social media and Agent's website, sign walkers, advertising and direct mailings relating to the Sale;

(h) cost of additional supplies used at the Closing Stores as may be required by Agent in the conduct of the Sale (excluding those supplies located at the Closing Stores on the Sale Commencement Date which may be used by Agent at no charge);

(i) credit card and bank card fees, bank charges, chargebacks and discounts with respect to Merchandise sold in the Sale;

(j) costs of processing moving, transferring or consolidating Merchandise between and among the Closing Stores and any and all costs, including delivery and freight costs, related to the processing, transfer and consolidation of Merchandise between and among such Closing Stores;

(k) bank service charges (for Closing Store and Merchant corporate accounts), cheque guarantee fees, and bad cheque expenses, to the extent attributable to the Sale;

(l) all Agent fees and charges required to comply with applicable laws in connection with the Sale;

(m) Closing Stores' cash theft and other cash shortfalls in the cash registers;

(n) postage, courier and overnight mail charges to and from or among the Closing Stores and head office (to the extent relating to the Sale);

(o) [Reserved];

(p) Third Party payroll processing fees;

(q) Agent's actual cost of capital, including Letter of Credit fees;

(r) Agent's reasonable out-of-pocket costs and expenses including but not limited to, reasonable legal fees and expenses incurred in connection with the review of data, preparation, negotiation and execution of this Agreement and any ancillary documents, and in connection with the Sale in an amount not to exceed $[redacted] unless otherwise agreed to by the Merchant and approved by Richter;

(s) pursuant to Section 10.1 hereof, which Agent in its discretion considers appropriate, and other miscellaneous Closing Store-level expenses incurred by Agent as approved by Merchant;

(t) actual cost of Agent's insurance reasonably allocable to this Agreement and the transactions contemplated hereby required under Section 13.3 hereof;

(u) the actual cost and expenses of providing such additional services which Agent deems appropriate for the Sale; and

(v) Central Services Expenses in an amount equal to $[redacted] per week for each week during the Sale, which amount shall be paid weekly to Merchant.

For those Expenses set out in 5.1(e), 5.1(f) and 5.1(g) Agent shall provide Merchant with a good faith estimate of such Expenses and the parties acknowledge and agree that (a) the Agent has full decision making authority with respect to such Expenses and (b) that such

estimates may not be representative of the final amounts of such Expenses and may be subject to change.

"**Expenses**" shall not include: (i) Excluded Benefits; (ii) any rent or other occupancy expenses other than Occupancy Expenses in accordance with Section 5.1(a) hereof; (iii) Central Services Expenses (except as provided in Section 5.1); (iv) any expenses associated with any of the Distribution Centres; (v) any fees or expenses owed to or incurred by Richter; or (v) any costs, expenses or liabilities arising during the Sale Term in connection with the Sale of Merchandise, other than the Expenses listed above, all of which shall be paid by Agent or Merchant, as applicable, promptly when due during the Sale Term. For certainty, royalties under licenses shall be the responsibility of and paid by Merchant and shall not constitute an Expense payable by Agent. Additionally, in the case of Expenses incurred by the Merchant, the Merchant shall only recover such Expenses net of applicable Sales Taxes.

Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, to the extent that any Expense listed in Section 5.1 is also included on **Exhibit 5.1(a)**, then **Exhibit 5.1(a)** shall control and such Expense shall not be double counted.

5.2 Certain Definitions.

As used in this Article 4 and this Agreement, the following terms have the following respective meanings:

"**Base Payroll**" means base hourly payroll, overtime and commissions and bonuses under the Agent approved employee incentive plan, but excluding bonuses, vacation pay and statutory holiday pay payable under Merchant's compensation policy in effect as at the Sale Commencement Date.

"**Central Services Expenses**" means costs and expenses for Merchant's central administrative services for the Sale including, but not limited to (a) Merchant's POS and inventory control systems, including inventory handling, data processing and reporting, and store level information; (b) payroll system and processing and human resources; (c) accounting systems, MIS services, asset protection services, operations, cash and inventory reconciliations; (d) Merchant's social media and Merchant's website, including updates and maintenance and email preparation and distribution (e) allocation systems for Merchandise.

"**Excluded Benefits**" means vacation days or vacation pay, sick days or sick leave, maternity leave benefits, disability benefits or other leaves of absence, termination or severance pay (including, without limitation, any notice or pay, in lieu of notice in accordance with provincial employment/labour standards, common law, or contract) and similar amounts, and all benefits in excess of the Benefits Cap provided for in Section 5.1(c) above. Excluded Benefits also means and includes any amounts payable for pension, profit sharing, bonus or other retirement, benefit or incentive plans other than those expressly described in Section 5.1(c) above.

"**Third Party**" means, with reference to any Expenses to be paid to a "third party", a party that is not affiliated with or related to Merchant.

All Expenses incurred during each week (i.e., Sunday through Saturday) of the Sale Term shall be paid by Agent to or on behalf of Merchant, or paid by Merchant or Richter and thereafter reimbursed by Agent as provided for herein, as set out in Section 5.1, immediately following the weekly reconciliation by Merchant and Agent pursuant to Section 4.6(a) above, based upon invoices and other documentation satisfactory to Agent, acting reasonably; provided, however, Agent shall be obligated to pre-fund Occupancy Expenses for the month of February 2017 and payroll-related expenses consistent with Merchant's customary payroll funding practices and timing. Merchant shall reimburse Agent in accordance with Section 4.1(g) any over-advance in respect of Occupancy Expenses for any Occupancy Expenses pre-funded by Agent in respect of a period after which Agent has vacated the Closing Store.

5.3 Security. In order to secure Agent's obligations under this Agreement to pay the balance of the Guaranteed Amount, within one business day following the Payment Date, Agent shall furnish Merchant, in form and substance and from an issuer reasonably acceptable to Merchant, an irrevocable standby letter of credit naming Merchant and Richter as beneficiary in the aggregate original face amount equal to the sum of [redacted] percent [redacted] of the estimated Guaranteed Amount (the "**Letter of Credit**"). As and when the Agent pays the balance of the Guaranteed Amount pursuant to Section 4.3(b), the Letter of Credit shall be reduced, from time to time, to an amount that the parties mutually agree upon, but in any event, not less than an estimate of three weeks of Expenses. The Letter of Credit shall have an expiry date of no earlier than 60 days after the Sale Termination Date. Unless the parties shall have mutually agreed that they have paid all amounts contemplated by the Final Reconciliation under this Agreement (or the Court has determined that such payments have been made), then, at least five days after such date Merchant shall receive an amendment to the Letter of Credit solely extending (or further extending, as the case may be) the expiry date by at least 60 days. If Merchant fails to receive such amendment to the Letter of Credit no later than five days before the expiry date, then Merchant shall be permitted to draw the full amount under the Letter of Credit to hold as security for amounts that may become due and payable to Merchant. In the event that Agent, after receipt of five Business Days' written notice, fails to pay an undisputed portion of the amounts owing hereunder (include any Expenses), Merchant may draw on the Letter of Credit in an amount equal to the unpaid, past due amount owing.

Section 6. Merchandise

6.1 Merchandise Subject to this Agreement.

(a) For purposes of this Agreement, including, without limitation, the calculation of the Guaranteed Amount, "**Merchandise**" shall mean: (i) all new, finished, first-quality goods inventory that is owned by Merchant and located at the Closing Stores as of the Sale Commencement Date; (ii) Defective Merchandise, (iii) all Distribution Centre Merchandise and In-Transit Merchandise received at the Closing Stores no later than the tenth (10th) day after the Sale Commencement Date, provided that if such goods are received at the Closing Stores after such 10 day period, but on or before the thirtieth (30th) day after the Sale Commencement Date (the "**Receipt Deadline**"), such goods shall be included in the Sale as Merchandise subject to the adjustment in Section 4.1(c); and (iv) Pre-Sale Returned Merchandise which is saleable as first quality merchandise and received

during the Sale Term pursuant to Section 9.5 hereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Merchandise shall not include: (1) goods held by Merchant on memo, on consignment, or as bailee, unless otherwise agreed to by Merchant and Agent or which belong to sublessees, licensees, department lessees, or concessionaires of Merchant; (2) Pre-Sale Returned Merchandise which is not saleable as first quality merchandise and would otherwise have been Excluded Defective Merchandise, whether returned during or after the Sale Term; (3) Excluded Defective Merchandise; and (4) any Distribution Centre Merchandise and In-Transit Merchandise received after the Receipt Deadline (collectively, the "**Excluded Merchandise**"). As used in this Agreement the following terms have the respective meanings set forth below:

(i) "**Defective Merchandise**" means any item which is not finished, first quality inventory that is saleable in the ordinary course. Examples of Defective Merchandise include but are limited to goods that are used, damaged, defective, scratched, dented, on display, out of box, out of season, related to a holiday outside of the Sale Term, worn, faded, torn, soiled or affected by other similar defects rendering it not first quality and for greater certainty, excludes Excluded Defective Merchandise.

(ii) "**Excluded Defective Merchandise**" shall mean (i) those items of Defective Merchandise that are not saleable in the ordinary course because they are so damaged or defective that they cannot reasonably be used for their intended purpose; (ii) items that are missing a component, mismatched, parts, typically sold as a set which are incomplete, mis-sized pairs, or gift with purchase items not ordinarily sold separately; (iii) goods with an expiration, sell by, or similar date that is prior to or during the Sale Term, including out-of-date newspapers, periodicals, or magazines; and (iv) those items of Defective Merchandise for which Merchant and Agent cannot agree upon a Cost Value.

(iii) "**Distribution Centre Merchandise**" means any item of Merchandise located at Merchant's Distribution Centres and reflected in the Cost Files.

(iv) "**In-Transit Merchandise**" means items of inventory that were ordered by Merchant in the ordinary course of business as identified on **Exhibit 6.1(a)(iv)** to be provided prior to the Sale Commencement Date, which inventory was in-transit to the Closing Stores or Distribution Centres as of the Sale Commencement Date.

6.2 Valuation.

(a) For purposes of this Agreement, "**Cost Value**" shall mean with respect to each item of Merchandise, the lower of the lowest of (i) the actual cost; (ii) the cost as reflected in the column named "Std Cost" in the merchandise file named "Inventory by SKU – December 2016 REVISED.mdb" and any other due diligence files or subsequent update (the "**Cost Files**") or (iii) the Retail Price;

provided, however, that the Cost Value of Defective Merchandise shall be dealt with in accordance with Section 6.2(d) below. If there is a discrepancy between the merchandise file named "Inventory by SKU – December 2016 REVISED.mdb" and any subsequent file in the Cost Files, the lowest actual SKU level cost for such item of Merchandise as reflected in the Cost Files shall apply.

(b) Merchant represents, and Agent acknowledges, that the Cost Files do not account for any Excluded Pricing Adjustments, and no such adjustments shall be taken into account in determining the Cost Value of any item of Merchandise.

(c) For purposes of this Agreement, the term "**Excluded Price Adjustments**" means the following discounts or price adjustments offered by the Merchant: (i) point of sale discounts or similar adjustments regardless of duration on the Sale Commencement Date; (ii) employee discounts; (iii) adjustments for damaged, defective or "as-is" items; and (iv) ticketing or marking errors; or customer specific, temporary, or employee non-product specific discounts or pricing accommodations.

(d) For purposes of determining the Cost Value of Defective Merchandise, such Cost Value shall be mutually agreed to by Agent and Merchant. If Agent and Merchant are unable to mutually agree on the Cost Value of any one or more items of Defective Merchandise, such items shall be Excluded Defective Merchandise.

6.3 Excluded Goods. Merchant shall retain all rights and responsibility for any goods not included as "**Merchandise**" hereunder, including, without limitation, the Excluded Merchandise. If Merchant elects on the first day of the Sale Term, and provided Merchant and Agent have mutually agreed on price and means to sell such items, Agent shall accept those goods not included as "**Merchandise**" hereunder and as identified by Merchant for sale as "**Merchant Consignment Goods**". Election by the Merchant to include Merchant Consignment Goods in the Sale constitutes a representation and warranty by Merchant that it is entitled to sell such goods and to allocate the proceeds of such sale as provided for in this Agreement. The Agent shall retain [redacted] percent [redacted] of the sale price (less [redacted] percent [redacted] of applicable Sales Taxes) for all sales of Merchant Consignment Goods, and Merchant shall receive [redacted] percent [redacted] of the sale price, plus [redacted] percent [redacted] of applicable Sales Taxes in respect of such sales. Merchant shall receive its share of the receipts of sales of Merchant Consignment Goods on a weekly basis, immediately following the weekly reconciliation by Merchant and Agent pursuant to Section 4.6(a) hereof. If Merchant does not elect to have Agent sell such goods not included as Merchandise, then all such items will be removed by Merchant from the Closing Stores at its expense as soon as practicable after the date hereof. Except as expressly provided in this Section 6.3, Agent shall have no cost, expense or responsibility in connection with any goods not included in Merchandise, including but not limited to, sales commissions and percentage rent.

Strictly Confidential

Section 7. Sale Term

7.1 Term. The Sale shall commence at the Closing Stores on the first day following issuance of the Approval Order, but in no event later than February 4, 2017 absent Agent's express written consent (the "**Sale Commencement Date**"). Agent shall complete the Sale and vacate each Closing Store's premises in favour of Merchant or its representative or assignee on or before April 30, 2017 (the "**Sale Termination Date**"). The period from the Sale Commencement Date to the Sale Termination Date shall be referred to herein as the "**Sale Term**." Agent may on at least seven (7) days' notice to Merchant earlier terminate the Sale at any Closing Store in its sole discretion. If Agent intends to vacate a Closing Store prior to the Sale Termination Date, Agent shall provide Merchant with not less than seven (7) days' advance written notice thereof (as to each such Closing Store, as applicable, the "**Vacate Date**") For greater certainty, the Vacate Date shall not be later than the Sale Termination Date and it being understood that the Agent's obligations to pay all Expenses, including Occupancy Expenses and all accrued and unpaid Expenses that become due and payable after the Sale Term, for each Store subject to a Vacate Notice shall continue until the applicable Vacate Date for such Store; provided, however, that, with respect to Occupancy Expenses, the Agent's obligations to pay all Occupancy Expenses for each Store shall continue until the 15th of a calendar month if the Vacate Notice applicable to each such Store is provided on or before the 8th day of such calendar month.

7.2 Vacating the Closing Stores. Subject to the terms of Section 7.1 hereof, on each Vacate Date and on the Sale Termination Date (as applicable), Agent shall vacate each Closing Store in favor of Merchant or its representatives or assignee, remove all Remaining Merchandise (subject to the right to abandon, neatly in place, the FF&E) and leave the applicable Closing Stores in an orderly and "broom swept" condition. Agent agrees that it shall be obligated to forthwith repair any damage caused by Agent (or any representative, agent or licensee thereof) to any Closing Store, ordinary wear and tear excepted. Agent's obligations to pay Occupancy Expenses, for each Closing Store shall be limited to the period prior to and including the applicable Vacate Date for such Closing Store. All assets of Merchant not used by Agent in the conduct of the Sale (e.g. FF&E, supplies, etc.) shall be returned by Agent to Merchant or left at the Closing Stores, as applicable, unless otherwise disposed of through no fault of Agent. Where reference is made in this Section 7 to vacating the Closing Stores, such shall mean vacating the Closing Stores, in favor of Merchant, its representatives or assignee and shall not mean vacating possession or disclaimer of lease in favor of the landlord or owner of the Closing Store premises, such lease being the property of Merchant.

Section 8. Sale Proceeds

8.1 Proceeds. For purposes of this Agreement, "**Proceeds**" shall mean the total amount (in dollars) of (i) all sales of Merchandise excluding Sales Taxes on such sales; (ii) all proceeds of Merchant's insurance (net of any deductible) directly attributable to loss or damage to Merchandise or loss of cash arising from events occurring during the Sale Term; and (iii) all proceeds from the disposition of Remaining Merchandise. "**Gross Sale Proceeds**" shall mean Proceeds plus Sales Taxes on such sales. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, "Proceeds" shall be exclusive of (i) Sales Taxes, and (ii) returns, allowances and customer credits.

8.2 Credit Card Proceeds. Agent shall have the right (but not the obligation) during the Sale Term to use Merchant's credit card facilities (including Merchant's credit card terminals and processor(s), credit card processor coding, merchant identification number(s) and existing bank accounts) for credit card Proceeds relating solely to the Sale (collectively, the "**Credit Card Processing Facilities**"); provided, however, Agent shall have the right to obtain Agent's own merchant identification numbers and bank accounts following the payment of the Initial Guaranty Payment on the Sale Commencement Date and all other amounts payable to Merchant on such date. To the extent that Agent uses Merchant's existing Credit Card Processing Facilities, Agent shall comply with all of Merchant's existing agreements with persons providing such Credit Card Processing Facilities. To the extent Agent so elects, Merchant shall exercise commercially reasonable efforts to assist Agent in obtaining such merchant identification number and bank accounts and shall update their systems to recognize and accept such merchant identification numbers and Merchant shall process credit card transactions on behalf of Agent and for Agent's account, applying customary practices and procedures. To the extent available, Agent shall have the right to accept Merchant's proprietary card. Without limiting the foregoing, Merchant shall cooperate with Agent to down-load data from all credit card terminals each day during the Sale Term and to effect settlement with Merchant's credit card processor(s) and shall take such other actions necessary to process credit card transactions on behalf of Agent under Merchant's identification number(s). Merchant shall not be responsible for and Agent shall pay as an Expense hereunder, all credit card fees, charges and chargebacks related to the Sale, whether received during or after the Sale Term. For greater certainty, the FF&E Proceeds do not constitute "Proceeds" as such term is defined herein.

Section 9. Conduct of the Sale

9.1 Rights of Agent. Subject to the issuance of Approval Order by the Court, Agent shall be permitted to conduct the Sale throughout the Sale Term in a manner consistent with (a) applicable laws and regulations, (b) the leases and other occupancy agreements relating to the Closing Stores, except as amended by Court order or agreement of the applicable landlord, (c) the sale guidelines annexed hereto as **Exhibit 9.1**, as the same may be modified and approved by the Court, subject to Agent's approval, acting reasonably ("**Sale Guidelines**") and (d) the terms of this Agreement. In addition to any other rights granted to Agent hereunder, in conducting the Sale, Agent, in the exercise of its sole discretion, but expressly subject in all cases to the restrictions set out above, shall have the right:

(a) to establish Closing Stores' hours, which are consistent with the terms of applicable leases, mortgages or other occupancy agreements and local laws or regulations;

(b) subject to Section 4.3 hereof and any requisite consents, to use without charge during the Sale Term (except where otherwise designated as an Expense pursuant to Section 5.1 hereof), all Owned FF&E and other FF&E, advertising materials, Merchant website, Merchant social media accounts (but for greater certainty, the costs or amounts payable to third parties relating to an email blast out of the ordinary course of business shall be an Expense), bank accounts, customer lists and mailing lists, Closing Store level (and to the extent available, corporate) point of sale systems and equipment and computer hardware and software, existing

supplies located at the Closing Stores, intangible assets (including Merchant's names, logos, trademarks and tax identification numbers), Closing Stores' keys, case keys, security codes, and safe and lock combinations required to gain access to and operate the Closing Stores, and any other assets of Merchant located at the Closing Stores (whether owned, leased, or licensed) consistent with applicable terms of leases or licenses. Agent shall exercise due care and return to Merchant immediately at the end of the Sale (or leave in the vacated Stores) all materials and supplies except materials or supplies expended;

(c) subject to Section 4.3 hereof, to use without charge (except as otherwise provided in Section 5.1 hereof) all of the Merchant's assets located at the Closing Stores or used in the ordinary course of business at the Closing Stores, including but not limited to Merchant's central office facilities, POS systems, central administrative services and personnel to process payroll, perform MIS and provide other central office services necessary for the Sale to the extent that such services are normally provided by Merchant in house at no cost to the Agent (except as otherwise provided in Section 5.1 hereof) and the Merchant has the obligation to provide such facilities, systems, services and personnel; provided, however, that in the event Agent requests Merchant to provide services other than those normally provided to the Closing Stores and relating to the sale of Merchandise by Merchant in the ordinary course of business and as expressly contemplated by this Agreement, Agent shall be responsible to reimburse Merchant for actual incremental cost of such services incurred by Merchant as an Expense of the Sale hereunder;

(d) to establish Sale prices and implement advertising, signage (including exterior banners and signs), and promotional programs consistent with the sale theme described herein, and as otherwise provided in the Approval Order and the Sale Guidelines, as and where applicable (including, without limitation, by means of media advertising, A-frame, offsite signage and similar signage, and use of sign walkers); and

(e) to transfer as an Expense, Merchandise between and among the Closing Stores.

9.2 Terms of Sales to Customers. Subject to Agent's compliance with the Approval Order and Sale Guidelines, all sales of Merchandise, and Owned FF&E will be "final sales" (and the same shall be printed or stamped on customer receipts) and "as is, where is" and all advertisements and sales receipts will reflect the same. Agent shall not warrant the Merchandise or Owned FF&E in any manner, but will, to the extent legally permissible, pass on all manufacturers' warranties to customers. All sales will be made only for cash or, nationally recognized bank credit and debit cards.

9.3 Sales Taxes. During the Sale Term, all Sales Taxes attributable to the sales of Merchandise as indicated on the Merchant's point of sale equipment shall be added to the sales price of Merchandise and collected by Agent at the time of sale on Merchant's behalf, and deposited in the Merchant's Designated Deposit Accounts for further deposit into the Sales Tax Account. Provided that Agent has collected all Sales Taxes during the Sale and remitted the

proceeds thereof to Merchant, Agent shall have no further obligation to Merchant, Richter, HUK10, any other lender, any taxing authority, or any other party. Merchant shall promptly pay all Sales Taxes and file all applicable reports and documents required by the applicable taxing authorities. Merchant will be given access to the computation of gross receipts for verification of all such Sales Tax collections. Provided Agent performs its responsibilities in accordance with this Section 9.3, Merchant shall indemnify and hold harmless Agent from and against any and all costs, including, but not limited to, reasonable legal fees, investigation and legal expenses, assessments, claims, demands, actions, proceedings, fines or penalties which Agent sustains or incurs as a result or consequence of the failure by Merchant to promptly pay such taxes to the proper taxing authorities and/or the failure by Merchant to promptly file with such taxing authorities all reports and other documents required, by applicable law, to be filed with or delivered to such taxing authorities. If Agent fails to perform its responsibilities in accordance with this Section 9.3, and provided Merchant complies with its obligations in accordance with this Section 9.3, Agent shall indemnify and hold harmless Merchant from and against any and all costs including, but not limited to, reasonable legal fees, investigation and legal expenses, assessments, claims, demands, actions, proceedings, fines or penalties which Merchant sustains or incurs as a result or consequence of the failure by Agent to collect Sales Taxes, remit to Merchant, and/or, to the extent Agent is required hereunder to prepare reports and other documents, the failure by Agent to promptly deliver any and all reports and other documents required to enable Merchant to file any requisite returns with such taxing authorities. These indemnities shall continue in full force and effect subsequent to and notwithstanding the expiration of termination of this Agreement. Without limiting the generality of this Section 9.3(a), it is hereby agreed that, as Agent is conducting the Sale solely as agent for the Merchant, various payments that this Agreement contemplates that one party may make to the other party (including the payment by Agent of the Guaranteed Amount) do not represent the sale of tangible personal property and, accordingly, are not subject to Sales Taxes.

9.4 Supplies. Agent shall have the right to use all existing supplies necessary to conduct the Sale (e.g., boxes, bags, twine, merchandise credits or the like) located at the Closing Stores at no charge to Agent. In the event that additional supplies are required in any of the Closing Stores during the Sale, the acquisition of such additional supplies shall be the responsibility of Agent as an Expense; provided, however, that Merchant shall assist Agent in obtaining supplies from Merchant's vendors at Merchant's cost.

9.5 Returns of Merchandise. During the Sale Term, and only at the Closing Stores, Agent shall accept returns of merchandise sold by Merchant prior to the Sale Commencement Date: (i) in accordance with Merchant's return/exchange policy in effect at the time of such purchase; and (ii) only for the first twenty-one (21) days after the Sale Commencement Date (the "**Pre-Sale Returned Merchandise**"). To the extent that any item of Pre-Sale Returned Merchandise is saleable as first-quality merchandise and is received during the Sale Term, then such item shall be included in the Sale and as Merchandise at the Cost Value as adjusted by the prevailing discount as described in Section 4.1(c). To the extent that any item of Pre-Sale Returned Merchandise is returned is not saleable first quality merchandise or is received after the Sale Term, then such item shall form part of the Excluded Merchandise under this Agreement. The aggregate Cost Value of the Merchandise shall be increased by the applicable Cost Value of any Pre-Sale Returned Merchandise (as adjusted by the prevailing discount as described in Section 4.1(c)) included in Merchandise as provided for in this Section 9.5. Agent shall reimburse

customers for Pre-Sale Returned Merchandise in the same tender as such item was purchased (as the case may be, the "Refund"). Merchant shall promptly reimburse Agent in cash for any Refunds Agent is required to issue to customers in respect of any Pre-Sale Returned Merchandise as part of the weekly reconciliation process. To the extent that Merchant is required to reimburse Agent for Refunds to customers in respect of any Pre-Sale Returned Merchandise, such amounts shall not reduce Proceeds under this Agreement. Any Pre-Sale Returned Merchandise not included in Merchandise shall be disposed of by Agent in accordance with instructions received from Merchant or, in the absence of such instructions, returned to Merchant at the end of the Sale Term.

9.6 Gift Certificates. During the Sale Term, Agent shall be entitled to accept gift certificates, gift cards, or Merchandise credits issued by Merchant prior to the Sale Commencement Date if directed by Merchant for the first thirty (30) days after the Sale Commencement Date. No gift certificates, gift cards or Merchandise credits shall be issued by Agent during the Sale Term. Merchant shall promptly reimburse Agent in cash in the amount of such gift certificates, gift cards or merchandise cards so honoured.

9.7 Force Majeure. If any casualty, act of war or terrorism, or act of God (excluding a snow or ice storm) prevents or substantially inhibits the conduct of business in the ordinary course at any Closing Store for more than five (5) days, such Closing Store and the Merchandise located at such Closing Store shall, in Agent's discretion, be eliminated from the Sale and considered to be deleted from this Agreement as of the date of such event, and Agent and Merchant shall have no further rights or obligations hereunder with respect thereto; provided, however, that (i) subject to the terms of Section 8.1 above, the proceeds of any insurance attributable to such Merchandise shall constitute Proceeds hereunder, and (ii) the Guaranteed Amount shall be reduced to account for any Merchandise eliminated from the Sale which is not the subject of insurance proceeds, and Merchant, shall reimburse Agent for the amount the Guaranteed Amount is so reduced prior to the end of the Sale Term. Merchant's obligation to reimburse Agent shall be deemed to be an overpayment and the obligation to reimburse same to Agent shall be secured by the Agent's Charge.

9.8 Merchant's Right to Monitor. In addition to Merchant's right to review Agent's books and records relating to the Sale under Section 4.6(b), Merchant shall have the right to monitor the Sale and activities attendant thereto and to be present in the Closing Stores during the hours when the Closing Stores are open for business; provided, however, that Merchant's presence does not unreasonably disrupt the conduct of the Sale. Merchant shall also have a right of access to the Closing Stores at any time in the event of an emergency situation and shall promptly notify Agent of such emergency.

9.9 Richter's Right to Monitor. In addition to Richter's right to review Agent's books and records relating to the Sale under Section 4.6(b), Richter shall have the right but not the obligation to monitor the Sale and activities attendant thereto and to be present in the Closing Stores during the hours when the Closing Stores are open for business; provided, however, that Richter's presence does not unreasonably disrupt the conduct of the Sale. Richter shall also have a right of access to the Closing Stores at any time in the event of an emergency situation and shall promptly notify Agent of such emergency

Section 10. Employee Matters

10.1 Merchant's Employees. Merchant shall use commercially reasonable efforts to make available and Agent may use Merchant's store-level employees in the conduct of the Sale to the extent Agent in its sole discretion deems expedient. Agent may recommend to Merchant the selection and scheduling of the number and type of Merchant's employees to assist with the conduct of the Sale. Merchant shall use commercially reasonable efforts (which shall not include payment of any additional amounts above current employee compensation) to make all of Merchant's employees at the Closing Stores available to Agent for the Sale. Agent shall assist Merchant in identifying any such store-level employees to be used in connection with the Sale (each such employee, a "**Retained Employee**") prior to the Sale Commencement Date. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Merchant's employees shall at all times remain employees of Merchant and shall not be considered or deemed to be employees of Agent. Merchant and Agent agree that except to the extent that the amount of wages and benefits of Retained Employees constitute Expenses to be reimbursed by Agent to Merchant hereunder, nothing contained in this Agreement and none of Agent's actions taken in respect of the Sale shall be deemed to constitute an assumption by Agent of any of Merchant's obligations relating to any of Merchant's employees including, without limitation, Excluded Benefits, notice and other termination type claims and obligations, or any other amounts required to be paid by statute or law; nor shall Agent become liable under any employment agreement or be deemed a related, joint or successor employer with respect to any of such employees. Agent shall use commercially reasonable efforts to comply in the conduct of the Sale with all of Merchant's employee rules, regulations, guidelines and policies which have been provided to Agent in writing. Merchant shall not, without the prior consent of Agent, raise the salary or wages or increase the benefits for, or pay any bonuses or other extraordinary payments to, any of the Retained Employees prior to the Sale Termination Date. If the number of Retained Employees made available to Agent pursuant to this Section 10.1 is insufficient to effectively run the Sale as determined by Agent in its sole discretion, Agent may request that Merchant engage additional temporary contract personnel on a per diem basis, and Merchant shall use reasonable commercial efforts to fulfill such request. If Merchant fails to facilitate the engagement of sufficient Retained Employees and temporary contract personnel as requested by Agent hereunder, Agent may engage such temporary personnel and all related costs and expenses shall constitute Expenses of Agent under this Agreement.

10.2 Termination of Employees By Merchant. All responsibility for hiring and firing and supervision of the conduct of the Retained Employees shall rest with Merchant. Agent may in its discretion stop using any Retained Employee at any time during the Sale. In the event Agent determines to discontinue its use of any Retained Employee in connection with the conduct of the Sale, Agent will provide written notice to Merchant at least seven (7) days prior thereto, except for discontinuance of use "for cause" (such as dishonesty, fraud or breach of employee duties), in which event no prior notice to Merchant shall be required, provided Agent shall notify Merchant as soon as practicable prior to such discontinuance of use so that Merchant can coordinate the termination of such Retained Employee and Agent shall provide Merchant with all supporting documents or information so that Merchant can arrange for the termination of such Retained Employee. From and after the date of this Agreement and until the Sale Termination Date, Merchant shall not transfer or terminate Retained Employees (except "for cause") without Agent's prior consent (which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld).

10.3 Payroll Matters. During the Sale Term, Merchant shall process and pay any amounts such as the Base Payroll, commissions, and all related payroll taxes, worker's compensation, employment and unemployment insurance, and benefits, including accruing vacation pay (but not arrears) for all Retained Employees or temporary contract personnel that may be reimbursed by Agent as per Section 5.1 hereof (except for employees and independent contractors hired by Agent) in accordance with its usual and customary procedures.

10.4 Employee Incentive Plan. Agent shall have the right to elect to pay, as an Expense, retention bonuses (each an "**Incentive Plan**") (which bonuses shall be inclusive of payroll taxes but as to which no benefits shall be payable), up to a maximum aggregate amount equal to [redacted] percent [redacted] of aggregate Base Payroll, to selected Retained Employees who do not voluntarily leave employment and are not terminated "for cause". Subject only to limitation of [redacted] percent [redacted] of aggregate Base Payroll, the actual amount of the Incentive Plan to be paid to any Retained Employee shall be in an amount to be determined by Agent, and shall be payable within thirty (30) days after the Sale Termination Date, and shall be processed through Merchant's payroll system. Agent shall provide Merchant with a copy of Agent's Incentive Plan at least one (1) Business Day prior to its implementation.

Section 11. Conditions Precedent

The willingness of Merchant and Agent to enter into the transactions contemplated under this Agreement and Richter to acknowledge and agree to the terms of this Agreement is directly conditional upon the satisfaction of the following conditions at the time or during the time periods indicated, unless specifically waived in writing by the applicable party:

(a) All representations and warranties of Merchant and Agent hereunder shall be true and correct in all material respects and no Event of Default shall have occurred at and as of the date hereof and as of the Sale Commencement Date;

(b) On or before the Outside Date, the Court shall have issued the Appointment Order and the Approval Order, in a form and substance acceptable to Merchant, Agent, and Richter all acting reasonably, and the Appointment Order and Approval Order shall not have been stayed, varied, or vacated nor shall an application to restrain or prohibit the completion of the Sale be pending.

Section 12. Representations, Warranties, Covenants and Acknowledgements

12.1 Merchant's Representations, Warranties and Covenants. Merchant hereby represents, warrants and covenants to Agent as follows:

(a) Merchant (i) is a corporation duly incorporated under the laws of the Province of Ontario, and (ii) is and during the Sale Term will continue to be, duly authorized, and qualified to do business and in good standing in each jurisdiction where the nature of its business or properties requires such qualification, including all jurisdictions in which the Closing Stores are located, except, in each case, to the extent that the failure to be in good standing or so qualified could not reasonably be expected to have a material adverse effect on the ability of Merchant to execute and deliver this Agreement and perform fully its obligations hereunder. Merchant

has all requisite corporate power and authority to own, lease and operate the assets and properties of Merchant and to carry on Merchant's business as presently conducted.

(b) Subject to the issuance of the Approval Order and pursuant to the order of the Court: (i) Merchant has the right, power and authority to execute and deliver this Agreement and each other document and agreement contemplated hereby (collectively, together with this Agreement, the "**Agency Documents**") and to perform the obligations of Merchant thereunder; (ii) all necessary action has been taken by or on behalf of Merchant to authorize the execution and delivery by Merchant of the Agency Documents and no further consent or approval is required for Merchant to enter into and deliver the Agency Documents, to perform the obligations thereunder, and to consummate the Sale; (iii) each of the Agency Documents has been duly executed and delivered by or on behalf of Merchant and constitutes the legal, valid and binding obligation of Merchant enforceable in accordance with its terms; and (iv) no court order or decree of any federal, state, local, or provincial governmental authority or regulatory body is in effect that would prevent or materially impair, or is required for Merchant's consummation of, the transactions contemplated by this Agreement.

(c) Merchant has maintained its pricing files (including the Cost Files) in the ordinary course of business and prices charged to the public for goods are the same in all material respects as set forth in such pricing files for the periods indicated therein (without consideration of any point of sale markdowns), and all pricing files and the Cost Files and all records relating thereto are true and accurate in all material respects as to the actual cost recognized on Merchant's books and records for the goods referred to therein and as to the selling prices to the public for such goods, without consideration of any point of sale markdowns, as of the dates and for the periods indicated therein. Merchant represents that (i) the ticketed prices of all items of Merchandise do not and shall not include any Sales Taxes and (ii) all cash registers located at the Closing Stores are programmed to correctly compute all Sales Taxes required to be paid by the customer under applicable law, as such calculations have been identified to Merchant by its retained service provider.

(d) From execution of this Agreement until the Sale Commencement Date, Merchant has and shall continue to ticket or mark all items of inventory received at the Closing Stores prior to the Sale Commencement Date in a manner consistent with Merchant's ordinary course past practice and policies relative to pricing and marking inventory. Merchant shall be responsible for ticketing Merchandise to be transferred to the Closing Stores during the Sale Term. Merchant shall not remove from merchandise any sale stickers or other markings indicating items are on sale prior to the Sale Commencement Date, and have not raised, and will not raise, prices of any Merchandise in contemplation of the Sale. From January 1, 2017 to the Sale Commencement Date, the Merchant has not and will not take additional permanent markdowns.

(e) Merchant will continue to provide Agent reasonable access to all pricing and cost files, computer hardware, software and data files, inter-stores transfer logs, markdown schedules, invoices, style runs and all other documents relative to the price, mix and quantities of inventory located at the Closing Stores, and will provide the services that constitute the Central Services Expenses for the duration of the Sale Term.

(f) Subject to the provisions of the Appointment Order, the Approval Order and the terms of this Agreement, throughout the Sale Term, Agent shall have the right to and the Merchant shall provide the unencumbered use and occupancy of, and peaceful and quiet possession of, each of the Closing Stores, the FF&E currently located at the Closing Stores and the utilities and other services provided at the Closing Stores. Merchant shall, throughout the Sale Term, and to the extent within its control, maintain in good working order, condition and repair all cash registers, heating systems, air conditioning systems, and all other mechanical devices necessary for the conduct of the Sale at the Closing Stores.

(g) Merchant has not taken, and shall not throughout the Sale Term take, any action, the result of which is to materially increase the cost of operating the Sale including, without limitation, increasing salaries, wages or other amounts payable to employees, except to the extent that an employee was due an annual raise.

(h) Merchant is not party to any collective bargaining agreements with its employees at the Closing Stores and no labour unions represent Merchant's employees at the Closing Stores and as at the date of this Agreement, there are no strikes, work stoppages or other labour disruptions affecting the Closing Stores or Merchant's central office facilities.

(i) Except as otherwise provided for in the Appointment Order, the Merchant agrees to operate its business at the Closing Stores in all respects from the date of this Agreement to the Sale Commencement Date in the ordinary course.

(j) Merchant has provided and will continue to provide Agent with all available sales, financial, inventory and other information that Agent has requested and hereafter may request relevant to the transaction contemplated under this Agreement to the extent that such information is in the Merchant's possession.

(k) Since January 1, 2017, Merchant has operated, and, absent a *bona fide* dispute, through the Sale Commencement Date, Merchant covenants to continue to operate, the Closing Stores in all material respects in the ordinary course of business including without limitation by: (i) selling inventory during such period at customary prices consistent with the ordinary course of business; (ii) not promoting or advertising any sales or in-store promotions (including POS promotions) to the public outside of the Merchant's ordinary course of business; (iii) except as may occur in the ordinary course of business, not returning inventory to vendors and not transferring inventory or supplies out of or to the Closing Stores; (iv) except as may occur in the ordinary course of business, not

making any management personnel moves or changes at the Closing Stores. Prior to the Sale Commencement Date, Merchant shall not offer any promotions or discounts at any of the Closing Stores, or at Merchant's retail locations (other than the Closing Stores) to the extent there are any such other locations, except as detailed on **Exhibit 12.1(k)**.

12.2 Agent's Representations, Warranties and Covenants. Agent hereby represents, warrants and covenants in favor of Merchant as follows:

(a) Each of the entities comprising the contractual joint venture that is the Agent hereunder is (i) a unlimited liability company, duly and validly existing and in good standing under the laws of the province of its organization, (ii) has all requisite power and authority to carry on its business as presently conducted in the jurisdictions where the Closing Stores are located and to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby and (iii) is and during the Sale Term will continue to be duly authorized and qualified to do business, and in good standing, in each jurisdiction where the nature of its business or properties requires such qualification.

(b) Agent has the right, power and authority to execute and deliver each of the Agency Documents to which it is a party and to perform its obligations thereunder. Agent has taken all necessary actions required to authorize the execution, delivery, and performance by Agent of the Agency Documents, and no further consent or approval is required on the part of Agent for Agent to enter into and deliver the Agency Documents and to perform its obligations thereunder and to consummate the Sale. Each of the Agency Documents has been duly executed and delivered by Agent and constitutes the legal, valid and binding obligation of Agent enforceable in accordance with its terms. No court order or decree of any federal, provincial, state or local governmental authority or regulatory body is in effect that would prevent or impair or is required for Agent's consummation of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement, and no consent of any Third Party which has not been obtained is required therefor other than as provided herein. No contract or other agreement to which Agent is a party or by which Agent is otherwise bound will prevent or impair the consummation of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement.

(c) No action, arbitration, suit, notice, or legal administrative or other proceeding before any court or governmental body has been instituted by or against Agent, or has been settled or resolved, or to Agent's knowledge, has been threatened against or affects Agent, which questions the validity of this Agreement or any action taken or to be taken by Agent in connection with this Agreement, or which if adversely determined, would have a material adverse effect upon Agent's ability to perform its obligations under this Agreement.

(d) The Sale shall be conducted in compliance with the terms of this Agreement, the Sale Guidelines and the Approval Order.

Strictly Confidential

Section 13. Insurance

13.1 Merchant's Liability Insurance. Merchant shall continue, at its expense, until the Sale Termination Date, in such amounts as it currently has in effect, or such other amounts as may be agreed to by the Merchant and the Agent, all of its liability insurance policies including, but not limited to, commercial general liability, products liability, comprehensive public liability, auto liability and umbrella liability insurance, covering injuries to persons and property in, or in connection with Merchant's operation of the Closing Stores, and shall cause Agent to be named an additional named insured with respect to all such policies. Prior to the Sale Commencement Date, Merchant shall, on a reasonable efforts basis, deliver to Agent certificates evidencing such insurance setting forth the duration thereof and naming Agent as an additional named insured, in form reasonably satisfactory to Agent. All such policies shall, on a reasonable efforts basis, require at least thirty (30) days' prior notice to Agent of cancellation, non-renewal or material change. In the event of a claim under any such policies Merchant shall be responsible for the payment of all deductibles, retentions or self-insured amounts to the extent said claim arises from or relates to the alleged acts or omissions of Merchant or its employees, agents (other than Agent's employees), or independent contractors (other than Agent and independent contractors hired by Agent in conjunction with the Sale).

13.2 Merchant's Casualty Insurance. Merchant shall continue until the Sale Termination Date, in such amounts as it currently has in effect, fire, flood, theft and extended coverage casualty insurance covering the Merchandise in a total amount equal to no less than the Cost Value thereof, which coverage shall be reduced from time to time to take into account the sale of Merchandise. In the event of a loss to the Merchandise on or after the date of this Agreement, the proceeds of such insurance attributable to the Merchandise (net of any deductible to be paid by Merchant) shall constitute Proceeds. Prior to the Sale Commencement Date, Merchant shall, on a reasonable efforts basis, deliver to Agent certificates evidencing such insurance setting forth the duration thereof and naming Agent as additional named insured, in form and substance reasonably satisfactory to Agent. All such policies shall, on a reasonable efforts basis, require at least thirty (30) days prior notice to Agent of cancellation, non-renewal or material change. Merchant shall not make any change in the amount of any deductibles or self-insurance amounts prior to the Sale Termination Date, without Agent's prior written consent.

13.3 Agent's Insurance. Agent shall maintain as an Expense throughout the Sale Term in such amounts as it currently has in effect, comprehensive public liability and automobile liability insurance policies covering injuries to persons and property in or in connection with Agent's agency at the Closing Stores and shall cause Merchant to be named an additional insured with respect to such policies. Prior to the Sale Commencement Date, Agent shall deliver to Merchant certificates evidencing such insurance policies, setting forth the duration thereof and naming Merchant as an additional insured, in form and substance reasonably satisfactory to Merchant. In the event of a claim under such policies Agent shall be responsible, as an Expense, for the payment of all deductibles, retentions or self-insured amounts thereunder, to the extent said claim arises from or relates to the alleged acts or omissions of Agent or Agent's employees, agents or independent contractors.

13.4 Worker's Compensation Insurance. Merchant shall continue to pay until the Sale Termination Date appropriate worker's compensation insurance (including employer liability insurance) covering all Retained Employees in compliance with all statutory requirements.

13.5 Risk of Loss. Without limiting any other provision of this Agreement, each of Richter and Merchant acknowledges that Agent is conducting the Sale on behalf of Merchant solely in the capacity of an agent, and that in such capacity (i) Agent shall not be deemed to be in possession or control of the Closing Stores or the assets located therein or associated therewith, or of Merchant' employees located at the Closing Stores, and (ii) except as expressly provided in this Agreement, Agent does not assume any of Merchant' obligations or liabilities with respect to any of the foregoing. Agent shall not be deemed to be a successor employer. Richter, Merchant and Agent agree that, subject to the terms of this Agreement, Merchant shall bear all responsibility for liability claims of customers, employees and other persons arising from events occurring related to the Sale during and after the Sale Term, except to the extent any such claim arises from the acts or omissions of Agent or its supervisors, agents, independent contractors, or employees (an "**Agent Claim**"). In the event of any liability claim other than an Agent Claim, Merchant shall administer such claim and shall present such claim to Merchant's liability insurance carrier in accordance with Merchant' policies and procedures existing immediately prior to the Sale Commencement Date, and shall provide a copy of the initial documentation relating to such claim to Agent at the address listed in this Agreement. To the extent that Merchant and Agent agree that a claim constitutes an Agent Claim or the parties cannot agree whether a claim constitutes an Agent Claim, each party shall present the claim to its own liability insurance carrier, and a copy of the initial claim documentation shall be delivered to the other party to the foregoing address.

Section 14. Indemnification

14.1 Merchant Indemnification to Agent. Merchant shall indemnify and hold Agent and its officers, directors, employees, agents and independent contractors (collectively, "**Agent Indemnified Parties**") harmless from and against all claims, demands, penalties, losses, liability or damage, including, without limitation, reasonable legal fees and expenses, asserted directly or indirectly against an Agent Indemnified Party resulting from, or related to:

(a) subject to Agent's performance and compliance with its obligations pursuant to Section 5.1(b), 5.1(c) and Section 10 hereof, any failure by Merchant to pay its employees any wages, salaries or benefits due to such employee during the Sale Term or other claims asserted against Agent by Merchant's employees resulting from Merchant's (and not Agent's) treatment of its employees;

(b) subject to Agent's compliance with its obligations under Section 9.3 hereof, any failure by Merchant to pay any Sales Taxes to the proper taxing authorities or to properly file with any taxing authorities any reports or documents required by applicable law to be filed in respect thereof;

(c) the gross negligence (including omissions) or willful misconduct of Merchant or any of its officers, directors, employees, agents (other than Agent) or representatives;

14.2 Merchant Indemnification to Richter. Merchant shall indemnify and hold Richter and its officers, directors, employees, agents and independent contractors (collectively, "**Richter Indemnified Parties**") harmless from and against all claims, demands, penalties, losses, liability or damage, including, without limitation, reasonable legal fees and expenses, asserted directly or indirectly against an Richter Indemnified Party resulting from, or related to:

(a) any failure by Merchant to pay its employees any wages, salaries or benefits due to such employee during the Sale Term or other claims asserted against Richter by Merchant's employees resulting from Merchant's (and not Richter's) treatment of its employees;

(b) any failure by Merchant to pay any Sales Taxes to the proper taxing authorities or to properly file with any taxing authorities any reports or documents required by applicable law to be filed in respect thereof;

(c) the gross negligence (including omissions) or willful misconduct of Merchant or any of its officers, directors, employees, agents (other than Richter) or representatives;

14.3 Agent Indemnification to Merchant. Agent shall indemnify and hold Merchant and its officers, directors, employees, agents and representatives ("**Merchant Indemnified Parties**") harmless from and against all claims, demands, penalties, losses, liability or damage, including, without limitation, reasonable legal fees and expenses, asserted directly or indirectly against a Merchant Indemnified Party resulting from, or related to:

(a) Agent's material breach of or failure to comply with any local, state, provincial or federal laws or regulations, or any of its agreements, covenants, representations or warranties contained in this Agreement or other Agency Document and any order of the Court relating to the Sale;

(b) any harassment, discrimination or violation of any laws or regulations or any other unlawful, tortious or otherwise actionable treatment of any customers, employees or agents of Merchant by Agent or any of its employees, agents, independent contractors or other officers, directors or representatives of Agent;

(c) any claims by any party engaged by Agent as an employee or independent contractor arising out of such engagement;

(d) any Sales Tax assessments (and penalties and interest arising therefrom or in respect thereof) in the event that Agent uses any system other than Merchant's point of sale system to compute Sales Taxes relating to the Sale as described in Section 9.3; and

(e) the gross negligence (including omissions) or willful misconduct of Agent or any of its officers, directors, employees, agents or representatives.

The foregoing indemnity is supplemental to and does not replace any of the other indemnities in this Agreement given by Agent, including, without limitation, the indemnities of Agent contained in Section 9.3 hereof.

14.4 [Reserved]

Section 15. Fixtures

(a) With respect to Owned FF&E, subject to the provisions of the Approval Order, Agent shall have the exclusive right to dispose of all of the Owned FF&E. Agent shall be entitled to receive (i) a commission equal to [redacted] percent [redacted] (the "**FF&E Commission**") of the proceeds from the sale of such Owned FF&E (net of Sales Taxes), plus (ii) reimbursement by Merchant of Agent's out of pocket expenses related to the disposition of the Owned FF&E which are not duplicative of the Expenses set out in Section 5.1 and are in accordance with a budget mutually agreed upon between Merchant and Agent. As of the Sale Termination Date, Agent may abandon, in place, in a neat and orderly manner any unsold Owned FF&E and any FF&E. The removal of any sold Owned FF&E shall be done in a manner consistent with the Sale Guidelines.

(b) All gross proceeds from the disposition of the Owned FF&E (collectively, the "**Gross FF&E Proceeds**"), shall be deposited in accordance with Section 4.7 above. From the Gross Sale Proceeds, Agent shall establish a holdback (the "**FF&E Holdback**") in the Agency Account in an amount equal to the Gross FF&E Proceeds, less the applicable FF&E Commission and applicable Sales Taxes subject to the Sales Tax Holdback in accordance with Section 4.7(b) hereof (being the "**Net FF&E Proceeds**"). Net FF&E Proceeds are to be remitted from the FF&E Holdback to Merchant pursuant to Section 4.3(c) hereof, as part of the weekly reconciliation conducted by the Parties pursuant to Section 4.6(a) of this Agreement.

(c) If Merchant elects to have Agent sell the Owned FF&E on a guaranteed basis, Merchant and Agent shall use good faith efforts to mutually agree upon the guaranteed amount (the "**Additional Guaranteed Amount**") on account of the sale of the Owned FF&E, which Additional Guaranteed Amount shall be paid by Agent on the Payment Date or within two (2) business days after mutual agreement with respect to such Additional Guaranteed Amount. In consideration for the payment of the Additional Guaranteed Amount, Agent shall be authorized to sell the Owned FF&E and retain all Gross FF&E Proceeds (net only of Sales Taxes) from the sale of all Owned FF&E for Agent's sole and exclusive benefit. Agent shall have the right to abandon any unsold Owned FF&E or FF&E, as provided herein.

Section 16. Events of Default

The following shall constitute "**Events of Default**" hereunder:

(a) Merchant or Agent shall fail to perform any of their respective material obligations hereunder, if such failure remains uncured seven (7) days after receipt of written notice thereof;

(b) Any representation or warranty made by Merchant or Agent proves untrue in any material respect as of the date; or

(c) Subject to Section 9.7, the Sale is terminated or materially interrupted or impaired at any Closing Store for any reason other than (i) an Event of Default by Agent; or (ii) any other material breach or action by Agent not authorized under this Agreement.

In the event of an Event of Default, the non-defaulting Party in the case of an Event of Default under subsection (a) or (b) or the Agent in the case of subsection (c) may, in its discretion, elect to terminate this Agreement, upon seven (7) Business Days' written notice to the other Party and pursue any and all rights and remedies and damages resulting from such Event of Default hereunder.

Section 17. Miscellaneous

17.1 Notices. All notices and communications provided for pursuant to this

Agreement shall be in writing, and sent by hand, by facsimile, electronic (PDF) transmission or courier delivery, as follows:

If to Agent:

Gordon Brothers Canada ULC
c/o Gordon Brothers Group, LLC
800 Boylston Street
27th Floor
Boston, MA 02199
Attention: Mackenzie Shea, Associate General Counsel
Email: mshea@gordonbrothers.com

and

Merchant Retail Solutions ULC
c/o Hilco Merchant Resources, LLC
5 Revere Drive
Suite 206
Northbrook, IL 60062
Attention: Ian Fredericks
Email: ifredericks@hilcoglobal.com

Strictly Confidential

With a mandated copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Agent's Canadian counsel	Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP Bay Adelaide Centre 333 Bay Street, Suite 2400 Toronto, ON M5H 2T6 Attn.: Stuart Brotman/Natasha De Cicco Email: sbrotman@fasken.com/ndecicco@fasken.com
If to Receiver:	Richter Advisory Group Inc. 181 Bay Street, 33rd Floor Toronto, ON M5J 2T3 Attn.: Pritesh Patel Tel: 416-642-9421 Fax: 416-488-3765 Email: ppatel@richter.ca

With a mandated copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Gowling WLG
1 First Canadian Place
100 King Street West
Suite 1600
Toronto, ON M5X 1G5
Attn.: David F.W. Cohen & Frank Lamie

Tel: 416-369-6667 / 416-862-3609
Email: david.cohen@gowlingwlg.com /
frank.lamie@gowlingwlg.com

If to Merchant:	HMV Canada Inc. 5401 Eglinton Avenue West, Suite 110 Etobicoke, ON M9C 5K6 Attn.: Nick Williams Email: nwilliams@hmv.ca

With a mandated copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Aird & Berlis LLP
Brookfield Place
181 Bay Street, Suite 1800
Toronto, ON M5J 2T9
Attn.: Steven Graff

Email: sgraff@airdberlis.com

17.2 Governing Law; Consent to Jurisdiction. This Agreement shall be governed and construed in accordance with the laws of the Province of Ontario and the federal laws of Canada applicable therein, without regard to conflicts of laws principles thereof. The parties hereto agree that the Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction to hear and finally determine any disputes arising from or under this Agreement, and by execution of this Agreement each party hereby irrevocably accepts and submits to the jurisdiction of such Court with respect to any such action or proceeding and to service of process by certified mail, return receipt requested to the address listed above for each party.

17.3 Amendments. This Agreement may not be modified except in a written instrument executed by each of the parties hereto.

17.4 No Waiver. No consent or waiver by any party, express or implied, to or of any breach or default by the other in the performance of its obligations hereunder shall be deemed or construed to be a consent or waiver to or of any other breach or default in the performance by such other party of the same or any other obligation of such party. Failure on the part of any party to complain of any act or failure to act by the other party or to declare the other party in default, irrespective of how long such failure continues, shall not constitute a waiver by such party of its rights hereunder.

17.5 Successors and Assigns; Merchant's Authority. This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and be binding upon Merchant and Agent, including, but not limited to, any trustee in bankruptcy or receiver or interim receiver thereof; provided, however, that this Agreement may not be assigned by either Party without the prior written consent of the other Party.

17.6 Subcontractors. Agent may utilize the services of subcontractors and or licensees in connection with the performance of its obligations hereunder.

17.7 Confidentiality. The terms of this Agreement, together with all information and documentation provided by the Merchant to the Agent pursuant to this Agreement, shall be confidential and subject to the terms and conditions of the confidentiality agreements between the Merchant and the Agent, except for disclosures which may be required by law or as Merchant considers appropriate, acting reasonably and in consultation with Agent, in connection with obtaining the Approval Order. Agent acknowledges and agrees that in connection with Merchant's application for the Approval Order, Merchant will file a copy of this Agreement with

the pricing information redacted and without **Exhibit 5.1(a)** to this Agreement and will seek an order sealing an unredacted copy of this Agreement, including such Exhibits.

17.8 Execution in Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in two (2) or more counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original and all of which together shall constitute but one agreement. This Agreement may be executed by facsimile or other electronic transmission, and such facsimile or electronic signature shall be treated as an original signature hereunder.

17.9 Section Headings. The headings of sections of this Agreement are inserted for convenience only and shall not be considered for the purpose of determining the meaning or legal effect of any provisions hereof.

17.10 Survival. All representations, warranties, covenants, agreements and indemnities made herein, by the parties hereto, shall be continuing, shall be considered to have been relied upon by the parties and shall survive the execution, delivery and performance of this Agreement.

17.11 Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the matters contemplated hereby and supersedes and cancels all prior agreements, including, but not limited to, all proposals, letters of intent or representations, written or oral, with respect thereto.

17.12 Choice of Language. The parties have specifically required that this Agreement and all related documents be drafted and executed in English. *Les parties aux présentes ont formellement demandé à ce que la présente convention et tous les documents auxquels celle-ci réfère soient rédigés et signés en langue anglaise.*

17.13 Further Assurances. The Merchant and the Agent shall each execute, acknowledge and deliver, or cause to be executed, acknowledged and delivered, at the cost and expense of the requesting party, such instruments and take such other actions as may be necessary or advisable to carry out their obligations under this Agreement, or any document, certificate or other instrument delivered pursuant hereto or thereto or required by applicable law.

17.14 Currency. Unless otherwise specified, all references to monetary amounts refer to Canadian dollars.

[SIGNATURES NEXT PAGE]

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Agent and Merchant have executed this Agreement as of the day and year first written above.

AGENT

GORDON BROTHERS CANADA ULC

By: _____
Name:
Title:

MERCHANT RETAIL SOLUTIONS ULC

By: _____
Name:
Title:

MERCHANT

HMV CANADA INC.

By: _____
Name:
Title:

ACKNOWLEDGED AND AGREED by the undersigned with effect as of the date first referred to above.

RICHTER ADVISORY GROUP INC., solely in its capacity as Court-appointed receiver of the assets, undertakings and properties of HMV Canada Inc., provided so appointed by the Court, and not in its corporate or personal capacity

By: _____
Name:
Title:

Strictly Confidential

Exhibits

1A	Closing Stores
1b	Distribution Centres
3.1	Approval Order
4.1(i)	Merchandise Threshold
4.1(j)	Cost Factor
5.1(a)	Occupancy Expenses
6.1(a)(iv)	In-Transit Merchandise*
9.1	Sale Guidelines
12.1(k)	Promotional Activity

*to be provided prior to Sale Commencement Date

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF PAYLESS SHOESOURCE CANADA INC. AND PAYLESS SHOESOURCE CANADA GP INC.

Court File No.

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

PROCEEDING COMMENCED AT TORONTO

BOOK OF AUTHORITIES
(CCAA INITIAL APPLICATION)

CASSELS BROCK & BLACKWELL LLP
2100 Scotia Plaza
40 King Street West
Toronto, ON M5H 3C2

Ryan Jacobs
Tel: 416.860.6465
Fax: 416.640.3189
rjacobs@casselsbrock.com

Jane Dietrich
Tel: 416.860.5223
Fax: 416.640.3144
jdietrich@casselsbrock.com

Natalie Levine
Tel: 416.860.6568
Fax: 416.640.3207
nlevine@casselsbrock.com

Lawyers for Payless ShoeSource Canada Inc., Payless ShoeSource Canada GP Inc. and Payless ShoeSource Canada LP